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Abstract 
Europe’s greatest challenges emanating from the Mediterranean Sea are irregular 
migration and maritime terrorism. These challenges have received great attention 
from the European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and 
beyond. In light of this, the EU and NATO as traditional and regional actors have 
adopted various approaches, initiatives and maritime operations to cope with these 
challenges. These operations include, among others, Operation Sophia for 
counter-migration and Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) for counter-terrorism. 
This thesis explores the current development of maritime security operations to 
combat terrorism and the migration crisis, and analyses how these initiatives play 
a role in security community-building process in the Mediterranean Sea. In 
particular, the thesis examines the application of the security community 
framework in maritime security through the enactment of maritime practices. The 
thesis provides a detailed analysis of the activities, actors and forms of 
cooperation constituting the EU and NATO’s practices to address maritime 
challenges in the Mediterranean Sea.  
This thesis adopts qualitative research methods to examine the expansion of the 
security community in the Mediterranean Sea by analysing the case studies of 
NATO and EU’s counter-terrorism and counter-migration initiatives. It examines 
the maritime policies, initiatives, and operations implemented by NATO and EU 
since 9/11 to combat these threats. Based on the repertoire of practices, the case 
studies examine the extent to which the security community is evidenced within 
the maritime activities. Findings from the case studies evidence the process of 
security community building, including through the practice of cooperative 
security and partnerships. In the conclusion chapter, the future research agenda for 
maritime studies and security community research is also explored. Ultimately, 
this thesis offers nuanced insights into the dynamics of security community 
research, contributing to the development of the framework into maritime security 
studies. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Mediterranean Sea: The Emerging Security Challenges 
1.1 Introduction 
In the modern era, international security has been associated not only with states 
and war but the emergence of transnational security isues, a non-military threats 
that cross borders and pose a challenge to the state authority. Complicating the 
picture is the fact that many transnational issues are driven by non-state actors, 
such as international terrorist organisations and smugglers. The spread of radical 
terrorist groups, the increase in cross-border drug trafficking, the potential 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the continued 
degradation of the environment may jeopardise the security of the states 
(Shearman and Sussex 2004: 3). In addition, these transnational threats do not 
only affect the land boundaries, but also have the potential to challenge the 
security of maritime domain.  
As the maritime realm is geographically vast and complex, it is 
consequently difficult to govern and as such, vulnerable to security threats 
(Germond and Grove 2010: 10). There are several issues which currently pose a 
challenge in the maritime domain such as piracy, maritime terrorism and possible 
attacks on shipping, irregular migration, the proliferation of WMD, human 
smuggling and drug trafficking (Boyer 2007: 77). These issues are not only 
significant for the coastal states, but also pose concern for the international 
community. In the post-Cold War era, the Mediterranean is at the centre of a 
security predicament and surrounded by areas of great instability. The dangers 
posed by terrorist organisations are preeminent particularly after 9/11 terrorist 
attacks, while another notable issue is the massive flow of migrants towards 
Europe and human trafficking. The Mediterranean Sea is also vulnerable to these 
security threats. Moreover, the adjacent Gulf of Aden is grappling with various 
threats and instability particularly piracy, it is consequently, may affect the 
security of the Mediterranean Sea. 
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The end of the Cold War has had a profound impact on the international 
system whereby it was widely assumed that peace and stability of the international 
system has been achieved (Greenberg et al. 2006: 1). This perception however has 
slowly declined with the recognition that global stability is undermined by the rise 
of transnational security challenges. There are security problems that arose as a 
consequence in the post-Cold War era which demonstrate the changing nature of 
conflict. In the past, security has been defined largely in a military context 
(Gillespie 1994: 13), though the post-Cold War era witnessed the potential of a 
wide variety of other threats to security. These new threats, aggravated by the 
increasing number of non-state actors required completely different approaches 
than those traditional defence that states have used for military aggression 
between nation states. Threats from non-state actors are more complex and 
perplexing because of their unrecognized identities, unidentified locations and the 
haphazard nature of their attacks.  
 The nature of the maritime environment contributes itself to a broad range 
of plausible attacks. Maritime environment covering the high seas that lie beyond 
any states jurisdiction makes it difficult to be monitored and regulated (Greenberg 
et al. 2006: 2). In addition, maritime environment also vulnerable to diverse 
potential attacks due to its growing importance as a trade and commerce routes. 
On the one hand, maritime terrorism is one of the challenges faced by Europe 
which has dominated its security debate since the horrific attacks of 9/11. The 
challenge of maritime terrorism is not a new phenomenon, rather it has started 
since early 1960s (Murphy 2007: 49). Despite numerous terrorist attacks on 
shipping at sea, however, cooperation and counter-measures to combat terrorism 
remained limited until the notable terrorist attack in 2001. On the other hand, the 
maritime domain has also increasingly received international attention as a front-
line area for irregular migration. The massive number of migrants’ flow via the 
sea has changed the dynamic of the security landscape, which is increasingly seen 
as a serious humanitarian problem (Calleya 2012: 85). Moreover, clandestine 
migration across the sea has also been increasingly linked with organised cross-
border crime and transnational terrorism (Lutterbeck 2006: 61). 
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The Mediterranean Sea, located at the crossroads of three continents, 
connects the Atlantic Ocean to the Black Sea and Red Sea variously through the 
Strait of Gibraltar, the Dardanelles and Bosporus, and the Suez Canal (Boyer 
2007: 75). The Mediterranean Sea has always been the focus of European and 
global attention particularly due to the political instabilities and regional crises 
surrounding it. The Mediterranean Basin is therefore geographically, culturally, 
and politically diverse with states of different ideologies and religions. Among the 
main concern of threats in the Mediterranean Sea are maritime terrorism, irregular 
migration and trafficking of persons (McNerney et al 2017: 4). Maritime security 
in the Mediterranean concerns over 500 million people with about 150 million 
situated on the coast, and as a consequence, plays a key role, ensuring economic 
stability, environmental protection and safety of European peoples (Evans 2011: 
11).  
The importance of the Mediterranean as a maritime highway has increased 
significantly in the post-Cold War era due to globalisation. For instance, the 
period between 1990 and 2004 illustrates a remarkable advancement in maritime 
commerce particularly within Europe, the United States and North Africa (Boyer 
2007: 76). Furthermore, the large quantity of crude oil and crude oil products that 
transit the Mediterranean Sea via its choke points including the Suez Canal, 
Bosporus Strait and Sumed pipeline1 have increased significantly during the same 
period (Boyer 2007: 76). It has been estimated that almost one quarter of a million 
vessels carrying more than 100 tonnes gross register tonnage (grt) of crude oil and 
natural gas are transiting the Mediterranean Sea every year (Dalby 2011: 20). That 
said, other than oil and oil products, large amounts of liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
are also moved across the Mediterranean Sea. The majority of this natural gas is 
mainly exported from the oldest gas exporter in the world, Algeria, which is 
transported for European consumption via the Mediterranean Sea (Calleya 2012: 
73). In addition, other than serving as an important sea lanes of communication 
(SLOC) for economy purposes and as a medium of transportation, the 
																																								 																				
1 The Sumed pipeline links the Ain Sukhna terminal in the Gulf of Suez with the Sidi Kerir 
terminal in Egypt. It allows larger oil tankers to pass through the Suez Canal to reach the 
Mediterranean for transport (Boyer 2007: 76). 
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Mediterranean Sea is also of great importance for its natural resources. The basin 
is rich with natural resources which supports local economies and provides large 
sources of food for the states surrounding it, particularly through fisheries (Boyer 
2007: 76). Large amount of fisheries sources of about 500,000 tonnes are 
harvested with more than forty thousand fishing boats in the Mediterranean Sea 
every year (Boyer 2007: 76). In sum, these developments have changed the 
security dynamics of the Mediterranean Sea which not only increased the 
importance of the basin for goods transportation, but also increased security 
considerations for the EU, particularly with the emergence of transboundary risks 
and non-military threats in the basin which concern all the EU coastal states.  
1.2 Research Questions 
In the post Cold War era, the Mediterranean Sea has gained importance in terms 
of security, particularly due to the crises and instabilities surrounding it, including 
civil wars in Syria, political turmoil in Arab countries and the emergence of 
radical groups. The two major actors in the basin, NATO and EU have expressed 
their commitment to sustain the security and safety of the Mediterranean and on 
account of their initiatives, the Mediterranean is enclosed and very well policed 
and under constant surveillance (Germond 2010: 67). The entire area is also 
within easy and rapid reach of sophisticated military and naval resources (Dalby 
2011: 20). Nevertheless, the Mediterranean Sea is still very vulnerable to certain 
threats, the two most notable are terrorism and irregular migration. 
Cooperation with Mediterranean partners is embedded in the EU’s 
strategic priorities but most notably evidenced through the implementation of the 
Mediterranean Maritime Strategy which was designed to enhance maritime safety, 
security and surveillance (Evans 2011: 9). The Internal Security Strategy of 
November 2010, formulated specifically to strengthen the EU’s external border, 
thus also serves as a useful platform to address security risk in the Mediterranean 
(Manservisi 2011: 8). This objective has resulted in increased cooperation 
between the member states concerning border surveillance to deal with the 
migration crisis (Manservisi 2011: 8). The EU has also actively enhanced its 
international security through the evolution of the Common Security and Defence 
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Policy (CSDP) in 2004. The 2005 EU Counter-terrorism Strategy and the 
employment of its Action Plan demonstrates how maritime security has become 
one of the top priorities for the EU security agenda (De Kerchove 2011: 33). Also, 
the Treaty of Lisbon asserts the clause, in which the EU and its member states 
shall act collectively if a member state is confronted with terrorist threats (Evans 
2011: 9). Therefore, the Mediterranean Sea is certainly an arena of importance for  
counter-terrorism measures in the EU and these also include transport 
(passengers, tourism, freight) and maritime border security (De Kerchove 2011: 
33). As a result, Frontex and European Border Surveillance System or commonly 
known as EUROSUR (outlined in greater detail in Chapter Six) were established 
in 2005 and 2013 respectively and are mainly responsible for enhancing the 
security of the external borders of the European countries.  
As a traditional naval force in the region, NATO has more advantages 
compared to the EU in terms of experience, assets and credibility (Germond and 
Grove 2010: 16). NATO maritime forces with the participation of the US has 
adept ‘hard security’ capabilities with more assets and power in the Mediterranean 
Sea. The EU, on the other hand, has developed a collective approach, coordinating 
various European agencies such as Frontex and European Maritime Safety 
Agency (EMSA) who are responsible in maritime security affairs to maintaining 
the stability of the sea (Germond and Grove 2010: 16). Therefore, both actors 
have advantages and complement each other. This serves as a medium for NATO 
and EU to integrate collectively in maritime security cooperation, thus contribute 
to the stability and security of the Mediterranean Sea.  
On another note, the basin’s diversity and history have divided the basin 
into two; the North and South which maintain different approaches to security and 
crisis management (Boyer 2007: 75).2 “Northern” states in the basin promote the 
practice of cooperative-security among themselves to resolve any disputes or 
conflicts. This includes the participation in international alliances and institutions 
																																								 																				
2 After the end of Cold War, the Mediterranean region has often been perceived as a new ‘arc of 
crisis’ whereby the North-South division is replacing the East-West rivalry. The North division 
represents the industrialized and developed states, meanwhile the South division represents the 
states with economic, political and social problems (Kinacioglu 2000: 27).  
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such as NATO, the EU, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE) and the Barcelona Process, to name a few (Boyer 2007: 75). “Southern” 
states on the other hand are less inclined to participate in any alliances or security 
arrangements with other states due to their suspicion over other’s states motives or 
intentions (Attina 2004: 24). These states alternatively are more likely to promote 
security cooperation within their own territorial boundary or at a certain point, 
form short-term alliances with like-minded states (Boyer 2007: 75) 
In the Mediterranean Sea, the main challenge is not just about coping with 
security threats, but also maintaining stability at sea; preventing and disrupting the 
activities of the illegal and hostile actors. The complicated security environment 
requires improved interoperability among all agents in order to deal with the 
threats (Germond and Grove 2010: 15). It is important to ensure that maritime 
activities promoted by the major security actors in the Mediterranean do not 
overlap, rather they should adopt a comprehensive approach to combat illegal 
activities at sea and ultimately enhance the efficacy of these operations in 
safeguarding the basin. For that purpose, this thesis concerns the dominant 
maritime threats faced by the European member states in the Mediterranean Sea 
and focuses on maritime initiatives implemented by the EU and NATO in order to 
cope with these challenges. This thesis develops and utilises within a case study 
analysis, a security community framework to study how security community has 
evolved in the Mediterranean Sea after the end of Cold War. In order to achieve 
this, the thesis will focus on the security community practices which exhibited 
within the maritime operations in the Mediterranean Sea. This framework has 
contributed to the wider implications for the debate on security community, 
particularly to broadening the dynamics of security community research in the 
maritime security practices. 
1.3 Aims of the Research 
The maritime environment is a particularly important domain for European 
cooperation on security challenges. The post-Cold War era illustrates the changes 
of security dynamics in the Mediterranean Sea where the region faces varied 
challenges surrounding it, including unresolved territorial disputes, religious 
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extremism, proliferation of arms and the risks associated with terrorist 
organisations. Since 9/11, NATO has taken a comprehensive approach for 
counter-terrorism through Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) which integrates 
its military tasks within the Alliance and their partners (Cesaretti 2008: 3). The 
other challenge that merits discussion here is the massive flow of irregular 
migration across the Mediterranean which also simultaneously increases the risk 
of human trafficking into and within Europe. The events of fatal shipwrecks and 
accidents in the Mediterranean have clearly highlighted the problems of 
clandestine immigration into Europe. The number of migrants’ arrivals have 
increased dramatically every year. Some 74,676 migrants were reported to have 
arrived in Greece and Italy for the first quarter of 2016 for example (IOM 2016b). 
This statistic however does not include the 374 migrants who lost their life at sea 
in trying to reach Europe (IOM 2016b). These realities have pushed the EU to 
improve their coordination in order to deal with irregular migration, which has 
resulted in the reinforcement of effective border control including, among others, 
the EU’s external border security agency, Frontex and maritime border 
surveillance system. 
Therefore, this study will first scrutinise and identify major security threats 
in the Mediterranean Sea and will thoroughly examine the imminent threats faced 
by European states in the post-Cold War era. In order to answer the question of 
how these isues have become threats at sea, the case studies chapter will briefly 
discuss the securitisation process, by which issues become the subject of security 
concern, particularly in the case of irregular migration. Second, the research 
focuses on maritime security cooperation, approaches and initiatives implemented 
by the EU and NATO to deal with these maritime issues. This objective is 
addressed in greater detail in the case studies chapters, discussing what has been 
done by both actors to manage the security threats in the Mediterranean Sea. The 
study also examines the extent to which the initiatives contribute a functional role 
to enhance safety and maintaining good order in the Mediterranean Sea. Third, the 
study scrutinises the evolution of the security community-building process 
through the implementation of maritime security practices by the EU and NATO 
in the Mediterranean Sea. More precisely, it investigates whether, and how, the 
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EU and NATO through their maritime initiatives can create a regional community 
that enhance security and reduce crisis around the Mediterranean Sea. 
1.4 Significance of the Study 
Due to the significant maritime traffic every year, the importance of the 
Mediterranean Sea is paramount. It serves as a major transit corridor, and has 
linked the Atlantic and Indian Oceans since the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 
(Bal 2011: 18). The high number of vessels carrying invaluable products and 
cargo transporting natural gas and petroleum from Middle East to Europe has 
increased security risks in the Mediterranean Sea. In addition, the Mediterraneans 
Sea is also vulnerable to  piracy attacks surrounding it.3 High seas are a vast and 
unregulated space which poses questions about whose responsibility it should be 
to sustain the security in the area. Is maritime security included under NATO and 
EU whereby they should have a presence in international waters? Or is maritime 
security an exclusive responsibility for the littoral states? 
The definition of maritime security concept is too vague to determine what 
is at stake in the current debate on maritime security. As Bueger and Germond 
explain, the concept of maritime security is the recent buzzword in international 
relations (Bueger 2015: 159) which was not often used before the end of the Cold 
War (Germond 2015a: 137). The upsurge of maritime security in academic 
literature began to take place in early 2000, following the impact of piracy attacks 
at sea and the 9/11 terrorist attacks which increased the risks of potential maritime 
terrorism (Germond 2015a: 137). Before the end of the Cold War, maritime 
security primarily referred to the naval context such as territorial disputes and 
control of maritime zones (Germond 2015a: 138). This scenario however, 
changed after the Cold War ended. Maritime security is now described more in a 
context of illegal activities at sea (including trafficking of people and terrorism), 
the preventive and reactive measures (counter-terrorism operations) and the 
emergence of non-state actors rather than hard power confrontation (Germond 
2015a: 138). Germond also suggests that maritime security involves activities 
																																								 																				
3 Although the Mediterranean is not directly affected with the attacks of pirates, nonetheless the 
vessels transiting through the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean to and from the Mediterranean are 
vulnerable to the risk of piracy (Fave 2011: 31). 
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which disrupt the good order at sea, such as discreet pollution and environmental 
and economic considerations (Germond 2015a: 138). In other words, maritime 
security has to do with (illegal and disruptive) human activities in the maritime 
space (Germond 2015a: 138) and the absence of aforementioned threats (Bueger 
2015: 159). 
The traditional notion of maritime security is primarily associated with 
naval concepts including naval warfare and and the seapower. This explains the 
legitimate use of force by state actors in order to respond and maintain the 
security within maritime domain (Germond 2015a: 138). Nonetheless, the current 
debate of maritime security also emphasises relations between the concept of 
seapower and maritime security. Bueger suggests that the concept of seapower is 
related to maritime security, in which emphasise the role of naval forces in 
maritime security (Bueger 2015: 160). The concept of seapower evaluate the 
extent to which naval forces should operate beyond its territorial waters and 
engage in international waters (Bueger 2015: 160). That said, this discussion 
merits exploration of the maritime security threats and the maritime security 
operations4 in far greater detail, and this constitutes the principal aim of this 
thesis. 
The thesis addresses the illegal and disruptive activities at sea which 
jeopardise the security, safety and good governance within the maritime domain 
in the Mediterranean Sea. Likewise, the reactive approach by the EU and NATO 
is also examined thoroughly in this thesis, contributing to a greater understanding 
of the roles of naval forces in the Mediterranean Sea. Exploring the threats and 
approaches by the actors, clarifies the current roles and responsibilities of the 
major maritime security actors. Deliberations on counter-terrorism and counter-
migration in the thesis require a framework of analysis, not only to give empirical 
knowledge of the policy but to also contribute to broader security discourse. A 
																																								 																				
4 ‘Maritime security operations’ has become a trendy concept particularly with the increased role 
of naval forces to preserve security and maintain good order at sea. As cited in Till (2009), the 
Royal Navy defines ‘maritime security operations’ as: ‘Actions performed by military units in 
partnership with other government departments, agencies and international partners in the 
maritime environment to counter illegal activity and support freedom of the seas, in order to 
protect national and international interests’ (See Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-
first Century (New York: Routledge, 2009). 
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range of practices are partially involved in maritime security including, among 
others, maritime surveillance, information sharing, training and exercises, legal 
enforcement activities (e.g. extradition and imprisonment), maritime strategies 
and capacity building (Bueger 2015: 162). Maritime security often requires inter-
state coordination and multilateral operations with actors playing critical and 
complementary roles. It also requires efficient enforcement of controls and 
coordinated responses (Bueger 2015: 163), especially given that the sea is vast 
and difficult to monitor. That said, in order to determine the kind of activities 
implemented by the maritime actors and how these actors can cooperate with each 
other, the concept of maritime security communities is paramount to address this 
discussion. 
The concept of security communities explains the cooperation between 
actors and the practices that are viable to understand how this cooperation takes 
place. The concept of security communities, as proposed by Karl Deutsch, 
highlights the absence of war, the peaceful settlement of disputes among a 
community members, and the development of shared identities and trust (Deutsch 
1957: 2). The concept of security communities emphasises the process of how 
threats are identified and how the members cooperate together to settle the 
conflicts. There are six vital repertoires of practices to sustain a security 
community mechanism. The repertoires are as follows: the practice of self 
restraint (the abstention from the use of force); the importance of partnerships 
within the community members interaction; comprehensive cooperative security; 
the natural practice of diplomacy; the creation of transnational security dialogue; 
and military planning, confidence building measures and policy coordination 
(Adler 2009: 71). Each of these practices is explored in detail in Chapter 2, 
however it is important to emphasise the development of the security community 
framework as an analytical tool in the thesis to demonstrate how useful the 
framework is to understand the maritime security practices in the Mediterranean 
Sea.  
Maritime security cooperation must effectively benefit all parties; 
therefore it is crucial to focus on the challenges the EU, NATO and the 
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Mediterranean countries face when managing maritime security in the 
Mediterranean Sea. In addition, the thesis discusses how the security communities 
framework evolved through the maritime practices in the Mediterranean Sea. The 
security community framework has been used widely to explain the cooperation 
and alliances between states, which has mainly focused on the land-oriented 
issues. Nevertheless, very few preceding studies are available to discuss the 
concept of the security community and its application in the maritime domain. 
That said, this thesis develops new insights of security communities, whereby it 
can not only be applied on land issues, but also it can be used to discuss security 
issues and cooperation in the maritime domain. 
The thesis as a whole contributes to the literature of maritime security 
threats in the Mediterranean Sea, there is a focus on two principal threats; 
terrorism and irregular migration. The thesis also analyses counter-terrorism and 
counter-migration operations in the Mediterranean Sea and finally explores the 
development of the security community framework in the maritime domain. For 
counter-terrorism and counter-migration operations, this thesis scrutinises the 
spectrum of activities by NATO and EU in order to to tackle these problems, 
particularly after the attacks of 9/11. This includes maritime surveillance, 
maritime security strategies and activities at sea (e.g. patrolling, escorting and 
inspections). In the context of counter-terrorism and counter-migration operations, 
the thesis demonstrates how terrorism and irregular migration in the 
Mediterranean Sea can undermine the national security of the member states 
which eventually leads to the enforcement of the aforementioned operations. It 
also demonstrates what kind of activities are conducted when EU and NATO 
expressed their commitment to maintain the security, safety and good order in the 
Mediterranean Sea. Finally, in the discussion of the security framework, the thesis 
contributes to the security community literature by developing an analytical 
framework to evaluate how actors cooperate in maritime security. The concept of 
security community also clarifies the quintessential form of collaboration and 
practices between actors in the maritime domain. It adds novelty to distinct 
security communities field in the maritime security spectrum.   
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1.5 Thesis Overview 
This study is comprised of six further chapters. Chapter 2 examines the theoretical 
framework which is used throughout this study and makes a connection with the 
cooperative-security enforcement in the Mediterranean Sea. This chapter 
examines in detail the origins of the concept of the security community 
framework according to Deutsch’s foundation text, Political community and the 
North Atlantic State (1957). The chapter focuses on the modification framework 
of the security community by Adler and Barnett according to their groundwork 
text, Security Communities (1998). This provides a broad overview of the security 
community framework and analyses its main elements, particularly cognitive 
regions; common meaning, and community; as well as the development of 
security communities. Following this, the expansion of the security community is 
explored. This includes the security community repertoire of practices which 
indicate the spread of security community within a region. This chapter also 
considers supplementary points by other scholars in the field, who discuss the 
evolution of security community framework in the other region and how it can be 
used to study the practices of maritime security. Finally, the possibilities for a 
broadly applicable security community framework are discussed, whereby the 
focus is placed on the spread of the framework in the study of counter-terrorism 
and counter-migration by the EU and NATO in the Mediterranean Sea. 
 Chapter 3 analyses the methodological aspect of the research. This chapter 
explores in detail the methodology involved in order to gain and collect all the 
related data, sources and information for this research.  This chapter explores the 
research design involved to analyse the development of the EU and NATO 
maritime security strategy in the Mediterranean Sea. This chapter starts with the 
explanation of major research questions, followed by the research design used in 
this study and finally describes the methodology and methods carried out to 
analyse the data. The rationale for the adopting qualitative research methods when 
conducting this research is also analysed. The research is based on a mixture of 
desk study, textual analysis and field work. Desk study involved analysis of 
academic writing, official government reports and other related documents, 
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international conventions, case studies and conference papers. Reference is also 
made to relevant internet sources. The field work component included conducting 
interviews with selected interviewees, attending and presenting papers in relevant 
workshops, seminars, symposiums, and conferences relating to maritime security 
matters, especially those related to the Mediterranean Sea. Figures, data and any 
related information from relevant international bodies pertinent to this study such 
as International Maritime Organization (IMO), International Maritime Bureau 
(IMB), NATO and EU were also gathered in the course of the research. Finally, 
this chapter justifies the selection of case studies which are discussed throughout 
the research. 
 Chapter 4 delves into the history, background and nature of maritime 
situation in the post-Cold War in the Mediterranean Sea. The principal objective 
of the chapter is to introduce and assess the core actors in the Mediterranean Sea 
and analyse their roles and initiatives in the Mediterranean Sea. This chapter 
provides insights and general overview of the past and current initiatives in the 
Mediterranean, implemented by the EU and NATO since the end of the Cold War. 
The chapter covers the beginning of the security initiatives by the EU and NATO 
with regards to Mediterranean security dialogue, maritime strategy and 
partnerships with Mediterranean countries. Therefore, the chapter focuses into 
varied strategies and initiatives, including, among others, Mediterranean 
Dialogue, Alliance Maritime Strategy, European Security Strategy and Barcelona 
Process to analyse their roles in managing maritime security challenges in the 
Mediterranean.  
Chapter 5 and 6 focus on the primary case studies of this thesis and 
examine the roles of the EU and NATO to combat terrorism and irregular 
migration. The first case study focuses on the terror threat in the Mediterranean 
Sea which dates back as early as 1960s with the emergence of modern maritime 
attacks by Palestinian insurgents. This section also covers the principal counter-
terrorism initiatives in the Mediterranean Sea that commenced in 2001 soon after 
the 9/11 attacks. The chapter analyses the history, development and enforcement 
of NATO’s Operation Active Endeavour (OAE); primarily established to address 
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the terrorist threat following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States. Also in 
this chapter, the roles of the EU are examined in regards to counter-terrorism 
measures. This section discusses EU counter-terrorism strategies, maritime 
operations and counter-terrorism centre which serves as a central information hub 
for the EU member states. Chapter 6 then further discusses the second case study, 
irregular migration. The chapter starts with discussion on migration incidents and 
statistics of migration flows in the Mediterranean Sea, looking at how this issue 
has proliferated from the issue of human security to become a security threat to 
one’s state. This chapter focuses on the counter-migration policies and responses 
by the EU and NATO to tackle the influx of migration movements via the 
Mediterranean Sea towards Europe. The study firstly details the efforts made by 
the EU to deal with migration crisis in the Mediterranean, through Operation 
Sophia and the EU’s Frontex agency, amongst others. This section also examines 
the roles of NATO in counter-migration in the Mediterranean. Although NATO’s 
role is limited compared to that of the EU, NATO has demonstrated a desire to 
participate and engage more actively with the existing EU counter-migration 
operations. NATO expressed its commitment to provide assistance to the EU to 
tackle the migration crisis and also announced their transition of OAE to the new 
Operation Sea Guardian. Such an operation is created to support Operation Sophia 
mainly focuses in the Aegean Sea.  
Chapter 7 concludes this thesis with a summation of findings concerning  
the relations experienced between security community practices and maritime 
initiatives in the Mediterranean. By exploring security community practices, this 
chapter scrutinises the extent of security community expansion through the EU 
and NATO’s maritime security practices. The chapter demonstrates the relation 
between maritime security and security community framework, which has 
demonstrated through the enactment of cooperative-security, partnerships and 
confidence building measures. Finally, the chapter includes some relevant 
discussions and recommendations for future research. The chapter also includes 
the thesis impact and the contribution that can be made for the future field. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Application of the Security Community Framework in Maritime Practices in 
the Mediterranean Sea 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The concept of security community provides an ideal explanation for the high 
level of cooperation and interaction to resolve disputes and conflicts, thus 
contribute to the long-term peace in the region. Specifically, it is a framework for 
analysis intended to study regional interactions and their relationship to security 
practices. The framework offers an alternative look into security politics, 
challenging the traditional realist paradigm of nation states’ security politics 
towards institutions interactions (Adler and Barnett 1998: 6). Initially proposed by 
Richard Van Wagenen in the early 1950s, it was not until Karl Deutsch and his 
associates resuscitated the concept in 1957 with in-depth theoretical and empirical 
treatment. Deutsch coined the concept to implicitly challenge the claims made by 
realists, that war is an inevitable feature in international politics which may one 
day eliminate the human race (Deutsch 1957: 4). Alternatively, Deutsch proposed 
the formation of security communities within political communities which 
eliminate war and the expectation of war within their boundaries. Deutsch 
emphasised that security communities mean the absence of interstate war 
(Deutsch 1957: 5).  
 
Despite its importance in security politics, the security community, 
however was never a prevalent concept during the Cold War, claimed as unfit for 
application within international politics situations. As Adler and Barnett (1996) 
argue, security communities began to receive greater attention after the end of the 
Cold War with the changes in global politics and international relations theory 
(Adler and Barnett 1996: 69). The movement of international relations theory 
away from rationalism and materialism and toward exploration into the role of 
identity, norms, and the social basis of global politics has made the security 
community a widely used concept (Adler and Barnett 1996: 72). The post-Cold 
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War era has witnessed the emergence of community-building, whereby states 
place themselves within a political community and become full members of the 
community.  By becoming the full members of a political community, it indicates 
the willingness of states to share similar identities, values, norms and interests. 
Membership into a security community means the ability to shape a shared 
collective destiny.  
 
 The concept of security community has gained importance and has been 
widely used in explicating security situations, not only in European region, but 
also in other regions such as Africa and Asia (Adler and Crawford 2006: 12). This 
includes the development of the African Union (AU), ASEAN, and Southern 
African Development Community (SADC). For instance, the seminal work of 
Christian Bueger (2013) developed the study of the security community within the 
scope of African maritime security regimes meanwhile Alan Collins (2014) in his 
work, analyses the security community building within ASEAN.5 These previous 
works on security-community building suggests that although limited, the 
importance of the concept of security community has gradually increased 
internationally. That said, the expansion of security community in the 
Mediterranean region has also gradually developed particularly to understand the 
relations between security practices and regional interactions in addressing 
contemporary security situation. Further discourse on the relationships of security 
community and these regions is examined in the latter part of this chapter. 
  
This chapter explores the origin of the concept of security communities as 
formulated by Karl Deutsch and later followed by the refined definitions by 
Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett. The first section focuses on the core 
																																								 																				
5 Christian Bueger in his exemplary work, Communities of Security Practice at Work? The 
Emerging African Maritime Security Regime, 2013, analyses how the emerging of security 
communities takes place particularly in the African security regime. Bueger proposes the 
formation of African maritime security strategy within the African Union (AU), the framework of 
Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Intergovernmental Authority for 
Development (IGAD), and the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DcoC) process (Bueger 2013: 300). See 
also Benedikt Franke, Africa’s Evolving Security Architecture and the Concept of Multilayered 
Security Communities, Cooperation and Conflict 43 (3), pp.313-340, 2008. On the other hand, 
Alan Collins in his seminal work, Bringing Communities Back: Security Communities and 
ASEAN’s Plural Turn, 2014, explores the study of ASEAN in a scope of non-liberal pluralistic 
security community (Collins 2014: 2). 
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assumptions of security communities laid out by Deutsch in the late 1950s; the 
second considers the advanced concept of security communities refined by Adler 
and Barnett in the late 1990s; and the third highlights the development from Adler 
and Barnett previous works, which includes the introduction of repertoire of 
practices to understand the mechanism of security communities. Finally, the 
possibilities for a broadly applicable security communities framework within 
security practices in the case studies are discussed.  
 
2.2 Security Communities: Origins of a Concept     
   
The concept of security communities was initially proposed in 1952 by Richard 
van Wagenen (Adler and Barnett 1998: 6). Nevertheless, it had to wait until the 
pioneering study by Karl Deutsch and his associates in their seminal work, 
Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in 
the Light of Historical Experience published in 1957, for detailed conceptual and 
empirical analysis. Security communities are a type of political community which 
reject the use of force or threat to resolve disputes. They challenge the 
fundamental thinking of realists which claim that war is inevitable in international 
politics (Ditrych 2014: 350). In other words, the basic premise of security 
communities is that war is no longer considered as a possible way to resolve 
disputes among its members, but the members will settle the conflicts through 
peaceful means. 
 
Deutsch defined a security community as a political community which 
integrated to the point where there is a ‘real assurance that the members of that 
community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in 
some other way’ (Deutsch 1957: 5). Integration in this context does not 
necessarily indicate the merging of peoples or governmental agencies into a larger 
unit. Rather, Deutsch explains that “integration mean the attainment, within a 
territory, of a ‘sense of community’ and of institutions and practices strong 
enough and widespread enough to assure, for a ‘long’ time, dependable 
expectations of ‘peaceful change’ among its population” (Deutsch 1957: 5). 
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Deutsch emphasises that integration requires some kind of organisation at the 
international level. Peaceful change on the other hand is a resolution of social 
problems by institutionalised procedures without the use of violence (Deutsch 
1957: 5). The presence of a ‘sense of community’ is essential in order to ensure 
peaceful change. As Deutsch asserts, “by sense of community we mean a belief 
on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to agreement on at least 
this one point: that common social problems must and can be resolved by 
processes of peaceful change” (Deutsch 1957: 5). In other words, ‘sense of 
community’ implies the situation where members of the community demonstrate a 
verbal attachment to shared values, mutual considerations, trust, loyalties and 
cooperative action (Deutsch 1957: 36). Ultimately, if the entire world integrated 
into a security community, the likelihood of war would be an unlikely occurence 
among the states. Deutsch observed security communities in two varieties, that is 
‘amalgamated security community’ and ‘pluralistic security community’. In the 
next section, I explore these two kinds of security communities in further detail. 
 
2.2.1 Amalgamated Security Community 
 
An amalgamated security community exists when there is a ‘formal merger of two 
or more previously independent units into a single, larger political units, with a 
common government’ (Deutsch 1957: 6). This common government could be 
federal or unitary, and Deutsch offers the United States as an example of the 
amalgamated security community who became a single governmental unit after a 
formal merger into an expanded state. According to Deutsch, amalgamated 
security communities entail early establishment of common laws, courts and 
police forces to maintain the balance of power among the members of a larger 
union or federation, in order to prevent one country from becoming much stronger 
than the others (Deutsch 1957: 27). If one member state is far stronger than the 
rest, the political elite have the disposition to neglect the needs of other smaller 
member states, which results in loss of responsiveness among the members. This 
may eventually prevent the integration process throughout the community and 
refrain the formation of security community between states. 
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 In order to establish successful amalgamated security communities, 
Deutsch identifies some essential requirements which eventually lead to the 
integration of the political communities. If a group of states fulfil these essential 
conditions, it means that they are likely to be successful in the amalgamation 
process. First, values and expectations are the essential conditions required to 
form a successful amalgamated security community (Deutsch 1957: 46). In this 
context, the political behaviour of the political units is motivated by the common 
values shared between each other. For instance, the elimination of different values 
from the internal politics in certain aspects such as religious values and domestic 
issues (i.e. slavery and race problems) provides an essential precondition for the 
establishment of a successful amalgamated security community in some countries 
(Deutsch 1957: 47). In other ways, it demonstrates the states’s motivation to 
eliminate the distinction of their domestic politics, rather they incorporate and 
accept it together. Second, successful amalgamated security communities require 
capabilities and communication processes among the members. The crux of this 
condition is effective channels of communication between the members, including 
political and administrative capabilities of  members  (Deutsch 1957: 50).  
 
 The third condition required for an amalgamated security community is 
the mobility of persons (Deutsch 1957: 53). Free mobility of persons is essential 
for political amalgamation in order to advance the process of integration. The easy 
movement of people across national boundaries demonstrates the willingness of 
states to become associated with others, which promotes the integration between 
the states to form an amalgamated security community. Deutsch suggests the 
unification of German states as the example of the inter-regional mobility 
accompanying amalgamation (Deutsch 1957: 53). Fourth, the condition present in 
amalgamated security community is the multiplicity and balance of transactions. 
A successful amalgamated security community requires a range of common 
functions and services, with different institutions to execute the tasks (Deutsch 
1957: 54). For instance, the set up of common institutions to implement specific 
functions such as in cultural, educational and legal divisions. The final conditions 
for the successful formation of amalgamated security community is the mutual 
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predictability of behaviour of the members. To be precise, it means that the 
members expect compatible behaviour whereby the members are familiar enough 
with each other’s behaviours that they can anticipate their actions and eventually 
respond accordingly with that prediction (Deutsch 1957: 56). In sum, these 
conditions are essential in order to determine whether or not a political 
community successfully forms an amalgamated security community. These 
conditions promote the integration between the members where they develop the 
‘we-feeling’ and mutual trust among themselves, which finally constructs a 
successful security community. 
 
2.2.2 Pluralistic Security Community  
 
The second type of security community is the pluralistic security community. This 
type of security community is different from amalgamated security community 
wherein it ‘retain[s] the legal independence of separate governments’ (Deutsch 
1957: 6). This means that two or more separate governmental units which form a 
security community retain their legal independence without being merging under 
a single, larger government. Political communities within a pluralistic security 
community possess similar core values, mutual identity, loyalty, and a sense of 
“we-ness”, however they retain the legal independence of separate governments 
and their supreme decision-making power (Deutsch 1957: 6). Pluralistic security 
communities indicate that the member states voluntarily cooperate collectively, 
adhering to peaceful resolutions of conflict, and eliminating the possibility of war, 
while at the same time retaining their independence and political autonomy. 
 
 In a pluralistic security community, the basic premise which indicates the 
emergence of such community is the elimination of war. War has become less 
attractive and improbable among the members of political communities. Deutsch 
points out three reasons behind the absence of war among members of pluralistic 
security communities. First, war became less attractive because members are 
apprehensive of the major destruction and devastation war may cause the states 
(Deutsch 1957: 115). Second, war becomes improbable because of the risk of 
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international entanglement that could expend the warring states. For instance, 
inter state war may lead to great power interventions imposed as a deterrence 
against  war between the two states (Deutsch 1957: 115). Interventions of several 
great powers will aggravate the war, therefore states are likely to refrain from war 
through every possible means to avoid international conflicts. Third, war becomes 
unattractive because it is not within the interest of domestic politics of all 
(Deutsch 1957: 116). For instance, although there is a political strain between two 
conflicting states, however war becomes unthinkable and not even an option to 
resolve the disputes. Rather, states will adopt a peaceful means to settle the 
conflicts. In sum, the absence of war within this period indicates the presence of a 
pluralistic security community between the states. 
 
In order to form a successful pluralistic security community, there are 
three important conditions required to achieve it. According to Deutsch, the first 
essential condition for the success of pluralistic security community is the 
compatibility among the primary political values of the member states (Deutsch 
1957: 66). For instance, two states with similar types of regimes are more likely to 
form a community among themselves, as opposed to states with different political 
ideologies. Sheehan, nevertheless, argues that ideological compatibility itself is 
not sufficient as a condition for a security community (Shehan 2006: 28).6 Later 
generations of security community theorists have attempted to explore the 
possibilities of security communities formation among non-democratic states 
(Sheehan 2006: 28). In addition, it also indicates the absence of any incompatible 
values which motivate the political behaviour of the political units. In other 
words, the compatibility values implies that members of the political community 
agreed to a set of socially accepted values that makes them become attached to 
each other. 
 
																																								 																				
6 Sheehan gives an example of how states with similar political ideologies are not sufficiently able 
to form a community. Although sharing the same political values, Turkey and Greece however 
failed to form a stable democratic regime during the Cold War and failed to become part of 
security community, which at the time was a characteristic of other NATO states (Sheehan 2006: 
28). 
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Second, there should be an established network of political and other 
communications, to provide a sufficient and immediate response towards member 
states’ messages and needs without resorting to physical force (Deutsch 1957: 66). 
The key of this conditions is an increase in the responsiveness in the process of 
decision making. The capacity of  members to respond to each other’s messages 
implies not only that they have received the messages, but the members also 
understand and consider the messages for their political decision making (Deutsch 
1957: 67). Good communication is crucial in the security community to hinder 
any distrust and sceptical feeling between members of the community. Deutsch 
(as quoted in Adler) stressed that communication is the pillar of social group and 
political communities. He asserts that communication alone enables a group ‘to 
think together, to see together, and to act together’ (Adler and Barnett 1996: 66). 
Through communication processes and transaction flows between peoples, it 
instills a sense of community not only among elites, but also among the peoples 
(Adler 1998: 174). Third, a successful pluralistic security community exists when 
there is a successful dynamic interaction of the first two conditions. It requires 
mutual predictability on the relevant aspects of each partner’s political, economic 
and social behaviour which can be acquired from similar political cultures 
(Deutsch 1957: 67). In short, states who shared similar values are able to 
understand each other’s behaviour better because it reflects the resemblance 
between them. Similarly, communication networks are able to provide the states 
an idea and predictable picture of the other (Sheehan 2006: 29). 
 
In sum, security communities focus on the interstate practices and 
transnational forces that build up the confidence among the member states to 
settle their differences through means other than war. Core principles in security 
communities therefore dictate how states govern their domestic behaviour in ways 
that are consistent with the community. The essential conditions of a security 
community is the elimination of war, but a peaceful means as a way to resolve 
disputes and conflicts between the community members. Existence of war or 
military action signals the breakdown of the community. Those states that form a 
security community have created a stable order and peace. In spite of a lack of 
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acceptance for the concept of security communities during the Cold War, the 
concept has been revived after the end of the Cold War. Constructivist scholars 
have been at the forefront of the revival, using Deutsch’s concept to grasp how 
social processes and international community may transform international politics 
(Adler and Barnett 1996: 72). Security communities formed after the Cold War 
are more relevant and suit security politics as they acknowledge the social 
character of global politics, identities, interests, culture, values and norms. In sum, 
this section explored the origins of the concept of security communities as 
formulated by Karl Deutsch and analysed the two kinds of security communities. 
In the next section, I will delve into the advanced concept of security communities 
as proposed by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett. 
 
2.3 Evolution of Security Community 
This section will draw on the seminal work of Emanuel Adler and Michael 
Barnett, Security Communities (1998) to extend the argument of the concept of 
security communities. Despite their admiration for Deutsch’s work, they argue 
that his conceptualisation of security community framework lack theoretical, 
methodological and conceptual treatment (Adler and Barnett 1996: 73).  
Therefore, Adler and Barnett propose a number of refinements and modifications 
to Deutsch’s original concept. This includes the distinction between loosely and 
tightly coupled pluralistic security communities and a three-stage model for the 
formation of security communities. Adler in his work also includes a broader 
definition of community to give more understanding on the correlation between 
security and the community itself (Adler 1997: 250). The refinement of the 
concept of security communities also draws attention to the importance of the 
concept in order to understand contemporary events. 
In the next section, I will explore the extensions of  the concept of security 
communities, by Adler and Barnett. They have further advanced the concept of 
security communities by providing refinement concept of pluralistic security 
communities by Deutsch. In this section, first I explore the conceptual vocabulary 
of security community with the further discussions of two types of pluralistic 
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security communities, loosely and tightly coupled pluralistic security community. 
Adler and Barnett argue that such communities are socially constructed ‘cognitive 
regions’ or ‘community regions’ (Adler 1997: 250). That said, I will also explore 
the emergence of security communities in non-Western regions. Second, I analyse 
the development of security communities by presenting three stages of security 
communities as observed by Adler and Barnett. Third, I scrutinise the spread of 
security communities within its repertoire of practices that sustain the security 
communities mechanism. Finaly, I will explore the emergence of security 
community in the Mediterranean region via maritime security practices. 
2.3.1 Security Communities – A Refinement of a Concept 
In the refinement of the security community framework, Adler and Barnett extend 
the definition of a pluralistic security community as initially formulated by 
Deutsch. According to Adler and Barnett: 
“Pluralistic security community is a transnational region comprised of 
sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of 
peaceful change.” (Adler and Barnett 1998: 30).  
Peaceful change here defined as “neither the expectation of nor the preparation for 
organised violence as a means to settle interstate disputes” (Adler and Barnett 
1998: 34).7 Although peaceful change assumes the elimination of war between 
states, it is however, important to understand that security communities do not 
imply the absence of interstate disputes at all, rather it implicitly specifies the 
systematic peaceful resolution of these disputes. In other words, a security 
community is an academic expression for the “social fact of interstate peace” and 
the mechanisms that sustain dependable expectations of peaceful change (Adler 
and Greve 2009: 69). The pluralistic security community was developed in an 
attempt to measure the extent to which the members can be called a community. 
Adler and Barnett emphasise that: 
																																								 																				
7 Adler and Barnett emphasised that peaceful change implies that states do not perceive other 
security actors within the community as a source of military threat to their legitimacy and 
autonomy. Therefore, security communities can still exist without a formal alliance, so long as 
there is a formal consensus and regulations that prohibit states from adopting war as a means to 
settle their conflicts (Adler and Barnett 1998: 34-35). 
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“Pluralistic security communities can be categorized according to their 
depth of trust, the nature and degree of institutionalization of their 
governance system, and whether they reside in a formal anarchy or are on 
the verge of transforming it.” (Adler and Barnett 1998: 30) 
Accordingly, Adler and Barnett suggests that the above categories enable the 
formation of two distinct ideal types, namely, loosely and tightly pluralistic 
security communities. They further elaborate the difference between these two 
types of pluralistic security community with the emphasis that the key distinctive 
feature of a security community is the existence of transnational community and 
interstate interactions linked to dependable expectations of peaceful change (Adler 
and Barnett 1998: 31). According to Adler and Barnett: 
“Loosely-coupled security communities observe the minimal definitional 
properties and no more: a transnational region comprised of sovereign 
states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change. 
[…] Tightly-coupled security communities however are more demanding 
in two respects. First, they have a “mutual aid” society in which they 
construct collective system arrangements. Secondly, they possess a system 
of rule that lies […] between a sovereign state and a regional, centralized, 
government; that is, it is something of a post-sovereign system, endowed 
with common supranational, transnational, and national institutions and 
some form of a collective security system.” (Adler and Barnett 1998: 30). 
As Adler and Barnett concede, what makes these two types of security community 
different is the nature of sovereignty and authority relations (Adler and Barnett 
1996: 79). Loosely-coupled security communities expect that other members will 
refrain from warlike activities and hence, self-restraint is practiced among the 
members (Adler and Barnett 1998: 30). Tightly-coupled security communities, on 
the other hand demonstrate that states retain their authority and autonomy and are 
free to act based on their interests as long as it is within the frame of the common 
understandings of the community and they comply with the regulations of the 
region (Adler 1997: 266). In other words, members of tightly-coupled security 
communities have unlimited authority and sovereignty to act as they deem 
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necessary in the international system. States only perceive insecurity when their 
legitimacy is challenged and the shared understandings of the community are 
endangered. In both cases, a security community means states expect peaceful 
change between members. It is important to understand the definition of 
community itself to determine the relationships between security and community.  
2.3.2 The Meaning of Community 
In general, a security community is a group of people (states) who share a similar 
identity and values. However, what actually defines a ‘community’ in the 
international politics? How can we perceive which groups of actors form a 
community and under what condition is a community created? In order to 
understand how communities can construct norms and identities to form an 
alliance with the outsiders, we first need to understand what defines a community. 
Adler and Barnett argue that there is no definite definition of community (Adler 
and Barnett 1998: 31). In general, the existence of communities is ‘based on 
commitments, duties, obligations and expectations held collectively by the group’ 
(Adler 1997: 263). Community also refers to a social structure consisting of the 
members’ shared identities and interest (Adler and Crawford 2006: 12). However, 
Adler and Barnett offer a useful definition of community to understand global 
politics. Adler and Barnett proposed three characteristics that define community.  
First, ‘members of a community have shared identities, values and 
meanings’ (Adler and Barnett 1998: 31). Common meanings are the basis of 
community where they develop the ‘we-feeling’ to understand common actions, 
norms and feelings. Common meanings also include people who share common 
traditions, language and usage.8 Common meanings will enable people to live in 
the same regulated world. Deutsch previously had also mentioned that community 
building results from common meanings. When everybody shares common 
objectives, common actions will make them into a community (Adler 1998: 174). 
Common meaning is the key for security communities and it is necessary for 
																																								 																				
8 See also Edward Hallett Carr, Conditions of Peace (London: MacMillan Company, 1942); and 
Ernst B. Haas, Nationalism, Liberalism, and Progress (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997). In 
their seminal works, Carr and Haas agree that common meanings are the building blocks of the 
collective identities on which international or transnational communities are based. 
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interactions between the members, if it is not available, then institutional and 
individual agents are needed to construct it. 
Second, community means the existence of direct relations among those 
members, in order to eliminate possibilities of indirect and isolated interactions 
between members of a community (Adler and Barnett 1998: 31). Those in the 
community communicate through some form of face-to-face encounters in various 
settings. However, Adler suggests that recent technological breakthroughs have 
facilitated the development of a sense of community among people “who are not 
physically present” (Adler 1997: 262). Adler asserts that security communities 
might emerge between non-contiguous states. This  means that a state can still 
become a member of security community despite the fact that they are 
geographically located at a great distance from the “core” members (Adler and 
Barnett 1998: 33). Regardless of Adler’s argument however, Alex Bellamy (2004) 
argues that the requirement of direct interaction would still be a causal factor 
which may undermine the formation of community above the geographic settings 
(Bellamy 2004: 31). Bellamy proposes that members of the community do not 
necessarily have to have direct interactions with one another to form a 
community. What matters most is that they have shared sense of community 
(Bellamy 2004: 32). 
 
Third, communities require a shared long term interest and need to refrain 
from self-centric behaviour while interacting with other members in the 
community (Adler and Barnett 1996: 74). In other ways, it demonstrates the high 
level of communication and interdependent between the members of community 
whose shared similar interests. All these characteristics can exist at the local, 
domestic or international level (Adler and Barnett 1998: 32). In sum, the actors 
who share identities, values, and meanings, direct interactions and mutual 
cooperation can form a security community. Specifically, the criterion that 
distinguishes a security community from other kinds of communities is that its 
members entertain dependable expectations of peaceful change. 
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Dependable expectations of peaceful change can be assessed through two 
criteria. First, “stable expectations can be achieved from the actors with pre-given 
interests and preferences; and secondly from the actors with common identities 
and interests which are shaped by their environment” (Adler and Barnett 1998: 
34). In other words, the emergence of dependable expectations of peaceful change 
build on the political actors with shared identities and interests which will assure 
war-avoidance practices. According to Adler and Barnet, peaceful change can best 
defined as: 
 
“Neither the expectation of nor the preparation for organized violence as a 
means to settle interstate disputes” (Adler and Barnett 1998: 34). 
 
If states perceive any security behaviour from other members within the 
community as threatening, it will jeopardise the security community mechanism. 
As reiterated throughout the thesis, the fundamental regulations of security 
community is the absence of a military encounter for conflict settlement. In 
addition, Adler also proposed that power plays a crucial role in the development 
of security communities. Power in security communities is understood as the 
“authority to determine shared meaning that comprises the identities, interests, 
and practices of states, as well as the conditions that confer, defer, or deny access 
to ‘goods’ and benefits” (Adler 1997: 261). In this context, power constitutes the 
institutional power to legitimise and authorise their behaviour, without having 
conflicting interests within the frame of common understanding of the 
community. 
 
In sum, community with mutual norms, interests and identities tend to 
form an alliance with the outsiders and finally create a security community. Power 
is never isolated in security communities, rather it helps to attract and reproduce 
common interests among the members. Powerful states are deemed to be 
necessary for the development of security communities, as their presence will 
allure weaker states to share the security and welfare associated with them.  
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The concept of security community describes a collective with a high level 
of transaction and communication in which emphasise the peaceful means to 
resolve a conflict. The discussion on security community focuses on the 
emergence of shared interests and identities, in which this interests can be 
understood as an ideal type to pursue collective security in the security issue area. 
Security community is particularly important and useful to explain the 
convergence of cooperation in the security issues whereby members of a 
community do not foresee the other members as threats, rather they developed a 
common identity and cooperate in joint activities and projects. Security 
community is an ideal type to understand the cooperation between the members in 
which it provides main criterion that the members have a shared understanding of 
what constitutes a threat and what does not, and what threats do require security 
action from the members (Bueger 2013: 301). The framework has contributed for 
better understanding of the states’ behaviour and level of cooperation in conflict 
resolution which has previously dominated by liberalism. Liberalism approach has 
dominated the discussion of cooperative-security through the construction of 
institutions to encourage cooperation. However, Adler and Barnett offered 
alternative framework to explain the mutual engagement  and development of 
shared interests between members to collaborate collectively in joint projects. In 
addition, constructivism with its focus on constitutive norms and identities in 
shaping state interests supported that security community can be better understood 
with the premises of constructivism. This is due to the fact that constructivism 
offers the notions that peaceful change might be achieved through the 
institutionalisation of values and shared identities, indicating the relevance of 
constructivism in complementing the concept of security communities. After we 
understand what a community is, the next section will extend this discussion by 
exploring Adler’s (1997) concept of ‘cognitive regions’.  
2.3.3 Cognitive Regions 
After a detailed narrative on the definition of community, we need to understand 
and identify what constructs a community between political actors. States who 
construct a community share similar identities and interests which evolve from 
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interactions across transnational regions. In a similar way, it can understand as the 
assimilation of interests of one states with another through various interactions 
such as economic and cooperative practices. States who share ethnic or national 
identities promote the idea of the formation of community-regions. 
 
According to Adler, community-regions are “regional systems of 
interdependent group of states who shared identities, values and meanings, which 
may transcend the territorial boundaries” (Adler 1997: 253). Adler categorises 
community-regions into three companion elements: (a) people who actively 
interact beyond state borders, (b) people who are actively interdependent in 
regional politics engagement in order to achieve regional purposes; and (c) people 
who as citizens of states, compel the constituent states of the community-region to 
act as agents of regional good (Adler 1997: 253). Within community-regions, the 
fundamental requirement from the members is that they shared mutual perceptions 
towards external threats and at the same time practice non-threatening activities 
between each other (Adler 1997: 254). In other words, community-regions build 
on a set of groups which are interdependent, not within a geography setting alone, 
but rather constructed by a shared culture, history, economics and politics. This is 
in accordance with Adler and Barnett’s argument that a security community can 
exist when there is a common characteristic between the actors at the international 
level, the members do not have to be geographically contiguous (Adler and 
Barnett 1998: 33).  
 
That said, community-regions can also be perceived as cognitive regions 
which establish the mutual interests and practices of the members. Cognitive 
regions help to formulate the mutual understandings and identities among the 
members which at the end will assure that region is kept ‘in place’ (Adler 1997: 
254). Although a  region is constructed beyond the territorial base, the constitution 
of cognitive region with mutual values, understandings and norms enable the 
actors to construct a community. This community region is what makes  ‘security 
communities’. Adler suggests that the EU is the appropriate example of a 
community-region (Adler 1997: 254), where the members interact actively across 
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state borders pursuing regional goals either in political, economic, or culture 
purposes. To sum up this discussion about community-regions, it is best to 
understand community-regions as a group of political communities, constructed 
beyond specific geographic settings, and comprised of actors who have common 
identities and interests and actively engaged to pursue the regional purposes. In 
other words, the states with mutual identities and understanding will keep the 
region in place although they are geographically distant. The members promote 
the idea of economic interdependence, a high degree of communication and 
cooperative activities which contributes towards the absence of war within 
community-regions. In the next section, I will analyse different perspectives of 
security community expansion which was previously focused on developed 
countries. By contrast, I will explore the spread of security community building in 
the other regions, including, among others, Africa and Southeast Asia. 
2.3.4 The Building of Regional Security Communities 
The emergence of a security community has always been associated with 
developed regions including North America and Western Europe. In Europe, it 
was claimed that they have achieved the level where they can expect peaceful 
change within their boundaries using security community practices (Adler and 
Crawford 2006: 12). Nevertheless, the emergence of such community has also 
regained its importance in the other regions where cooperation among states has 
gradually increased. The security community transcends Europe, and can also 
been seen in  Southeast Asia, Africa and the Balkan region for instance. 
Bueger, in his work, Communities of Security Practice at Work? The 
Emerging African Maritime Security Regime (2013) explains how the expansion 
of maritime security communities has taken place particularly in African security. 
With the growing concerns over  maritime threats in Africa  especially piracy, 
there has been a significant effort to construct a maritime security regime 
complex. Bueger stressed how attempts to formulate African maritime security 
strategy is portrayed through the African Union (AU) and the framework of 
Southern African Development Community (SADC). The article discusses how 
the security community framework can be used to study the practice of African 
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maritime security through the application of shared repertoires, joint enterprises 
and mutual engagement (Bueger 2013: 300).  
Similarly, Suzette Grillot in her works, Developing Security Community in 
the Western Balkans: The Role of the EU and NATO (2010), examines the roles 
played by the third-parties, such as international organisations towards fostering 
the development of a security community and international integration. Using the 
Western Balkans as the case study, Grillot investigates how the EU and NATO 
play their roles as mediators to encourage the development of a security 
community through the process of socialisation (Grillot 2010: 62). Grillot 
explores how the practices of the EU and NATO in the Western Balkans post-
conflict are geared towards developing a regional security community. For that 
purpose, Grillot examined the initiatives of the EU in the Western Balkans 
through the implementation of Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) in 
1999, which offers a possibility of future EU membership (Grillot 2010: 74). SAP 
is an initiative which promotes the integration of Western Balkan countries into 
the EU political and economic structures (Grillot 2010: 74). With this initiative, 
the EU attempted to instill a sense of community among the Western Balkans 
states through membership requirements, which required them to engage 
collectively in regional cooperation and finally contributes to the development of 
security community. NATO on the other hand, offer a membership of Partnership 
for Peace (PfP) for the Balkan states, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia 
and Montenegro after its involvement in the peacekeeping operations in those 
countries (Grillot 2010: 75). PfP also promotes the idea of integration into 
political and security agendas among the members, whereby it required the 
members to engage in regional interaction. That said, the integration has 
contributed significantly to the evolution of a security community among Western 
Balkan countries. Ultimately, this article argues that both NATO and EU have 
contributed to the evolution of security community building in the Western 
Balkans particularly through their membership initiatives and policies in the 
region. 
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Although the spread of security communities regained its importance 
beyond regions, there is some contradiction from scholars who perceived security 
community expansion differently. For instance, within the ASEAN framework. 
ASEAN has always been the favoured example to describe the nascent non-liberal 
pluralistic security community as it fulfills the mechanisms required to build a 
security community (Adler 1997: 256; Adler 2008: 222; Adler and Greve 2009: 
76). However, Collins argues that there is a contrasting point about the 
communities mechanism. Alan Collins in his works, Bringing Communities Back: 
Security Communities and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Plural Turn 
(2014), points out that ASEAN is an institution which emphasises self-restraint as 
its fundamental practice among the members. However, Collins argues that the 
practice of self-restraint prevent the formation of security community within 
ASEAN (Collins 2014: 10). Collins asserts that ASEAN has not created a security 
community, liberal or non-liberal because it has not developed the linkages 
(material and ideational) among its member states, and peoples, that create a sense 
of community (Collins 2014: 2). Despite Adler’s admiration towards the 
emergence of ASEAN as a security community, Collins however concerns that 
principles which are the main pillars of ASEAN have somehow prevented 
ASEAN from developing into a security community.  
There are principles which should be obliged by the member states in 
order to create one non-liberal security community. The member states require 
common understanding about security and abide with principle not to interfere in 
each other’s affair to preserve the harmonious and stability of every member. The 
norms that underpin ASEAN have however prevent the type of interaction that 
can establish an intrusive governance mechanism (Collins 2014: 10). This norm 
represents the restriction of interactions between member states, therefore it does 
not consistent with the practices as being delineated in the security community, 
which are strongly emphasised on the collective-security as their basic norms. 
ASEAN’s main principles of non-interference also somehow undermine a process 
towards establishing a real community (Collins 2014: 10). The limited nature of 
interactions between ASEAN’s members is also reflected in the application of the 
‘self-restraint’ principles among them. ‘Self-restraint’ in ASEAN context means 
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no interference in each other’s domestic affairs, consequently led to the absence 
of a sense of belonging between the members (Nathan 2006: 284; Collins 2014: 
10). ASEAN is indicating that they are gradually moving towards pluralism with 
active engagement with a variety of stakeholders while at the same time legitimise 
civil society organisations (Collins 2014: 13). However in order to transform into 
security community, ASEAN needs to eschew their fundamental principles of 
self-restraint. The future of ASEAN to become a pluralistic security community 
although probable still remains uncertain. 
Comparatively, Nathan (2006) argues that domestic stability is also a 
missing condition when discussing the development of security communities 
(Nathan 2006: 275). Domestic stability is one of the conditions towards security 
community, as it relates to the security of people (Nathan 2006: 278). Dependable 
expectation of peaceful change is not subjected to the states per se, but also 
include the population or people embodies in one territory. Moreover, domestic 
stability is a necessary condition of a security community because it provides the 
connection between intra and interstate conflict. In this case, domestic violence 
will lead to suspicious and tension between states, preventing them from 
achieving the mutual trust and sense of collective identity (Nathan 2006: 280). 
Domestic instability or internal violence may interrupt the progress of building a 
security community because it will undermine the regional stability. Domestic 
repression also obstructs the process of making a security community because 
there will be a trust issue among the states, stiflling the sense of common identity 
among the member states. Furthermore, chaotic situations resulting from political 
instability in one state may lead their neighbouring countries to take collective 
action in order to help and maintain peace. Nevertheless, this action will lead to a 
greater opposition by the population creating disorder where the development of 
security community between states may be at stake. The other reason which 
makes domestic stability a necessary condition of a security community relates to 
the volatility and uncertainty associated with instability (Nathan 2006: 287). 
Although domestic instability does not always lead to cross-border violence, the 
risk of such violence cannot be dismissed (Nathan 2006: 287). Concerns over the 
spill-over effects of domestic violence may heighten due to several factors; (i) the 
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scale, intensity and duration of domestic violence, (ii) proximity, and (iii) balance 
of power (Nathan 2006: 287).  
 
In conclusion, the evolution of security communities can also be studied in 
non-Western regions. The spread of security communities has gradually diffused 
throughout the world where states have begun to enhance their interactions and 
form an alliance to share collective actions not only against external threats, but 
also to enhance cooperation in economy, culture and social. Security communities 
do not only explain the emergence of cooperation among the developed states, but 
they also transcend to other regions. We can observe the pattern of security 
cooperation has expanded in Southeast Asia, Africa and Balkan, although some 
missing conditions for security mechanism were identified in certain regions. In 
the next section, I will delve into the three stages of formation for security 
community to understand the evolution of how states transform into a security 
community. 
 
2.4 The Formation of Security Communities 
The concept of security communities provides a basis to understand the 
development and existence of a community and how it influences the interaction 
between states in security politics. However, in order to understand the 
development of security communities itself, Adler and Barnett offer three stages 
and indicators present in the formation of a security community. The three 
designed stages are nascent;  ascendant and finally, the mature phase.  
Phase I: Nascent 
The  nascent stage is where two or more states begin to consider coordinating 
their relations between each other to expand their mutual security, reduce the 
transaction costs associated with their exchanges, as well as to strengthen and 
develop more interactions in the future (Adler and Barnett 1996: 86). In this 
context, we can predict that it will involve various exchanges including 
diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral exchanges (Adler and Barnett 1998: 50). 
This phase demonstrates the growing needs of the state to engage with multilateral 
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relations to share their mutual interests.9 To ensure cooperation, states will 
normally establish ‘third parties’, consisting of organisations and institutions 
which can act as an observer to assure participating states are obliged to the 
contracts and rules (Adler and Barnett 1996: 86).  
 There are a number of reasons which motivate states to extend their 
interation with other members of the security community. For example, they may 
discover that they share common interests which require collective action, 
inspiring them to  form a strategic alliance (Adler and Barnett 1998: 50). One of 
the possible mechanisms that motivate states to form institutions is a mutual 
security threat.10 Parenthetically, states also seek to create organisations to 
enhance cooperation between them in area of interest, e.g. health, economic and 
environment. The creation of organisations will make the members become more 
interdependent (Adler and Barnett 1996: 87). In this case, Adler and Barnett offer 
Arab states for reference, by which they suggests the Arab states should intensify 
their security and political interactions, allowing them foster political community 
between themselves, rather than putting too much concern over the external threat. 
In sum, this phase is recognised as the initial phase where states begin to regain 
interest to have more interactions with other states which share similar interests 
and needs collective cooperation to engage in particular area they deem need 
necessary.11 
 
																																								 																				
9 This presupposition however has criticised by Ondrej Ditrych (2014). In his works, Security 
Community: A Future for a Troubled Concept? International Relations (28), pp.350-366, Ditrych 
argues that the benchmark indicating the beginning of security coomunities is insufficient to prove 
the emergence of security communities within states. He emphasised that security communities not 
only exist within states with shared interest, rather it can be observed everywhere, including at the 
global level (Ditrych 2014: 354). 
10 Deutsch suggests that when states discover that they share common threat, it is a sufficient 
condition to initiate an alliance between states, and finally form a security community. States 
discover that they require collective action and coordination policies to settle their common threats 
(Adler and Barnett 1996: 86). 
11 Laurie Nathan (2006) argues that domestic stability is a missing condition when discussing the 
development of security communities (Nathan 2006: 277). Nathan stressed that domestic stability 
should be one of the norm that required in developing security community as it relates to the 
security of people (Nathan 2006: 278) (See Laurie Nathan 2006, Domestic Instability and Security 
Communities. European Journal of International Relations, 12 (2), pp. 275-299. 
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Phase II: Ascendant 
According to Adler and Barnett, this phase demonstrates the development of 
networks (Adler and Barnett 1998: 53). Likewise, new institutions and 
organisations begin to consider either to create tighter military coordination and/or 
decrease fear that the other represents a threat; and states begin to trust each other 
more than before and encourage dependable expectations of peaceful change 
(Adler and Barnett 1998: 53). When the interactions begin to develop, the 
community that shared mutual interests and identity will create new institutional 
and organisational. In short, this phase is defined as an intensification of relations 
between states, where core states or a coalition of states play important role in 
sustaining the development of security communities. The ascendant phase 
demonstrates where the security community begins to diffuse among states and 
existing channels that were identied and intensified in the nascent phase. In this 
phase, more interaction emerge, various new social institutions and organisational 
forms take place, and states make efforts in promoting greater regional 
interaction, states will also empower various groups in civil society including 
nongovernmental organisations, social movements and expert groups (Adler and 
Barnett 1996: 90).  In sum, this phase demonstrates where states generate more 
interactive cooperation between members. They also increasingly share consensus 
over the mutual threats they face with, and simultaneously resort to peaceful 
settlement of any conflicts. 
Phase III: Mature 
The mature stage is where the security communities define and entertain 
dependable expectations of peaceful change (Adler and Barnett 1998: 55). At this 
stage, war is likely to be improbable, rather members of the security communities 
will respond to any external threat or attack as a collective security system. The 
differences between members have diminished, therefore it is unlikely for them to 
prepare war among themselves (Adler and Barnett 1998: 55). In general, the 
mature phase provides a broader distinction between loosely and tightly-coupled 
security communities. As briefly discussed in the earlier section, loosely-coupled 
security community assume that the cognitive region whose shared meanings and 
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mutual identity form a high level of trust between each other. That said, although 
some conflicting interests still exist between members of the community, it will 
never disrupt the interactions between the members (Adler and Barnett 1998: 55). 
Instead, members of the community will share dispositions of self-restraint.12    
 In order to determine the existence of loosely-coupled security 
community, Adler and Barnett offer few essential indicators: multilateralism; 
unfortified borders; changes in military planning; common definitions of threat; 
and discourse and the language of community (Adler and Barnett 1998: 55-56). 
First, multilateralism indicates the high degree of trust among the members. 
Multilateralism will likely lead to unified decision-making process and conflict 
settlement due to high level of consensus between members of the community 
(Adler and Barnett 1998: 55). Second, unfortified borders are implemented 
increasingly between the members. This does not indicate the entire absence of 
military encounters against threats, rather it implies that members of the 
community promote the expansion of border checks and patrols instead. Third, the 
security community comes into existence when there is a changes in military 
planning. The enlargement of military pact and operations between members 
however never perceived as a probable source of enemies, rather seen as a way to 
increase cooperation between the members to address mutual challenges (Adler 
and Barnett 1998: 56). Fourth, members of the security community share a 
common understanding and definition to identify any particular security concern 
that may be perceived as a threat to their survival and legitimacy. Finally, the 
community achieve specific standards of regulations and actions, by which the 
patterns of their interactions and communications are different from the outsiders. 
This demonstrates the similar way of life between the members with similar 
governance system whose at the same time maintaining a ‘we-feeling’ that 
eventually unite all the members and develop security community. 
																																								 																				
12 This has been re-emphasised by Adler (2008) in his works, The Spread of Security 
Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO’s Post-Cold War 
Transformation. European Journal of International Relations 14 (2), pp. 195- 230. Adler 
emphasised that security community at this phase implies the evolution of particular security 
community practices, including self-restraint. Self-restraint signals the guarantee that member 
states will handle any disputes through compromise and diplomatic means without resorting to the 
use of force, especially military encounters to settle the conflicts (Adler 2008: 204-205). 
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 Conversely, a tightly-coupled security community is different from the 
former in certain respects. Specifically, it focuses on few additional aspects than 
the previous indicators of loosely-coupled security community. Adler and Barnett 
offer different indicators, namely cooperative and collective security; a high 
degree of military agreement; policy coordination against ‘internal threats’; free 
movement of the population; and the internationalisation of the population (Adler 
and Barnett 1998: 56-57). The first indicator which is cooperative and collective 
security presupposes that the members advance from mutual arms control and 
confidence building to “cooperative security” to adjudicate security issues within 
the community. Meanwhile “collective security” refers to responses and actions 
agreed between member states against external threats outside the community 
(Adler and Barnett 1998: 56). Second, the level of interdependence between 
members increase whereby they will observe common threats to be handled with a 
high level of military cooperation merging the use of military resources between 
the members. Third, tightly-coupled security communities emphasise the 
importance of policy coordination to address the external threats, which have been 
mutually identified by the members. Fourth, the development of the free 
movements of the population between the members’ states demonstrates the 
existence of a tightly-coupled security community. For instance,  waiving visa 
requirements for citizens to travel across the members’ states implies that the 
members have increasingly developed the ‘we-feeling’, seeing themselves as one 
large community, compatible and not a threat to each other (Adler and Barnett 
1998: 57). The fifth indicator is the internationalisation of authority. This 
indicator explains the process where domestic laws of the members become 
consolidated in efforts to accommodate security situations of the community. This 
eventually leads to the internationalisation of law where all members abide to 
agreed practices of law and the mechanism of its enforcement (Adler and Barnett 
1998: 57). 
In summary, security communities are not community born with the 
existing cultural traits which shapes the frameworks, rather they are created. They 
start with preliminary interactive processes, which later leads to greater regional 
interaction where the members of the communities start to develop the feeling and 
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sense of community among themselves, and finally reach the peak of the 
development process where they are now within a group of community with a 
high degree of communication, trust and shared identity. The security 
communities are at their highest level of interaction where any discrepancies are 
eliminated, war is improbable and states are expected to resolve their disputes 
peacefully. The failure to achieve this mutual trust in the future is the signal of the 
breakdown of security communities. 
2.5 Security Community Mechanism and Repertoire of Practices  
After a comprehensive discussion on the formation of security communities from 
the perspective of Adler and Barnett, this section analyses the spread of security 
communities mechanism through the employment of repertoire of practices. This 
collection of security practices are adopted primarily to reiterate that any external 
threat to members’ survival is best governed by cooperative-security measures, 
confidence building and creation of partnerships which incorporate all the 
members. As has been reiterated repeatedly throughout the thesis, the necessary 
condition for the security community mechanism is the absence of war between 
states in a security community. The decay of this notion indicates the failure of 
security communities. For this reason, a set of repertoires is required to assure 
sustainability of security community mechanism. According to Emanuel Adler 
and Patricia Greve (2009), there are six vital repertoire of practices which help to 
sustain the security community mechanism.13  
First, dependable expectations of peaceful change are based on the practice 
of self-restraint; the abstention from the use of force as a means to conflict 
adjudication. Adler defines that “self-restraint is not (only) a political choice […] 
nor is it just a habit […] –– it is a disposition (Adler 2008: 205). Norbert Elias 
(1982) suggests that self-restraint from a psychological perspective includes the 
																																								 																				
13 See Emanuel Adler and Patricia Greve (2009), When Security Community Meets Balance of 
Power: Overlapping Regional Mechanisms of Security Governance. Review of International 
Studies, 35 (S1), pp. 59-84. Adler and Greve propose that mutual trust and collective identity are 
the conditions for the formation of alliance/alignments to prevent security dilemmas among the 
members. Therefore in order to maintain the mechanism of a security community, a set of 
practices are necessary to acquire the peaceful change between states in a security community 
(Adler and Greve 2009: 71). 
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‘taming of emotions and affects’ and the ‘extension of mental space beyond the 
moment into the past and future’ (Elias 1982: 236).14 Similiarly, Alexander Wendt 
(1999) also proposes the definition of self-restraint as a strengthening of the 
principle of “respect for difference”, in a way that states will feel less anxious of 
any potential loss if they compromise their interests with other states (Wendt 
1999: 363). The fundamental idea of security community is a mutual trust 
between members, however it is undeniable that there may still be contestation 
over their interests (Adler and Greve 2009: 71). With the practice of self-restraint, 
this contestation can be overcome between the members whereby violence is no 
longer an option, what matters most is that they adopt peaceful means through 
compromise and diplomatic measures to settle their conflicts. Adler further 
emphasises that self-restraint evolves not only within domestic members of the 
states, but it also transcends the transnational communities of the community 
(Adler 2009: 205). When the practice of self-restraint spread to non-liberal 
communities, it may motivate the non-members to develop cooperative security as 
a way of communication, and consequently help them evolve into non-liberal 
security communities (Adler 2008: 206). In summary, self-restraint is not merely 
a political tool or habit; rather it is a disposition which enables all the people in 
the security community to interact collectively without considering war as a 
means to settle any disputes.  
Second, repertoire of practices that sustain the security community 
mechanism is the inclination towards the importance of common enterprises, 
projects, and partnerships in the radius of interaction between the members (Adler 
and Greve 2009: 72). According to Attina (2006), partnerships can be defined as a 
“security arrangement between international actors to enhance stability of the 
region without the use of force, but instead establish more agreements, 
multilateral dialogue, confidence buidling measures and security treaties” (Attina 
2006: 242). As part of the partnership arrangements, the members will not only 
promote peaceful change in the region, but also gain the benefits the partnerships 
offer (Adler 2008: 207).  
																																								 																				
14 For a detailed debate, see Norbert Elias, Power and Civility: The Civilizing Process (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1982). 
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Third, Adler and Greve point out that ‘cooperative security’ which is 
indivisible and comprehensive is the natural security practice of security 
communities (Adler and Greve 2009: 72). The comprehensive cooperative 
security is the inclusion of traditional security elements to economic, 
environmental, cultural, and human right factors. It is also indivisible, in the sense 
that one state’s security is closely interlinked and may affected the security 
dynamics of the other states (Adler 2006: 9). In other words, any transboundary 
security issues faced by one state will be shared by the neighbouring states, and 
thus any unilateral actions will directly affect the other states as well. The most 
important attributes of cooperative security is the cooperative itself, in which 
“security is based on confidence and cooperation” and the peaceful settlements of 
conflicts with collective practices of the multilateral institutions (Adler 2006: 9). 
Adler emphasises that cooperative security includes a set of security practices to 
confront the threats that compromise the survival of the members. These practices 
include the creation of transnational dialogue and confidence building as the most 
appropriate way to manage any conflicts settlements (Adler 2008: 207). In other 
ways, cooperative-security provides assurance for the members not to feel 
vulnerable to long-standing threats which may affect their survival (Marquina 
2003: 310). Cooperative security also assumes the idea to promote regional 
identities and include neighboring states into the community as a member to 
handle security threats (Adler 2008: 207).  
Fourth, security community mechanisms advocate that diplomacy is a 
normal or natural practice in a security community. This implies that violence is 
not an option for conflict settlement, rather members of the community will adopt 
‘norms of consultation’ and multilateral decision-making practices (Adler and 
Greve 2009: 72). In other words, members of security communities focus on 
reassurance of good intentions between each other rather than deterrence. Fifth, a 
‘disposition towards spreading the community outward through explicit or 
implicit practices of socialisation or teaching’ upholds the security community 
mechanism. These includes the creation of partnerships, transnational security 
dialogues, or the formation of regions around a focal point (Adler and Greve 
2009: 72). Finally, the sixth repertoire of practices that sustain security 
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community mechanisms is the expansion of more specific practices which include 
changes in military arrangement and the implementation of confidence building 
measures (military integration, joint planning and exercises, intelligence 
exchanges, revision of army doctrines from traditional war-fighting to post-
conflict reconstruction), policy coordination, and unfortified borders15 (Adler and 
Greve 2009: 72).  
In sum, the sustainability or breakdown of a security community therefore 
relies upon whether or not these repertoire of practices can be upheld. These 
repertoire of practices lie at the heart of dependable expectations of peaceful 
change, hence the commitment of all member states to abide and comply with the 
repertoire of practices will ensure the sustainability of the security communities. 
In this section, I explored the repertoire of practices that sustain security 
community mechanism and are sustained by it in return. By and large, I have 
discussed the core principles and essence of security community framework. This 
includes the origins of the concept, the evolution and modifications of the 
concept, the formation of the security community and repertoire of practices of 
the security community mechanism. In the next section, I will scrutinise the 
security community building process in the Mediterranean region which 
constitutes the principal focus of this thesis. 
2.6 An Emerging Security Community in the Mediterranean Region 
In this section, I will explore the expansion of security communities with a 
particular focus in the Mediterranean region which is the essence of this thesis. 
Security community building in the Mediterranean and particularly discussion of 
maritime domain has not really featured in security community studies. That said, 
I will focus on two essential areas of discussion in the Mediterranean Sea, that is 
terrorism and irregular migration. For this purpose, I will draw on Emanuel Adler 
(1998) and Niklas Bremberg’s (2016) works as they have studied the 
Mediterranean region from a security community perspective.  
																																								 																				
15 In their works, Security Communies (1998), Adler and Barnett assert that unfortified borders as 
one indicator of the existence of security community. They presume that instead of military 
invasion, border checks and patrols are the better way in border control management against 
external threats (Adler and Barnett 1998: 55). 
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The Mediterranean, according to many political scholars, is less than a 
region but comprises of states with varieties of dynamics and identities. The 
Mediterranean region has shown expansion of institutional cooperation despite the 
limited similarity in values and common identity (Attina 2006: 239). Emanuel 
Adler (1998)16 has studied the construction of regional security partnerships in the 
Mediterranean from a security commmunity perspective. Adler suggests the 
possibility for the Mediterranean region to develop toward becoming a security 
community. Accordingly, the Mediterranean Sea is extremely vulnerable to varied 
threats, principally due to the fact that the economy and trade are booming in the 
basin. These threats include, among others, global terrorism, the proliferation of 
WMD, interstate military conflict, drug trafficking, and irregular migration. Adler 
argues that in order to handle the security risks from these threats, EU members 
adopted a collective system, creating multilateral security dialogues, ‘track-two’ 
diplomacy, and confidence building measures within the EU institutions such as 
Western European Union (WEU) and  the Council of Europe, to name a few 
(Adler 1998: 186). The process of regional building in the Mediterranean however 
has been interrupted by a number of factors including endless violent conflict in 
the Middle East and suspicions over the projection of Western expansion in the 
Mediterranean (Adler 1998: 187). The forms of cooperation has remained limited 
in the Mediterranean Sea before the end of the Cold War. However, after Cold 
War, the regional economic development through cooperative institutions has 
gradually increased. For instance, the plan for the establishment of Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) was proposed in early 
1990s by several southern European countries. The principal aim of CSCM was 
none other but to expand regional cooperation and promote mutual trust between 
the members (Adler 1998: 187). NATO also played an important role in regional 
building in the Mediterranean with its formulation of Mediterranean policy in 
1994 to boost collaboration with non-members (Adler 1998: 188).  
																																								 																				
16 See Emanuel Adler (1998), Condition (s) of Peace, Review of International Studies, 24 (5), 
pp.165-191. 
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Comparatively, Emanuel Adler together with Beverly Crawford (2006) 
have also explored the Mediterranean from a security commmunity perspective.17 
Adler and Crawford claimed that the creation of partnerships and dialogues in the 
Mediterranean is framed within pluralistic security community processes and 
practices (Adler and Crawford 2006: 18-19). In order to demonstrate how the 
integration in the Mediterranean region takes place, the security community 
framework is the most suitable concept to use. Using the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership (EMP) and Barcelona Process as a case study, Adler and Crawford 
suggests that within cooperation to tackle security threats in the Mediterranean 
has constructed Mediterranean region as a pluralistic security community (Adler 
and Crawford 2006: 18). 
The effort to construct the Mediterranean as a region is not novel, rather it 
started decades ago during the period of Cold War. However the effort to integrate 
Mediterranean failed because of lack of participation from the Mediterranean non-
member countries. In addition, different perception towards which security issues 
could potentially challenge the stability of the region has made it difficult to 
integrate the states and form a region. In 1972, the European Community created 
the Global Mediterranean Policy in order to promote bilateral economic relations 
as well as to provide assistance and agreements between non-member countries of 
the Mediterranean (MNMCs) (Adler and Crawford 2006: 21). However, due to 
lack of participation from the non-member countries, this cooperation failed to 
develop. The next effort took place in 1973 when the Conference on Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) attempted to create regional cooperation with the 
regional experts in economics, science, culture and the environment. However this 
effort has also failed because the cooperation program received little attention 
from the United States, which at that time gave more attention to East-West 
conflict (Adler and Crawford 2006: 21). The Barcelona Process and the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), demonstrate the application of security community 
																																								 																				
17 See Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford (2006), Normative Power: The European Practice of 
Region-Building and the Case of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. In. Emanuel Adler et al. 
(eds). The Convergence of Civilizations: Constructing a Mediterranean Region, pp. 3-50. This 
work promotes the idea that construction of a Mediterranean region as a pluralistic security 
community within the EMP and Barcelona Process is a long term goals of political actors. 
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practices in particular political and security dialogue between the members, 
community building and seminar diplomacy (Adler and Crawford 2006: 26). 
Another notable study of the spread of security community in the 
Mediterranean region is by Niklas Bremberg (2016). His work, Diplomacy and 
Security Community-Building: EU Crisis Management in the Western 
Mediterranean focuses on the analysis of the expansion of security community 
building in the Mediterranean to handle non-military threats and transnational 
challenges. Bremberg argues that repertoire of practices of security community 
mechanism, particularly cooperative security has gradually increased in the 
Mediterranean as a means for conflict resolutions (Bremberg 2016: 3). Bremberg 
claimed that the insecurity/security in the Mediterranean, particularly in the 
southern Mediterranean is essential in the post-Cold War period as the region is 
confronted with varied security challenges. These include the threats of terrorism, 
illegal migration, radicalist networks, and economic recession. In order to study 
the correlation between member states and non-members of Mediterranean, it is 
essential to discover the process of security community building by the EU 
through security practices (Bremberg 2016: 3). The empirical focus of his work is 
the relations between Spanish and Moroccan diplomatic relations to engage with 
crisis management in the region. Focusing on civil protection and CSDP 
demonstrates how the EU promotes security community building outside the EU 
with non-members (Bremberg 2016: 21). It has also enables the study to explore 
the roles of the EU as a security community-building institution in the 
Mediterranean to promote security beyond its borders.  
To sum up, the Cold War era demonstrates very limited study on regional 
building in the Mediterranean, particularly for maritime domain which has not 
really featured in security community research. However, we can still presume 
that the practices implemented in the Mediterranean via the institution practices 
implies that the security community process began decades ago, although it was 
limited in nature. Adler and Crawford suggest that limitation of security 
community building in the Mediterranean during the Cold War was due to the 
irrelevance of the concept for security politics during the time. The end of Cold 
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War however has shown that various initiatives and security dialogues have been 
formulated in the Mediterranean region to create regional security community. It 
began to materialise because of the contemporary security issues Mediterranean 
region was grappling with as a result of the emergence of non-state actors and 
transboundary threats. On the other hand, Bremberg provides an exemplary works 
as a foundation to study Mediterranean region from a security community 
perspective and to understand how the expansion of security community 
materialises through cooperative security practices for crisis management. 
Although Adler and Bremberg provide empirical studies of Mediterranean region 
from a security community perspective, it lacks empirical study on maritime 
domain. Other important transnational threats have also been neglected in security 
community research. For this reason, the principal discussion of this thesis merit 
broader exploration of the Mediterranean region, with emphasis on the maritime 
domain in the Mediterranean Sea. The thesis will also focus on transnational 
threats in the Mediterranean Sea, namely terrorism at sea and irregular migration. 
In order to understand the correlation between security community building and 
security practices in the Mediterranean Sea, I will delve into the initiatives and 
policies for both counter-terrorism and counter-migration by the EU and NATO. 
Focusing on these two major areas of security practices, it will contribute to new 
insights into the dynamics of security community research. 
2.7 Security Community Building: Maritime Security Practices in the 
Mediterranean Sea 
The section will explore the study of the security community and its repertoire of 
practices into maritime security practices in the Mediterranean Sea. The empirical 
focus of the thesis is the relations between EU and NATO in enforcing counter-
terrorism and counter-migration activities. A crucial question now arises. Which 
practices of security community mechanism are observable in maritime security 
practices through counter-terrorism and counter-migration activities? This is 
important to understand the security community building process through the 
maritime security practices in the Mediterranean, and concurrently enables us to 
identify the formation stage of security community building in the Mediterranean. 
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 For that reason, I will therefore explore empirical case studies from a 
security community framework. I will explore which repertoire of practices are 
relevant in the security practices in the Mediterranean Sea. For the first empirical 
case study, counter-terrorism, the repertoire of practices which is perceptible for 
the study of security community research is evident. As both EU and NATO are 
tightly-coupled security communites and increasingly developed into ‘mutual aid 
society’, cooperative security practices have considerably expanded. Furthermore, 
I will observe practices of confidence building measures and military 
engagements in the Mediterranean Sea. First, the enforcement of counter-
terrorism operations by NATO, Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) clearly 
exemplifies the practices of partnerships and confidence building measures. It 
demonstrates the high level of trust between NATO members to adopt cooperative 
security as a means to collectively deal with terrorist threats in the Mediterranean. 
This operation also conforms with the description whereby it involves military 
joint operations, intelligence exchange and unfortified borders with additional 
form of partnerships with its partners. 
 The second case study, the security practices for irregular migration also 
indicates observable features of security community practices. What I mean here 
is, counter-migration activities by the EU and NATO demonstrate apparent 
attributes of security practices. First, I will study the spread of cooperative 
security within the implementation of counter-migration activities. Cooperative 
security as a natural practice of EU and NATO enables these institutions to adopt 
collective actions to deal with mass movement of people across the Mediterranean 
Sea while at the same time disrupt the smuggler networks. This can be examined 
from the enforcement of Operation Sophia, for instance. For this operation, EU 
has engaged in a close relationship with its agencies such as Frontex, NATO and 
Libyan authorities to manage the migration crisis in the Mediterranean. 
Confidence building measures  also merits broader exploration as it demonstrates 
the spread of security community practices in the basin. This can clearly be 
observed within various military cooperations, joint planning and exercises within 
the frame of counter-migration activities. This includes joint operations by 
Frontex such as Triton and Nautilus. These operations not only involved actively 
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in joint operations but also enforce various training and exercises with other 
actors, particularly naval forces and border guards. That said, I will observe these 
security activities to analyse the process of security community expansion in 
counter-migration in the Mediterranean Sea.  
 In sum, this section explores the evolution of the security community 
framework within the maritime security practices in the Mediterranean. Focusing 
on the empirical case studies of counter-terrorism and counter-migration, I 
explore which security practices are evident to demonstrate the expansion of 
security community building in the Mediterranean Sea. In other ways, I link the 
concept of security community, in particular, of security community practices, to 
maritime security practices and argue that practices which embody a set of values 
are essential sources of community-building. Accordingly, few repertoire of 
practices were identified within the implementation of maritime activities at sea. 
Through the maritime security practices in the Mediterranean Sea, it seems clear 
that both NATO and EU have reached the mature phase of a security community. 
A community is considered as a mature security community when they conform 
with the essential indicators, which includes cooperation and collective security; 
high level of military integration and adoption of policy coordination against 
internal threats. Accordingly, maritime activities for counter-terrorism and 
counter-migration in the Mediterranean demonstrates the existence of military 
engagement and joint military operations between the members of the community 
(i.e. Operation Active Endeavour, Operation Sophia, Operation Sea Guardian, and 
Operation Coherent Behaviour). In addition, various cooperative security 
practices including multiple training and exercises, policies, dialogues, are also 
actively expanding to deal with these threats. A relevant point to be emphasised 
here is that practicing cooperative security as a collective way to deal with 
transnational threats implies that security community building spreads in the 
Mediterranean Sea. In this thesis, it seems clear that the repertoire of practices 
demonstrate cooperative security by the EU and NATO in the Mediterranean, 
wherein more confidence building measures have been taken, joint exercises held, 
and intelligence exchanges to manage maritime security in the Mediterranean 
have taken place.  
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2.8 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has explored the security community framework, firstly discussing 
the origins of the concept introduced by Karl Deutsch in 1957. Deutsch argues 
that there are two types of security community, which is amalgamated and 
pluralistic security community. Nevertheless, the origins concept of security 
community is no longer relevant to contemporary world politics due to the fact 
that the dynamics of international politics have changed after the end of the Cold 
War. While still agreed with some of the conceptual foundation, Adler and 
Barnett have established a refined definition of security community framework to 
conform with current circumstances with some additional works. Adler and 
Barnett have introduced the distinction between tightly and loosely coupled 
pluralistic security communities, as well as developed three stages model for the 
formation of security community. Furthermore, Adler and Greve also delineates 
six repertoire of practice which help to keep security community mechanism in 
place. 
Security community practices have been widely diffused in the 
Mediterranean region, in this case it can be demonstrated through cooperation 
building in the Mediterranean Sea between NATO, EU and the Mediterranean 
countries either regionally or internationally. The concept of security community 
is an attempt to find a remedy for the insecurity of states in international arena. In 
other words, the security community aims to provide a collective security for 
members through the implementation of mutual actions and cooperation. 
According to the repertoire of practices delineated to sustain security 
communities’ mechanism, these attributes are evidently demonstrated within the 
maritime operations in counter-terrorism and counter-migration and ultimately 
demonstrate how the cooperative security has been implemented in managing 
maritime security issues in the Mediterranean Sea. The security community in this 
context also implies how it has developed a comprehensive and strong community 
based on the practice of self-restraint, the elimination of the possibility of war 
among themselves but with a focus on mutual cooperation. 
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This chapter explores the essential conceptual foundation for the thesis and 
offers a framework to assess the relations between security community practices 
and maritime security operations. The correlation between the concept of security 
community and repertoire of practices demonstrates that practices are certainly an 
important source of community building. The chapter specifically analyses the 
extent to which the security community process is exhibited in maritime security 
operations, which at the same time addresses the main research question of the 
thesis. In order to demonstrate how the security community framework can be 
used to answer the research questions, the next chapter delves into the 
methodology conducted to analyse the case studies of counter-terrorism and 
counter-migration in the Mediterranean Sea.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	
	
52	
CHAPTER 3 
Research Design and Case Selection 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter explored the security community framework, the foundation 
of the framework and the repertoire of practices of the security community 
mechanism. This chapter explains the research design of the thesis. Specifically, 
the chapter analyses adoption of qualitative approach as a research method for the 
thesis, the rationale for case study selection and details the methods used for the 
collection of empirical data. The essential point here is the use of the security 
community framework to explain the spread and expansion of security community 
building in the Mediterranean Sea. This can be demonstrated through a linkage of 
the concept of security community, in particular security community practices, 
with maritime security practices. 
The research design adopted for the study focuses on the concept of 
security community as a framework in this research. The adoption of qualitative 
research methods and case selection are made to determine the presence of 
maritime security threats and to aid with analysis of security community practices 
in the Mediterranean Sea. The essence of the framework is that the elements and 
mechanisms enable us to evaluate the security community evolution through the 
implementation of counter-terrorism and counter-migration initiatives in the 
Mediterranean Sea. Specifically, the framework assists to determine the direction 
of this research, allows for the mapping of maritime security and enables us to 
answer the research question of what actors deal with security threats in the 
maritime domain. In so far as the security community framework has never been 
employed in a maritime context, the thesis plays an important role, bringing new 
insights into the dynamics of security community research. 
That being said, this chapter explores the rationale of adopting qualitative 
research approach for this research. Also, I analyse the reason behind the selection 
of the empirical case studies and discuss why the thesis focus only on terrorism 
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and irregular migration instead of other potential maritime threats in the 
Mediterranean Sea. Finally, the chapter explores the methods used throughout the 
study for data collection, that is textual analysis and interviews. The section 
focuses on a discussion of selected empirical material and the process of 
conducting interviews in order to acquire additional information for the research. 
The discussion intended to explicate how the empirical materials were used to 
answer the research objectives and research questions of the thesis.   
3.2 Qualitative Research Approach 
In conducting a research, qualitative research method is one of the essential 
approach used for data collection and data analysis. Qualitative research is 
commonly associated to ‘social science research’ (Sjoberg and Horowitz 2013: 
104), which involves a specific set of methods to achieve critical outcomes such 
as archival research, content analysis and in-depth interviews. In qualitative 
research, a broad and holistic approach is required to study and understand the 
social phenomena (King and Horrocks 2010: 7). Qualitative research can be 
conducted for a wide range of studies including, among others, to understand 
social interactions among people; to understand behaviour, beliefs or opinions of 
the study participants; and to study complex issues such as human trafficking 
(Hennink et al. 2011: 10). Qualitative research allows the researcher to identify 
issues and understand a phenomenon from the perspective of participants, which 
is through their experience or interpretations. In other ways, qualitative research 
concerns how the social, cultural or economic context could shape and influence 
people’s behaviour. This is referred to as the interpretive approach. In order to 
understand people’s behaviour or subject of the study, the researcher needs to be 
flexible and open-minded settings to allow for neutral, equitable and unbiased 
judgments towards the participants information (Hennink et al. 2011: 9). 
Interpretive research does not intend to prove how accurate the defined concept or 
framework are, rather it focuses on how the framework can be used in a certain 
study (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 40). For instance, this research used 
qualitative/interpretive research methods, as this study attempts to trace a 
connection between the security community framework and maritime security 
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practices through the implementation of maritime security initiatives. In short, 
qualitative research is a way to provide in-depth understanding of the contextual 
influences on the research issues, provide depth and nuance to the research issues, 
as well as making sense of the research studies.  
This thesis adopted a qualitative research approach in order to understand 
the process of security community building in order to achieve better 
understanding of a maritime security phenomenon. In determining the spread of 
the security community framework in the Mediterranean Sea, it is necessary to 
study the spectrum of threats in the basin and examine the processes involved 
through the employment of maritime security practices. In order to answer the 
research objectives and to provide answers to the research questions, a qualitative 
study based on in-depth content analysis was conducted. The thesis used textual 
analysis and interviews as the main methods for data collection. Supplementary 
sources featuring statistics, such as the number of migrants’ arrival to the 
European countries and number of migrants’ death at sea were also used to 
support the qualitative data derived from textual analysis and interview. These 
statistics were useful in providing additional information in relation to irregular 
migration issues, explaining how the issue has worsened. In line with the 
methodology and selection of methods to collect the data, it therefore seemed 
relevant that this thesis adopted a qualitative research approach throughout the 
research.  
Previous research on the security community framework were also widely 
constructed within qualitative research approach. For instance, Niklas Bremberg 
(2016) used qualitative research to study the security community building in the 
Western Mediterranean. Bremberg studied the role that the EU plays as a security 
community building institution by using Spain and Morocco as case studies in 
order to explain how the security community expanded between Spain and 
Morocco to tackle non-military threats and transboundary risks through the 
practices of diplomacy and cooperative security. Similarly, in this thesis I explore 
how the practices within counter-terrorism and counter-migration connect the 
concept of security community practices with the community-building process in 
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the Mediterranean Sea. In order to collect empirical data for the analysis, 
Bremberg made use of government policies, legislative documents and semi-
structured elite interviews18 to collect information of Spanish-Moroccan 
cooperation. In my own study, I conducted a smaller number of interviews with 
five interviewees including the EU and NATO officials due to the in-depth nature 
of my research. The purpose of interviews in my research is to complement 
existing data from textual analysis and provide additional useful information, 
which I could not retrieve from the documents. Also, the interviews were intended 
to achieve depth of information (rather than breadth), therefore only few 
participants are needed in my research. Furthermore, Bremberg also collected 
secondary sources such as policy reports and made use of statistical data to 
explain EU’s external trade relations (Bremberg 2016: 19). Likewise, making use 
of secondary sources was useful in my own study too as it aided to provide 
additional information and allows producing the detailed narratives of the issues. 
Statistical data assists to describe the research issue accurately particularly 
capturing essential aspects such as the number of migrants’ arrival to Europe and 
total fatality from the boats casualty in the Mediterranean Sea. Ultimately, the 
statistical data enables to describe the real pressing situation of migration crisis in 
the Mediterranean. This thesis took a similar approach to the study of security 
community expansion in the Mediterranean Sea.19  
Fotios Moustakis (2003) has also used qualitative research to study 
security community expansion in the Eastern Mediterranean. He studied Greece 
and Turkey as  principal case studies and analyses the application of pluralistic 
security communities in the Mediterranean within the context of cooperation 
between Greece and Turkey. His study examines the extent to which both Greece 
and Turkey have achieved or fulfilled the conditions required for a pluralistic 
security community through their cooperative mechanism (Moustakis 2003: 89). 
																																								 																				
18 Bremberg conducted around seventy interviews with various European and national government 
officials, diplomats, military officials and civil protection experts (Bremberg 2016: 20). 
19 Likewise, Bremberg made use of secondary sources such as policy reports, newspaper articles 
and academic works to acquire further information about the cooperation between Spain and 
Morocco. He also used statistical data including trade volume and military spending between EU 
and Morocco, in order to establish the connection between their cooperation and security 
community building in crisis management (Bremberg 2016: 19). 
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The study is similar to my own in a way that it adopted case study research to 
concentrate on specific case studies in relations to security community expansion, 
only that in my case I focus on cooperation in counter-terrorism and counter-
migration to study the spread of security community in the Mediterranean Sea. 
The key point here is that his study adopted similar model to what this thesis 
employs, in that we aimed to scrutinise the extent of security community 
expansion through the repertoire of practices of security community framework. 
In sum, qualitative research is the most prevalent approach to be used in 
conducting a research of security community framework. While previous research 
on the security community framework has generally preferred the qualitative 
approach, I applied the similar approach to study and understand security 
community expansion through counter-terrorism and counter-migration policies in 
the Mediterranean Sea. Qualitative research, particularly textual analysis and 
interview, allow me to understand how the process of security community 
building takes place through the employment of maritime practices. This is 
achieved from the useful information obtained from the interviews and extensive 
literature explaining the forms of maritime practices that exist in the 
Mediterranean Sea. It also assists to establish understanding about the terrorism 
and irregular migration as a security threats in the Mediterranean Sea with 
detailed information and substantial data acquired from various sources of 
documents and interviews. This is dicussed in further detail in the latter section of 
the methods of data collection. Therefore, to reiterate, qualitative research is 
required in this thesis not only to study maritime security in the basin, but more 
importantly allow to understand security community mechanism in the 
Mediterranean Sea. 
3.3 The Case Study Research and Case Selection 
The implementation of counter-terrorism and counter-migration policies by the 
EU and NATO in the Mediterranean Sea were selected as the main case studies in 
this thesis. This is because, as indicated in Chapter 1, the Mediterranean Sea is 
among the busiest maritime highways in the world, which makes it particularly 
important for trade and economic purposes. After the end of the Cold War, the 
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Mediterranean became the centre of the security nexus and instabilities 
surrounding it, including inter-state disputes, illegal migration, terrorism and drug 
trafficking, to name a few. The instabilities and conflicts surrounding the region 
have exposed the region with the potential security risks, which can undermine 
the stability and economic growth in the Mediterranean Sea. Terrorism and 
irregular migration are by far the most dominant threats in the Mediterranean Sea. 
As they are included within the top priorities of NATO and EU security policy, 
this indicates that the threats deserve greater space for analysis. Additionally, it is 
essential to study the roles of the EU and NATO as the main security actors in the 
region to maintain the safety and security of the Mediterranean, and focus the 
study on their security policies, in this case counter-terrorism and counter-
migration.  
 
The collection of data for the thesis draws upon process-tracing 
techniques. Pouliot proposes that case study methods like process-tracing 
contributes to enhancing internal validity (Pouliot 2013: 45). In this process-
tracing, the researcher examines histories, archival documents, interview 
transcripts, and other sources to find the link between causes and observed 
outcomes (George and Bennett 2005: 6). This technique is particularly well-suited 
for qualitative research because it concentrates on detailed case studies with a 
particular focus on the intervening variables to test theories, which makes it 
suitable to be used in developing conceptual frameworks (Bremberg 2016: 15). 
Moreover, case studies allow for conceptual refinements with a higher level of 
validity over a smaller number of specific cases (George and Bennett 2005: 19). 
This supports my rationale for employing the case study model for counter-
terrorism and counter-migration. These two case studies can demonstrate the 
extent to which the security community framework has developed in the 
Mediterranean Sea with the focus on the repertoire of practices of the framework. 
These two case studies are also an ideal options for the case study approach, 
allowing in-depth research of maritime security studies. Similarly, I adopted 
textual analysis and interviews as the methods to collect the data for the research 
and it is relevant in relation to studying whether the security community 
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framework is evident in the sequence of maritime practices in the selected case 
studies.  
 
	 In choosing empirical cases, the thesis aimed to select security threats, 
which received greater attention and involved various cooperative tools from the 
EU and NATO. More importantly, the essential criterion in case study selection is 
the need to establish new perspective of security community framework within 
the maritime boundaries. The security community has been widely used to analyse 
threats emerging from or at land-sources, therefore in order to bring nuanced 
insights in the research framework, the maritime domain will be the centre of the 
thesis.  
It is evident that the Mediterranean is not only battling with terrorism and 
irregular migration problems, but also other security threats such as drug 
trafficking, inter-state disputes, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) and possible acts of piracy. To put into consideration, threats such as 
environmental pollution and IUU fishing are also considered as a threats in the 
Mediterranean. However, these threats would lead to very different studies 
particularly in explaining the relevant actors dealing with the threats in the basin. 
In regards to the security community framework, it would also lead to different 
perspectives of security community research had the other threats selected instead 
of terrorism and irregular migration. The purpose of this thesis is not only to study 
the security community from the maritime domain perspective, but also to assess 
the extent to which the security community has evolved and exhibited within the 
maritime security practices in the Mediterranean Sea.  
For instance, drug trafficking is a possible security challenge for the 
Mediterranean, in as the region serves as a crucial crossroads for drug smuggling 
by organised criminal groups in Europe. This includes the smuggling of heroin 
mainly from Afghanistan, cocaine from South America, and cannabis from North 
Africa (Delicato 2010a: 2). The most prominent zones for drug smuggling 
towards Europe is the Balkan routes in the Black Sea or Adriatic Sea (Germond 
and Grove 2010: 13). The Balkan serves as the main route for worlds’ drug 
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trafficking with various types of drugs being smuggled every year, including, 
among others, heroin, cocaine, cannabis, and even ecstacy (Delicato 2010a: 2). 
The Balkan route has poor capacities of coastal monitoring and policing, which 
makes it even more vulnerable for drug smuggling. One of the Balkan routes 
within South-Eastern Europe has become an increasingly important gateway for 
drug trafficking routes to Western and Central Europe, particularly in the supply 
of heroin. These are a few examples of drug smuggling threats via the Balkan 
route and considering the importance of this issue, this could be worthy of study 
on their own merits. In addition, diverse drug flows come from various directions 
and multiple modes of transport includes air, land and sea using a range of 
methods. However, the most popular and traditional route of drug trafficking to 
Europe is via land route since 1980s.20 This also supported my rationale not to 
focus on drug trafficking as a case study for the thesis, as the principal aim is to 
focus on a threats emerge primarily at or from maritime domain more than a land 
based issues. 
 
Other potential case studies for analysis in the Mediterranean were 
considered, such as environment pollution. Known as one of the busiest sea routes 
in the world, Mediterranean Sea is the main transit for ships exporting and 
carrying crude oil and crude oil products. It is estimated that about 220,000 
vessels of more than 100 tonnes each across the Mediterranean Sea via the Suez 
Canal, Strait of Gibraltar, and Bosporus Strait every year (EEA 2006: 25). The 
																																								 																				
20 Land route has been dominating drug trafficking route to European consumer markets 
particularly the trafficking of cocaine where Turkey play an important role as a transit hub from 
Asia and Middle East before arriving Europe (EMCDDA, 2015b). According to the Report on 
Analysis of Opioid Trafficking Routes from Asia to Europe published by EMCDDA in 2015, there 
are three major factors influencing the trafficking routes to Europe. First, traffickers have the 
tendency to pursue for specific route that is safer and will likely to avoid areas of instability and 
conflicted. This is to guarantee the safety of drug consignments before reaching Europe. In 
contrary, however, traffickers may also choose to use the areas of conflict as a trafficking route, 
due to the fact that conflicted areas are always less policed and have weak governance. Traffickers 
will likely use this opportunity to exploit for drug trafficking activities via that area of conflict. 
Secondly, in relations to the rigid law enforcement activities to tackle the proliferation of 
trafficking networking, the traffickers are likely to shift their modus operandi and route of 
trafficking to avoid the possibility of being arrested (EMCDDA, 2015b). The third factor 
influencing the trafficking routes is the development of transport infrastructure, including courier 
services and container shipping. The development has facilitated towards more rapid connection 
and transportation between drug production and drug consumer markets, to reduce the possibility 
of being intercepted by the law enforcer (EMCDDA, 2015b). 
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increasing volume of goods moved through the Mediterranean Sea has exposed 
the basin to greater challenges of pollution. One of the challenges facing by the 
Mediterranean Sea is the oil discharged from the ships. It is estimated that about 
250,000 tonnes of oil were discharged every year from varied shipping operations 
such as fuel and discharge oil, illegal bunkering and tank cleaning practices (EEA 
2006: 25). In addition, around 80,000 tonnes of oil have been spilled every year in 
the Mediterranean Sea resulted from shipping accidents (EEA 2006: 26). 
However, 80% of the pollution in the Mediterranean Sea comes from the land 
based sources including industrial emissions, domestic waste and urban waste 
water (Scoullos 2010: 1).21 In short, there is a potential to study pollution in the 
Mediterranean Sea as a case study of the thesis, however I decided to exclude 
discussion about pollution in the thesis for two reasons.  
 
First, threats related to pollution and environment are not apt for the thesis 
because the threats are better known as ‘softer’ or non-violent threats, whereas the 
focus of the research is to investigate the maritime threats which involve more on 
security aspects or normally known as ‘violent threats’. Introducing pollution as a 
case study would have diverted the approaches of the security actors when dealing 
with the other violent threats such as terrorism. Secondly, pollution in the 
Mediterranean Sea involves initiatives including environment convention and 
declaration in order to prevent pollution and protect marine environment. By 
contrast, the practices of security community framework highlights the practices 
of military integration, security dialogue and confidence building measures to 
coordinate cooperation between the members of community. Therefore, the 
missing link of this repertoire of practices would have led to very different studies 
in security community research had this pollution issue been selected instead of 
terrorism and irregular migration. After all, the purpose of the research is 
dedicated mainly to assess the extent of security community expansion through 
																																								 																				
21According to statistics by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), it has been 
estimated that millions tons of sewage, mineral oil, mercury, lead and phosphates are dumped into 
the Mediterranean every year. Apart of industrial and domestic waste, pollutants also include 
pesticides and nutrient chemicals derived from agricultural activities, oil and petroleum 
hydrocarbons, litter, and radioactive and thermal inputs (EEA 2006: 16-17). 
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the maritime practices, and so this is why terrorism and irregular migration are a 
relevant cases to study. 
 
It should be noted that the Mediterranean Sea is also currently challenging 
in terms of potential acts of piracy. In fact, European waters are not affected by 
this activity, however Somali coasts with high-risk piracy area, situated in close 
proximity to Europe may cause spillover effects to the Mediterranean Sea. As a 
result, few operational initiatives have been employed by the EU such as 
Operation Atalanta in order to tackle the series of attacks of piracy in the Gulf of 
Aden (Germond and Grove 2010: 13). However, to reiterate, unlike terrorism and 
irregular migration, piracy is not a predominant threat in the Mediterranean Sea. 
Owing to counter-piracy initiatives employed in Somalia coasts, the proliferation 
of piracy would not concern the security of the Mediterranean Sea. In addition, 
the purpose of the research is to investigate the approaches of both EU and 
NATO, however in the case of piracy the absence of NATO engagement in the 
Mediterranean Sea would not answer the research questions of the thesis.  
 
In order to examine the rationale of why terrorism and irregular migration 
present a security threats in the Mediterranean Sea, a historical background was 
discussed in Chapter 5 and chapter 6 respectively. This historical overview was 
provided to demonstrate the reasoning of how terrorism and irregular migration 
considered as a security threats to Europe, and also to explain why both threats 
received greater attention from the EU and NATO in their security policy in the 
Mediterranean Sea. Moreover, an overarching historical background was also 
provided in Chapter 4 principally to demonstrate the development of NATO and 
EU roles in the Mediterranean Sea after the end of the Cold War. Such a 
development assists in understanding the enlargement of NATO and EU maritime 
strategies in the Mediterranean Sea, in order to address multiple security 
challenges in the basin in the post-Cold War international system. These include 
Alliance Maritime Strategies, Mediterranean Dialogue, European Union Maritime 
Strategies and other maritime operations in the Mediterranean Sea. By analysing 
the roles of actors in the Mediterranean Sea after the Cold War, it can demonstrate 
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which actors play the most dominant roles to provide stability and security in the 
region, and so that is why NATO and EU are the relevant security actors to study 
in the thesis. Therefore, the historical background of Chapter 4 provides a 
foundation for the subsequent case studies chapters by exploring the historical 
context of NATO and EU maritime initiatives in the Mediterranean. 
 
One significant reason behind the selection of counter-terrorism and 
counter-migration as case studies is because these case studies are interlinked. 
Irregular migration has always been linked to terrorism (Schmid 2016: 74). In the 
Mediterranean Sea, terrorists could possibly exploit the migration crisis. With 
thousands of refugees crossing the Mediterranean from Africa and Middle East, 
terrorists may take advantage to smuggled into Europe undetected, disguised as a 
migrants. For instance, Islamic state militants were claimed hiding among 
migrants crossing the Mediterranean disguised as asylum seekers, which are most 
likely the militants who pushed out from Libya (Batchelor 2016: 1). Therefore, 
the interlink between these two case studies is highly evident whereby one 
initiative of counter-terrorism may lead to counter-migration initiatives and vice 
versa. In other ways, counter-migration initiatives could potentially assist in 
combatting terrorism particularly with the management of external borders, which 
may help to detect terrorists during security checks at key arrival points in 
frontline member states. The link supports why case study of terrorism and 
irregular migration is relevant and essential to be analysed in the thesis.  
 
Principally, the rationale of selecting terrorism and irregular migration as  
case studies implies the purpose of the thesis to analyse the maritime security 
practices implemented in the Mediterranean. Subsequently, it intends to explore 
the expansion of security community framework, particularly through these 
maritime security practices. In so doing, maritime activities from both counter-
terrorism and counter-migration enable to demonstrate how security practices 
have been implemented in the Mediterranean Sea. In contrast, the other potential 
threats as mentioned above would have led to different studies if they had been 
selected as a case study. For instance, an initiative to combat drug trafficking and 
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pollution prevention does not demonstrate the spectrum of repertoire of practices 
as delineated by security community framework, such as military planning or 
confidence building measures. Taking this into consideration, it is therefore 
relevant to justify the selection of counter-terrorism and counter-migration as both 
activities demonstrate how security practices were employed within the policies 
and ultimately demonstrates the evolution of security community-building in the 
Mediterranean Sea.  
 
3.4 Methods for Data Collection 
The empirical material collected to analyse the case studies covers the period from 
2001 particularly after 9/11 terrorist attacks until 2016. The bulk of the empirical 
material consists of two primary parts; documents and interviews. As for 
documents, it covers the most part of the material used for the thesis, such as 
official policies and legislative documents for counter-terrorism and counter-
migration by NATO and EU. For interview, data derived from interview 
transcripts after the completion of interview session with several related 
interviewee.  
 
3.4.1 Textual Analysis 
For this thesis, the bulk of data derived from document collection and analysed 
afterwards. Pouliot proposes that textual analysis is among the methods to gain 
indirect access to data, such as selecting particular textual genres that lead into the 
subject of studies (Pouliot 2013: 49). Accordingly, the principal data for the thesis 
was retrieved from official policies and legislative documents of the EU and 
NATO in relation to their policy on counter-terrorism and counter-migration in 
the Mediterranean Sea. These documents were analysed intended to understand 
the process of counter-measures in the Mediterranean Sea, and subsequently 
provide substantial information to evaluate the roles of NATO and EU in 
maritime operations. In addition, textual analysis also consisted of literature 
analysis from academic works and general texts on EU and NATO selected policy 
fields. The texts have been analysed and provide the bulk of narratives for 
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discussion on the implementation process, guidelines and action plan related to 
the selected areas of research. 
 
Primary sources from the EU have been retrieved mainly from the 
institutions’ web-based archive. This includes, European Maritime Strategy 
adopted by the Council of the EU, regulations adopted by the European 
Commission, conclusions adopted by the European Council, joint statement by 
European External Action Service, press release, as well as Regulations on 
Establishing Frontex and EUROSUR from the European Parliament. The 
selection of the EU official documents primarily draws on related policies to 
counter-terrorism and counter-migration, which indicates the process of maritime 
activities or maritime legislation in the Mediterranean Sea. For instance, in 
helping to determine which maritime threats pose greater concern for the EU, I 
analysed the EU policy, European Union Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) 
that covers both internal and external aspects of EU’s maritime security. The 
strategy identifies the risks and threats that the EU is currently dealing with in the 
maritime domain. To that end, the strategy provides essential data that is 
appropriate to explain the maritime security situation in the Mediterranean Sea. 
Furthermore, other EU policies were analysed to investigate the maritime 
activities in the Mediterranean Sea. For instance, European Council decisisons 
dated June 2015 on the proposal of adoption of Eunavfor Med operation in the 
Southern Mediterranean were analysed for this purpose. This document provides 
legal mandates and strategic directions of the operation which functions as a main 
legal framework for EU counter-migration initiatives in the Mediterranean Sea 
and serves as essential textual analysis in the thesis. 
 
Likewise, the resources for NATO were also retrieved largely from their 
official web pages. This includes press releases from NATO Warsaw summit, 
conclusions adopted by NATO regarding Operation Sea Guardian, various 
committee reports by NATO Parliamentary Assembly of combatting terrorism 
and maritime security in the Mediterranean, as well as parliamentary speech on 
Operation Active Endeavour. For example, to analyse the current NATO 
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operations in the Mediterranean Sea, the Warsaw Summit Communiqué serves as 
important document to identify NATO maritime activities. This document 
highlights distinct provision in regards to implementation of Operation Sea 
Guardian to deal with migration crisis in the Mediterranean Sea. The Wales 
Summit Declaration, on the other hand also serves as fundamental framework for 
NATO engagement in the maritime domain particularly with the provision on the 
counter-terrorism operation, Operation Active Endeavour. This declaration also 
highlights provision on NATO’s commitment to enhance its naval forces to 
support maritime situational awareness and to conduct maritime operations. 
Ultimately, these primary sources including official policies and declarations are 
substantial for collecting essential information of NATO maritime activities.  
 
Another sources for empirical data also obtained from academic works and 
regional specialists on EU and NATO policies in counter-migration and counter-
terrorism. For instance, Navigating Troubled Waters: NATO’s Maritime Strategy 
by Jason Alderwick (2010), NATO’s Role in the Struggle against Transnational 
Terrorism by Anton Bebler (2008), and NATO’s Role in the Mediterranean and 
Broader Middle East Region by Alberto Bin (2008), explored NATO’s maritime 
strategies to combat terrorism at sea, particularly through its Operation Active 
Endeavour in the Mediterranean Sea. There are a large number of academic 
journals, articles and books relevant to the study of EU and NATO policies in the 
Mediterranean Sea. This academic writing serves a major role in contributing to 
the empirical discussions particularly in relation to maritime security threats in the 
Mediterranean Sea. Secondary sources derived from media sources, including 
newspaper, articles, policy report and commentaries have also been analysed to 
provide additional useful information for a more detailed narratives of the 
empirical studies.  
 
3.4.2 Interviews 
Another important part of the empirical sources derived from semi-structured elite 
interviews. As Pouliot suggests, qualitative interviews are particularly suitable to 
provide different perspectives for the researcher (Pouliot 2013: 51). Moreover, 
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interviews assist researchers to scrutinise the issues discussed in more detail 
considering the broad knowledge the interviewees have. In-depth interviews are 
useful in order to reconstruct the knowledge because the ideas and information 
gained from the interviews often reveals more than the documents material 
(Pouliot 2013: 51). Therefore, in order to collect more contemporary and reliable 
resources, I conducted several elite interviews with NATO military officials, EU 
military officials and enforcement officials of the EU agencies. I have conducted 
five interviews during a period from June to November 2016. The interviews were 
conducted in several places including in Warsaw, Rome and Cardiff. The 
interviewees include, spokesperson and Chief of Media Cell Eunavfor Med, the 
EU Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, spokesperson of Frontex, former NATO’s 
Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Operations and Operational Manager of 
Joint Operation Triton (EU). 
 
Before the interview was conducted, there are several factors taken into 
account in the selection process and type of interviews to be conducted. For my 
research, I have selected a semi-structured interview rather than structured 
interview because it provided more flexibility for both interviewer and 
interviewee during the interview session to vary the sequence of the questions and 
pursue more information with the follow-up questions. After all: ‘semi-structured 
interview[s] can be useful if the interviewer needs to adapt to respondents with 
varying levels of comprehension or ability to articulate their responses’ (Blakeley 
2013: 160). As for the selection process of interviewees, they were selected 
according to their background, rank, and experience, which appropriate for the 
research. The interviewees are the operational and military officials who have 
been directly involved with the implementation of counter-terrorism and counter-
migration activities in the Mediterranean Sea. The data gleaned out from the 
interviews serves as important information to support the materials derived from 
the other texts and documents. The interviews also fill the gap of missing data 
unable to be retrieved from the textual analysis.  
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 As a standard procedure for the interview, a set of questions were prepared 
prior. However, as the interviewees represent different agencies from one another, 
all interviewees have been asked a different set of questions according to their 
expertise. In general, only during the beginning of the interview they were asked 
the same question about the roles of their agencies in counter-terrorism and 
counter-migration in the Mediterranean Sea. The interview then pursued with 
follow up question of various themes or topics that were required for the research. 
The representatives from the EU agencies were asked to elaborate about the 
details of the EU current maritime operations in the Mediterranean in the 
respective policy fields related to terrorism and irregular migration. They were 
also asked about the future cooperation with NATO to deal with maritime threats 
in the Mediterranean Sea. Similarly, representative from NATO was asked the 
similar theme of questions. However, the questions also include how they 
perceive their future role in the Mediterranean Sea in order to engage more 
actively as they have limited enforcement operations in the area in comparison to 
the EU. All the interviewees agreed to be recorded during the interviews and 
transcripts were made available for the thesis. Direct quotes are used throughout 
the thesis with only very few adjustments where necessary for clearer 
comprehension. 
 
3.5 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter I have explained the rationale behind adopting a qualitative 
research approach. The justification of the selection for case studies in this 
research has been clarified, explaining why the other potential alternative cases 
were not included in this thesis. This chapter also explained the methods 
conducted for data collection, including textual analysis and interviews. Having 
explored the methodological foundations and research design for the thesis, in the 
next Chapter 4 it explores the important historical background of the 
Mediterranean Sea security environment after the end of the Cold War. The next 
chapter also provides a broad overview of the relevant actors in the Mediterranean 
Sea and their initiatives, maritime operations and security strategies to deal with 
the security threats in the basin. It provides a detailed narrative and essential 
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background of the type of maritime activities which are already in force in the 
Mediterranean region, before the subsequent discussion on specific case studies in 
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 respectively. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Mediterranean After the Cold War: Actors and Initiatives 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters have explored security community framework and the 
methodology involved throughout the study. This chapter links the security 
community practices with the maritime activities and maritime security actors in 
the Mediterranean. The chapter provides an initial overview about the security 
actors in the Mediterranean after the end of the Cold War and further to analyse 
initiatives, approaches and strategies in order to cope with varied challenges in the 
region. The chapter explores the broader discourse on cooperative tools as a 
reactive measures for the maritime security threats, beginning in the post 9/11 
terrorist attacks. 
The Mediterranean Sea is defined in strict geographic terms as consisting 
of the territories of only those states that have a Mediterranean coastline (Winrow 
2000: 3).22 The Mediterranean Sea is bordered by states with different political 
ideologies, southern shores mostly dominated by authoritarian and semi-
authoritarian states with large Muslim populations. Meanwhile, its northern shore 
consists of several liberal democracies, and its eastern shore shared by liberal 
democracies, namely Israel and Lebanon, as well as Syria as an authoritarian state 
(Boyer 2007: 75). Historically, The Mediterranean Sea is the ‘oldest’ sea, where 
the rise of naval and economic history began. It has also been a theatre of conflict 
between the Christian and the Muslim world (Begarie 2006: 30). The 
Mediterranean Sea, because of its geographic position between three continents 
has been called the ‘keyboard of Europe’ and has become the world’s trading 
routes and offered numerous resources (Till 2006: 242). The Mediterranean Sea 
																																								 																				
22 The Mediterranean states include Algeria, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Croatia, 
Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, 
Slovenia, Spain, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. This would exclude Jordan and Mauritania, two of the 
Mediterranean dialogue countries in NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue (Winrow 2000: 3). 
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remains an important shipping route, where approximately 20 to 30 percent of the 
world’s ships pass through the Mediterranean Sea every day (Till 2006: 244).  
Mediterranean Sea was a theatre of power struggle between the great 
powers during the Cold War era, that includes the Soviet Union, United States, 
and Europeans that are Great Britain, France, Italy, and to a lesser extent, Spain 
(Germond 2010: 65). European countries and the United States were most 
concerned with the presence of Soviet Union in the Mediterranean during the 
Cold War, therefore their primary objective was to contain the Soviet Union from 
expanding its power in the Mediterranean at that time. As for the Europeans, they 
had different interests towards expanding their power in the Mediterranean Sea. 
UK had an interest to expand its power outside their territory, Italy and Spain 
were more concern with the security issues emerge from the Mediterranean Sea 
due to close proximity with the basin23, meanwhile France has the interest to 
expand its power overseas and maintain their presence in the basin which is a very 
strategic and pivotal route for trade and economic (Germond 2010: 65). 
Meanwhile, the Mediterranean Sea is also surrounded by a number of ongoing 
conflicts, especially the tensions between Greece and Turkey, the Israel-Arab 
wars, the Suez crisis, the Algerian war, Lebanon war and increasingly domestic 
instability throughout the region. The Arab Spring had a serious negative impact 
in the region and has changed the dynamic of security environment in the 
Mediterranean by which not only it affected the stability of the region, but also 
resulted in an exodus of refugees to the Europe.24 The crises and instability across 
																																								 																				
23 The Mediterranean Sea is surrounded by areas of great instability and linked to adjacent 
maritime theatres which have their own personal dynamics, therefore security issues are strongly 
interrelated. This includes the piracy problems in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean which may 
directly affected the security of the coastal states, including Spain and Italy (Germond and Grove 
2010: 11). 
24 The consequences of Arab Spring have exposed the region with security risks and instability, 
including the failure of Morocco to regain stable government since the Arab uprisings; chaos and 
civil wars in Syria, Yemen and Libya; and the emergence of new radical groups in Syria, Yemen, 
Libya and Iraq (See Alsoudi 2015: 41-57). With many Arab countries facing serious challenges to 
their security and stability because of the political turmoil and social unrest, it has resulted to 
massive migration movements to Europe. The instability has forced thousands of people to flee 
their conflicted countries in search for better life and economic opportunity. The Arab Spring also 
has had a disastrous impact on the economy of the EU. Economic crisis led to low economic 
growth and high unemployment in the conflicted countries. The unrest led to fluctuations in the 
price of oil which has affected the economy of the EU, by which the Eurozone crisis hit the North 
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the Middle East and North Africa region, as well as the threats of terrorism across 
the region and beyond, indicate that the unrest of the region has direct 
implications to the EU.  
Then, the end of the Cold War manifested the emergence of a broader 
concept of security. Rather than one solely based on territorial defence, new terms 
of security encompassing terrorism, proliferation of WMD, transnational 
organised crime, irregular migrations and environmental concerns were developed 
(Winrow 2000: 140). In the post-Cold War era, the Mediterranean is at the centre 
of changing security dynamics with the growing division of two interdependent 
shores, one to the North, and one to the South. According to Germond (2010), 
there was a feeling of distrust between the Northern and the Southern states of the 
Mediterranean region (Germond 2010: 67). On the one hand, Northern states are 
concerned with the crisis and instability surrounding the Southern states, such as 
civil war and political turmoil, while the Southern states on the other perceive 
Europe and US involvement signal a power enlargement in the region (Germond 
2010: 67; Winrow 2000: 114). The presence of security actors in the region was 
initially to address the traditional military threats, however the nature of conflict 
in the post-Cold War era is contrasted with the Cold War era with the emergence 
of new non-military security threats. Terrorism, proliferation of WMDs, massive 
flows of irregular migrants and drug trafficking are feared to threaten the safety of 
the basin, therefore it has urged the security actors to retain their presence in the 
Mediterranean. NATO and the EU have increased their presence and security 
efforts in the Mediterranean demonstrating their readiness to preserve the stability 
and security in the basin after the end of the Cold War. The two organisations 
have also explicitly stated the importance of the Mediterranean Sea in terms of 
security.  
This chapter explores the presence of security actors in the Mediterranean 
Sea and delves into their maritime strategy, cooperative tools and mechanism of 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 					
states, meanwhile most South states of the Mediterranean facing severe financial crisis (See 
Knoops 2011: 17-18). 
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collaboration in the Mediterranean Sea. The chapter starts with the background of 
security actors which made their presence dominant in the Mediterranean after the 
end of Cold War, namely NATO and the EU. In addition, this chapter examines 
various strategies, initiatives and approaches including multilateral dialogues and 
maritime operations by the security actors to enhance the stability and security of 
the Mediterranean. The chapter provides a broad overview of maritime activities 
by NATO and EU in order to address varied threats in the region and serves as a 
bridge to link the security community framework with the maritime security 
practices in the Mediterranean. The chapter is essential to address the power 
enlargement of NATO in the Mediterranean after the end of Cold War, 
particularly to actively engage in promoting stability and security in the region. 
The chapter provides the history of NATO’s presence in the region and the list of 
cooperative security tools that developed in the Mediterranean, including, NATO 
maritime strategy and Mediterranean security dialogue. The chapter is also 
important as it provides a broad idea about the implementation of the EU security 
strategy in the Mediterranean, including the European Security Strategy and 
Barcelona Process, for example. With this broader idea in mind, the chapter 
focuses on the discussion to explore the security strategy and operational 
operations by NATO and EU to address security threats in the Mediterranean 
region, particularly looking at the maritime domain. 
4.2 Post Cold War: NATO in the Mediterranean 
NATO presence in the Mediterranean Sea during the Cold War was primarily to 
contain the Soviet Union’s influence in the basin (Kinacioglu 2000: 28). NATO 
was uneasy with the ambitions of Soviet Union to gain political influence in 
Mediterranean states such as Syria, Algeria, Egypt and Libya (Winrow 2000: 51). 
NATO believed that the presence of Soviet Union in the Mediterranean Sea posed 
a threat to the sea lines of communication and trade routes. Mediterranean during 
that period was “the most intensely utilised maritime corridor of the world” 
because of the Mediterranean-Persian Gulf connection and the transport of energy 
supplies and oil (Winrow 2000: 51). Soviet Union’s interest in the Mediterranean 
was significantly reflected through the development of weaponry and permanent 
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naval forces in the Mediterranean Sea. In response to the expansion of Soviet 
Union’s presence in the basin, NATO established a Maritime Air Force in Naples 
to coordinate surveillance in the Mediterranean in June 1968 (Winrow 2000: 51). 
A year later, a naval-on-call force for the Mediterranean, namely 
NAVOCFORMED has also been deployed in the Mediterranean Sea. 
The end of the Cold War was followed by the breakup of Soviet Union, 
therefore NATO no longer perceived the Soviet Union’s influence as a serious 
challenge or a factor that could affect the interest of NATO in the Mediterranean 
(Winrow 2000: 50). Winrow claims that for NATO members such as Spain and 
Portugal,  the Soviet threat was a distant one, reassured that Soviet Union will be 
less of a challenge in the Mediterranean (Winrow 2000: 50). This stance however 
shared differently with the other NATO members, for instance Turkey and Italy in 
which they perceived the Soviet as a real threat in the region. Notwithstanding, 
generally the European members of the NATO were more interested in economic, 
social and political problems such as the migration issue, originated from the 
Maghreb rather than the Soviet Union threat (Winrow 2000: 50). 
After the end of the Cold War, the importance of the Mediterranean Sea 
has tremendously increased in terms of security, with the disputes and instabilities 
surrounding it. NATO as a traditional naval actor in the Mediterranean has 
constantly engaged with the security issues of the sea and remained active in 
deploying their forces to carry out  operations in the basin. The end of Cold War 
also marked the changes in security landscape in the Europe, which required 
NATO to work beyond merely collective self-defence (Reichard 2006: 103). 
NATO urged to build a new partnerships with all the nations in Europe as 
reflected in the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept which classified partnership as one 
of the Alliance’s fundamental security tasks (Herd 2013: 68). The Strategic 
Concept was designed with the aspirations to stimulate comprehensive 
partnerships, cooperation and dialogue with other countries in the Euro-Atlantic 
area. With this objectives, NATO aspired to achieve mutual confidence and 
capacity for joint operations with the Alliance (Herd 2013: 68).  
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In the Mediterranean, NATO has developed a closer security partnership 
with countries in the region, where this marks a shift in Alliance priorities towards 
greater involvement in these strategically important region. In order to show its 
commitment towards the safety and security of the Mediterranean, NATO has 
developed Alliance Maritime Strategy (AMS) which was in accordance with the 
objectives of the Strategic Concept and also introduced multilateral dialogue such 
as NATO Mediterranean Dialogue. These dialogues and cooperative tools are 
mainly to address issues related to counter-migration, counter-terrorism, counter-
trafficking, proliferation of WMDs and other pertinent issues which have become 
a serious concerns after the end of the Cold War.  
After the end of the Cold War era, NATO has experienced several 
enlargement process in order to adapt and prepare themselves with the new 
security challenges. NATO has enlarged three times during the Cold War. It was 
first started with the Greece and Turkey joined in 1952, followed by West 
Germany in 1955 and Spain in 1982 (Dunay 2013: 50). Later in 1999, NATO 
extended its enlargement to Eastern Europe which involved Poland, Hungary and 
Czech Republic in spite of the strong opposition from Russia (Dunay 2013: 52). 
The remarkable transformation of NATO was during the second eastern 
enlargement, at the time of the Prague Summit in 2002, where it expanded its 
mission to increase its military capabilities and strengthen its partnerships (Santis 
2003: 177). This enlargement took place with major rearrangement largely shaped 
by the international security concerns, notably the threats of terrorism. Greater 
alliances were deemed necessary to address terrorism at that time, therefore this 
enlargement met the purpose to enhance the support from the allies whose main 
concern was the threat of terrorism (Dunay 2013: 54). The Alliance’s enlargement 
was initially motivated by the expansion of the new membership but latter was 
also driven by the needs to build more partnerships and alliances with states that 
share identical interests and concerns. 
NATO has been actively promoting and developing cooperative tools in 
the Mediterranean due to several reasons. The leading reason is to promote 
dialogue and foster stability and security in the Mediterranean due to significantly 
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growing number of security challenges in the region after the end of Cold War 
(Germond and Grove 2010: 11). The heightening of security threats such as 
terrorism, proliferation of WMDs, the influx of irregular immigrants and failed 
states are common concerns shared by NATO member states and also countries in 
the Mediterranean region. This has consequently led towards common responses 
and cooperation between NATO and the countries in the region, in order to 
effectively deal with the challenges and to ensure the effectiveness of the 
operations. NATO has actively engaged in the areas beyond Europe, including in 
the operation of maritime counter-terrorism in the Mediterranean. To better 
address the maritime challenges after the end of the Cold War, NATO has 
established its first maritime strategy encompassing strategies and cooperative 
tools on maritime challenges.  
4.2.1 Alliance Maritime Strategy  
NATO is fundamentally a maritime organisation as its name implies, the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (Alderwick 2010: 13). The Alliance during the Cold 
War played a vital role through its higher-end naval warfare includes anti-
submarine warfare and major fleet action (Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 47). NATO 
is a fundamental key player of maritime power to preserve the security in the 
North Atlantic region (Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 47). Maritime forces were 
indeed the paramount military foundation of the Alliance during the Cold War 
(Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 47). Consequently, NATO has published a Maritime 
Strategy in 1984, but the objective was to accommodate the current Cold War 
security circumstances. Later in July 2008, NATO acknowledged the needs to 
develop a new Alliance Maritime Strategy (AMS) and a supporting Maritime 
Security Operations Concept (MSO) to better address the new maritime security 
challenges (Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 48). The development of the AMS was a 
phased approach, later in 2009 the North Atlantic Council endorsed the idea to 
develop the maritime strategy, and then during the Alliance summit 2010 in 
Lisbon all the member states adopted a new strategic concept which was 
completed in 2009. Accordingly, member states are bound to the essential purpose 
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of the strategic concept, which is to preserve freedom and security (Kraska and 
Pedrozo 2013: 48). 
 As a traditional naval security actor, NATO has the necessary advantage in 
maritime capabilities (Germond and Grove 2010: 15). NATO affirmed that the 
capabilities rather for the naval warfare purpose, will be generated towards 
operationalising maritime security operations (Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 49) in 
particular to secure the safety of the world maritime transportation and maintain 
good order at sea for all the passages. After several phases of developing the 
AMS, finally NATO released its new comprehensive Maritime Strategy in 2011 
to complement the previous maritime forces and policies to achieve NATO’s 
goals. Although AMS and MSO were designed to complement each other, 
nevertheless its work tasks are slightly different. On the one hand, the AMS 
provides a long-term framework for the next 20-30 years (Kraska and Pedrozo 
2013: 49), working towards accomplishing goals and missions in the maritime 
domain as desired by the NATO. Concurrently, the MSO Concept, on the other, 
supporting the maritime security operations including the provision of immediate 
operational guidance of allied naval forces operations (Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 
49). 
The contemporary threats and the rising number of unpredictable non-state 
actors in the maritime domain has urged NATO to equip themselves with the 
capabilities to tackle the issues. Consequently, NATO has introduced five roles to 
achieve their missions in sustaining the security in maritime sphere, that is 
deterrence and collective defence; crisis management; cooperative security; 
building partnerships capacity; and maritime security operations (Kraska and 
Pedrozo 2013: 49). The three core tasks distinguished for Allied forces in the 
2010 Strategic Concept, in which NATO’s unique maritime power could help 
address critical security challenges are commonly known: collective defence; 
crisis management; and cooperative security. In addition, the strategy later 
introduced the fourth area: the support of maritime security in a broader sense 
(Chapsos and Kitchen 2015: vi). The Strategy provides broad guidelines on how 
to maximise the use of the capabilities and evolve with it.                                   
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The first core task of NATO as delineated in the maritime strategy is 
deterrence and collective defence. NATO has significant maritime capabilities and 
flexible maritime forces, which are the key to deter aggression. The maritime 
forces of NATO contribute to high-end collective defence and promote security 
and confidence in the North Atlantic region (Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 50). The 
principal self-defence for NATO includes nuclear deterrence in which NATO 
provides missile defence capacity for territory protection.25 Nuclear deterrence of 
NATO is highly depends on the extension of deterrence under the U.S. nuclear 
umbrella, and also with support from deterrent forces of other NATO members, 
which is United Kingdom and France (Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 50). Another 
prominent self-defence measure for NATO is the counter-proliferation of WMDs. 
NATO enforced its counter-proliferation of WMDs with the assistance from the 
U.S. who provide missile defence, to deter any forms of not merely nuclear but 
also conventional attacks at sea against member states (Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 
50). NATO is committed to deploying its maritime forces rapidly, carry out a 
command and control role from the sea, preserve freedom of navigation and 
conduct effective mine counter-measure activities.  
 
Secondly, the core task of NATO is crisis management with NATO 
maritime forces as a key player. The responsibilities include enforcing an arms 
embargo, conducting maritime interdiction operations, contributing to the 
Alliance’s counter-terrorism efforts, providing immediate humanitarian assistance 
in the aftermath of a natural disaster, crisis response operations, conflict 
prevention, and peace enforcement.26 Crisis management of NATO also includes 
deployment of combined, joint forces in adamant non-permissive environments 
(Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 51). To this end, the AMS provides four maritime 
contributions in crisis management. Firstly, the capacity to secure sea control and 
denial, to carry out interoperable maritime strikes, and to execute command and 
control at sea, including in operations involving non-NATO navies and 
																																								 																				
25 NATO, Alliance Maritime Strategy, March 2011 (Available at: 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_75615.htm, pp. 3). 
26 NATO, Alliance Maritime Strategy, March 2011 (Available at: 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_75615.htm, pp. 4).	
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organisations.27 Secondly, NATO naval forces contribute to the rapid 
humanitarian assistance and disaster aid. Thirdly, navies must be able to provide 
flexible and continuous responses to crises, including a simple presence through 
‘demonstrations of force’, peace-enforcing missions, the enforcement of embargo 
and no-fly zones, counter-terrorism, and evacuation of civilians in crisis 
situation.28 Finally, naval forces must adept to provide logistical support for joint 
force operations in hostile environments, including for afloat command bases.29 
 
Third, collaboration approaches to international security through 
partnerships, dialogue and cooperative security significantly contribute to the 
strategy’s missions. The importance of building comprehensive cooperation and 
partnerships is clearly highlighted in the Strategic Concept. Therefore, the 
Alliance is committed to engage with more relevant countries through cooperative 
security. NATO’s maritime forces not only contribute to ensure Alliance security, 
but also to provide security among its partners. The Alliance’s maritime 
operations and partnerships are focused on diplomatic activities engagement, port 
visits routine with the ships from the Standing NATO Maritime Groups, building 
partnership capacity to response to maritime threats, and joint exercises and 
training.30 Engagement with partners through joint training and exercises helps to 
build regional security and stability, contribute to conflict prevention and enhance 
information exchange (Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 52). These efforts also promote 
cooperation and complement other key actors in the maritime domain, such as the 
United Nations, IMO and the EU. Working closely with its international partners, 
NATO is committed to achieve its maritime missions together to prevent war, 
avoid the conflicts and preserve the freedom passage of the seas.  
The fourth core task in Alliance Maritime Strategy as highlighted by 
NATO is maritime security. It entails the capacity of NATO naval forces to 
																																								 																				
27 NATO, Alliance Maritime Strategy, March 2011 (Available at: 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_75615.htm, pp. 4). 
28 NATO, Alliance Maritime Strategy, March 2011 (Available at: 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_75615.htm, pp. 4). 
29 NATO, Alliance Maritime Strategy, March 2011 (Available at: 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_75615.htm, pp. 4). 
30 NATO, Alliance Maritime Strategy, March 2011 (Available at: 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_75615.htm, pp. 5).	
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undertake whole range of maritime interdiction missions, including in support of 
law enforcement and to prevent the transport and deployment of weapons of mass 
destruction.31 The strategy reiterates NATO’s commitment to help protect vital 
sea lines of communication and maintain freedom of navigation. This includes 
surveillance activities, information sharing, maritime interdiction, and 
contributions to energy security, including the protection of critical infrastructure. 
Concluding, it suggests that NATO maritime forces play a key role to contribute 
to a safe and secure maritime environment with a high degree of coordination, 
joint training and exercises. To better enforce maritime security operations, 
NATO is working closely through its maritime components, namely Allied 
Maritime Command (MC) and Maritime Command (MC). Allied Maritime 
Command Northwood, United Kingdom, reports to Joint Forces Command 
Brunssum in the Netherlands, meanwhile Maritime Command Naples, Italy is 
under Joint Forces Command Naples (Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 53).  
 
There are two Standing NATO Maritime Group (SNMGs) and two 
Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Maritime Groups (SNMCMGs) which 
consist of integrated and multinational naval forces to perform operations at sea 
under NATO command and control. The Standing Naval Forces are an essential 
maritime capabilities contribute to regional maritime security capacity-building 
within their maritime operations and joint exercises (Chapsos and Kitchen 2015: 
vi). For each standing group, the operations carried out with the naval capabilities 
includes six to ten vessels which are provided by the member states on a rotational 
basis (Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 53) for a period of four to six months. They are 
also involve in joint exercises, maritime interdiction missions and crisis 
intervention, as well as sea patrolling activities to protect shipping lanes from any 
potential conventional attacks.  
 
The forces of SNMGs and SNMCMGs are responsible in their specifically 
designated area. On the one hand, SNMG1 and SNMCMG1 carried out the 
operations in the Eastern Atlantic and report to MC Northwood in the United 
																																								 																				
31 NATO, Alliance Maritime Strategy, March 2011 (Available at: 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_75615.htm, pp. 6). 
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Kingdom (Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 54). SNMG1 operates a number of 
operations, where they mostly carried out their tasks underway with training 
exercises and cooperation with non-SNMG1 naval forces. They use all the 
trainings available and support facilities to conduct the operations. SNMG1 
participates in major NATO and national exercises at sea, apart of developing new 
NATO naval warfare tactics (Morse 2010: 48). On the other hand, SNMG2 and 
SNMCMG2 are assigned to conduct patrolling missions in the Mediterranean Sea 
and report to MC Naples. However, they have also deployed to pursue the 
Operation Ocean Shield in the western Indian Ocean, mainly for counter-piracy 
missions against Somali piracy (Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 54).32 For SNMG and 
SNMCMG, operations will be conducted based on routine participation among 
the member states. Other than Standing Maritime Group forces, the integration of 
all forces of NATO is also vital to sustain the effectiveness of the maritime 
operations. All the forces compound of land, air, sea and other special operations 
forces components should be integrated extensively to assure the effectiveness of 
its missions. Sea forces always need to integrate effectively with the air and land 
forces to ensure necessary actions can be taken promptly upon arrival. The NATO 
Response Force (NRF) is committed to implement all forces integration and also 
in position to operate successfully in a threat environments (NATO 2016c).33 
According to Morse (2010), the primary objectives of the establishment of 
the naval standing forces are to complement and preserving the capability to (i) 
ensure the presence of NATO maritime forces are more visible to demonstrate the 
confederation of the Alliance’s members working together in a single force; (ii) 
provide NATO with immediate readiness for any times of crisis, dispute or 
limited aggression; (iii) equip NATO with the elements of formation of a more 
powerful force if required; and (iv) assist to enhance the capabilities of NATO’s 
naval forces through extensive participation in multinational exercises and day-to-
day operations (Morse 2010: 49). NATO standing naval forces have been an 
																																								 																				
32 In the first quarter of 2015, SNMG2 consist of flagship USS Vicksburg (CG 69), Turkish ship 
TCG Turgutreis (F 241), Canadian ship HMCS Fredericton (FFH 337), and German oiler FGS 
Spessart (A 1442), ready to deployed in the Mediterranean Sea serving as NATO’s maritime force 
dedicated to maintaining peace and stability in the region (Available at: http://www.mc.nato.int). 
33 Warsaw Summit Communiqué, Press Release, 9 July 2016.	
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influential  forces in the Mediterranean and assuredly demonstrates the Alliance’s 
commitment towards collective action among its members states. 
4.2.2 NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) 
Security of the Alliance in the post-Cold War era remains subject to numerous 
risks and challenges, not merely military but also non-military. The proliferation 
of non-state actors exposed the states towards greater challenges in dealing with 
unpredictable threats, it is therefore paramount for the Alliance to broaden its 
approach in security tasks. Moving from collective defence towards a collective 
security organisation, NATO has equipped itself with in strengthening the 
partnerships and enhancing multilateral dialogues with other countries.  One of 
the primary instrument of this policy is the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD). 
NATO’s MD is the principal instrument to accomplish NATO’s ambitions in 
building tangible partnerships and dialogues (Bin 2008: 726). 
The Mediterranean Dialogue was launched in December 1994 during a 
Brussels Ministerial meeting. It currently involves seven non-NATO countries of 
the Mediterranean region: Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan 
and Algeria (McNerney et al 2017: 15). MD was initiated as a result of the 
Alliance’s reflection that security in Europe is closely linked to security and 
stability in the Mediterranean region (Santis 2003: 180). With the principle 
objectives to contribute to regional security and stability, NATO’s MD also 
intended to promote better mutual understanding and confidence, as well as good 
and friendly relations across the Mediterranean. At the same time, MD helps to fix 
any misconceptions about NATO’s policies and goals among Dialogue countries, 
to better represent themselves as an essential security actor in the Mediterranean 
(Herd 2013: 71). According to Boening (2007), MD was initiated to reach out to 
non-NATO member countries who might share identical pursuits and have an 
interest in cooperating with security projects carried out by NATO (Boening 
2007: 6). These ‘partners’ will be at first be involved in confidence building 
programs before becoming members when they fulfill some major qualifications 
such as developments in domestic military capability (Boening 2007: 6; Herd 
2013: 72). It is an integral part of NATO's adaptation to the post-Cold War 
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security environment, as well as an important component of the Alliance’s policy 
of outreach and cooperation. 
Since its inception, MD highlighted the principles of non-discrimination 
and self-differentiation, as well as encourage bilateral and multilateral 
consultations between NATO and its Mediterranean members. Members are free 
to participate in the Dialogue, which includes the freedom to participate in 
programs organised within the Dialogue. The programs encompass several fields, 
namely seminars and workshops in the field of information, science and 
environment, crisis management and military cooperation (Boening 2007: 6). The 
Alliance’s MD also complements other international efforts, primarily those of the 
EU’s Barcelona Process which aims in tackling the socio-economic imbalances of 
the region. The imbalances perceived as the main cause of conflicts and tensions 
in the area. While the EU is working towards balancing socio-economic factors 
within the region, MD is concurrently working towards coordinating and 
complementing the efforts (Santis 2003: 180). 
Since its inception, the Dialogue has been specifically dedicated to 
improving Mediterranean security perceptions and tackling any concerns that may 
arise from its partners, which includes peacekeeping and peace supporting. The 
Alliance laid out a few key principles of the MD to better accommodate all its 
members; (i) the dialogue is progressive in terms of participation, allowing 
additional countries to join and the content of the dialogue to evolve; (ii) the 
structure of the dialogue is bilateral, lessen the vulnerability of disruption due to 
political developments in the region; (iii) emphasis is placed on non-
discrimination among partners, where all are offered the same basis for 
cooperative activities; (iv) the dialogue is intended to complement other 
international initiatives such as those of the EU, Western European Union (WEU) 
and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); (v) 
activities within the dialogue are paid for by the partners themselves, except for 
certain information activities (Said 2003: 188). 
The Mediterranean Dialogue is based upon the twin pillars of political 
dialogue and practical cooperation (Santis 2010: 142). For the political dialogue, 
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political consultations in the NATO+1 are held on a regular basis both at 
Ambassadorial and working level. These discussions provide an opportunity for 
sharing views on a range of issues relevant to the security situation in the 
Mediterranean, as well as on the further development of the political and practical 
cooperation dimensions of the Dialogue. The political dimension also includes 
visits by NATO Senior Officials, including the Secretary General and the Deputy 
Secretary General, to Mediterranean Dialogue countries (Santis 2003: 180). The 
main purpose of these visits is to conduct high-level political consultations with 
the relevant host authorities on the way forward in NATO's political and practical 
cooperation under the Mediterranean Dialogue. 
The Dialogue is a phased approach: five founder countries were first 
invited to participate before another two countries later brought in to join the 
partnership. Through the Mediterranean Cooperation Group (MCG) established in 
July 1997 at the Madrid Summit, NATO countries are directly involved in the 
political discussions with the representatives of the Dialogue (Santis 2003: 180). 
High level meetings between NATO and MD countries have taken place on a 
regular basis ever since, and an annual MD Work Program (MDWP) has been 
established. Activities under MDWP are within the range of information, civil 
emergency planning (CEP), science and environmental (SEA), crisis 
management, defence policy and strategy, small arms and light weapons (SALW), 
global humanitarian mine action (GHMA), proliferation of WMDs, terrorism, and 
the MD Military Program (MDMP) (Herd 2013: 72). The development of the 
Work Programme and the results, however, remain modest despite making some 
progress. This is  mainly due to budget constraints. Since most of the activities 
within the Dialogue are based on self-funding, this has slowed down the 
development of the activities (Sanz 2003: 196). Slow progress also likely occurred 
due to little enthusiasm showed by the Dialogue partners towards common 
activities offered by NATO. Furthermore, Dialogue countries have different 
perceptions of what they expect from NATO and consequently have allocated 
different resources to the process (Herd 2013: 72). 
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A particular effort has therefore been made to stimulate the development 
of the Dialogue. In 2002, NATO decided to upgrade the political and practical 
dimensions of the Dialogue by introducing new initiatives including consultation 
on security matters, including terrorism-related issues (Santis 2003: 180). During 
the Summit meeting in Istanbul in June 2004, NATO's Heads of State and 
Government (HOSG) invited Dialogue partners to establish a more ambitious and 
expanded framework for the MD. NATO offers expanded the framework beyond 
merely dialogue, confidence and understanding but rather towards ‘enhanced 
practical cooperation’ with the objective to contribute towards regional security 
and stability through stronger practical cooperation. The objective included the 
elevation of the existing political dialogue, achieving interoperability, developing 
defence reform and contributing towards the fight against terrorism (Behnke 
2013: 175). Since then, an annual MDWP has focused on agreed priority areas, 
and has been the main cooperation instrument available and has been expanded 
progressively. 
4.3 Maritime Security Operations in the Mediterranean 
NATO’s operational concept for maritime security is to enforce operations and 
security arrangements among its member states in order to enhance cooperation 
and capabilities to tackle terrorism and other illicit activities at or from sea, as 
well as to enhance information sharing amongst them. The main operation being 
implemented is Operation Active Endeavour, launched under Article V of the 
Washington Treaty. In what follows, the next section will probe the background 
of OAE from the aspect of the enforcement and the structures. As the only 
maritime operation in the Mediterranean, OAE is vital to represent the efforts of 
NATO to contribute towards the security and safety of the region from the 
terrorist organisation threats from 2001 until present day. 
4.3.1 Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) 
NATO at present has actively deployed its SNMG at sea, not only for training and 
joint exercises but also to conduct patrolling missions. Recent NATO deterrent 
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patrols focusing in the Mediterranean Sea aims to prevent the escalation of 
terrorist threats. NATO’s anti-terrorist operation in the Mediterranean Sea, 
Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) was formally begun on 26 October 2001, 
having evolved out of NATO’s immediate response following the 9/11 attacks on 
the United States (Feldt 2011: 16). This operation was mainly designed to prevent 
the movement of terrorists, weapons of mass destruction at or from sea and also 
other illicit activities at or from sea. Initially, OAE focused on a naval presence as 
well as surveillance operations in the eastern Mediterranean Sea using naval 
forces assigned to the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean and Standing Naval 
Force Atlantic (Boyer 2007: 84).  
From October 2001 until March 2003, OAE had a mandate to monitor the 
ships in the eastern part of the Mediterranean. From March 2003, the NATO 
mandate has been extended to include on-board inspection to those suspected 
vessels at sea with the consent of the merchant vessel’s master or the flag state 
(Germond 2010: 68). From February 2003 until May 2004, NATO naval forces 
operating in the Mediterranean Sea also served to escort civilian ships through the 
Strait of Gibraltar from Alliance member states requesting them (Germond 2010: 
68). The expansion of the operation was most likely intended to avoid further 
terrorist operations learning a lesson from the previous attack on the French oil 
tanker Limburg off the coast of Yemen in 2002 (Boyer 2007: 84). After March 
2004, the OAE was extended to the whole Mediterranean Sea to ensure better 
command of the entire sea. OAE missions not only conducted within member 
states, but also reach out to other non-NATO nations including Ukraine, Russia, 
Albania, Algeria, Georgia, Israel and Morocco (Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 55). 
Expansion of OAE’s mandate to vessel queries and compliant boarding is 
normally assigned under the task of Task Force Endeavour (TFE) comprising a 
conduct by aircraft and surface units (Global Security 2017). In practice, before 
boarding the suspicious ships NATO forces will first gather all the information 
and pass it to the Maritime Component Command Headquarters in Naples (CC-
MAR Naples) and the NATO Shipping Centre in Northwood, United Kingdom 
(NATO 2016b). After the authorisation from North Atlantic Council (NAC), the 
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NATO forces will then board and inspect the vessel. If any terrorist-related 
activity is found on the vessel, OAE forces will be promptly deployed to the area 
ready to carry out the approved action by NAC (Boyer 2007: 84). On the other 
hand, if irregularities other than terrorism are found, the law enforcement 
authorities will convey this information to the appropriate law enforcement 
agency for the action at the vessel’s next port of call (NATO 2016b). 
Nevertheless, in the case of a refusal from the suspicious vessel upon the 
inspection and boarding of NATO forces, NATO will cooperate with national 
authorities once the vessel enters the alliance member’s territorial waters for 
further action (Boyer 2007: 84). 
The expanded OAE operations intended to cover the entire Mediterranean 
Sea, was then followed by the adoption of the new operational pattern by NATO 
in October 2004. According to Cesaretti (2008), the new operational pattern has 
focused on gathering and processing information and intelligence to target 
specific vessels of interests (Cesaretti 2008: 2). Specific tasks such as tracking and 
boarding of vessels were conducted, as well as providing enhanced presence and 
intensive surveillance capability with the cooperation from Alliance’s Standing 
Maritime Group (Boyer 2007: 85). The pattern of these operations emphasised 
that the primary task of the OAE forces is to help deter and disrupt any action 
supporting terrorism at or from the sea; controlling choke points- the most 
important passages and harbours throughout the Mediterranean.  
Assigned Joint Task Force ENDEAVOUR is responsible for  addressing 
any terrorist-related activities with the high equipped capabilities of land, air and 
sea (Boyer 2007: 85). The Task Force consists of balanced collection of surface 
units, submarines, and Maritime Patrol Aircraft (Boyer 2007: 85). Task Force 
ENDEAVOUR is regularly assisted by NATO’s maritime elite forces and 
standing NATO Maritime Groups. The combined forces helped to increase the 
presence of NATO forces at sea on-mission to prevent terrorism and other illicit 
activities. In addition, joint capabilities of all units have increased interoperability, 
built capacity and improved cooperation and information sharing. 
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4.4 Summary 
In summary, NATO was always a Mediterranean alliance during the Cold War era 
and continues to have vital interests in the region after the end of Cold War. The 
post-Cold War security environment marked great changes in the Mediterranean. 
The region is now an area of central geo-strategic interest to NATO. Security in 
the Mediterranean has taken a different shape after the end of Cold War where the 
challenges are now not only derived from the traditional military threats, but also 
non-traditional security threats. The emergence of non-state actors and 
transnational security threats including terrorism and irregular migrations in the 
region has raised NATO’s concern to retain its presence in the Mediterranean.  
NATO introduced Maritime Strategy in 1984 focused on how NATO 
might prevail in Cold War circumstances, however NATO revised the strategy in 
2008 in response to the changing security environment in the Mediterranean. The 
strategy highlighted four overarching tasks including deterrence and collective 
defence; crisis management; cooperative security; and maritime security 
operations. NATO’s maritime forces are the key player operating in the 
Mediterranean Sea. SNMG2 and SNMCMG2 are assigned to conduct a patrolling 
mission in the Mediterranean, dedicated to serve in counter-terrorism mission and 
any illicit activities at or from sea. In addition, NATO also enhances its 
cooperative tools through partnerships and dialogue within NATO itself and with 
non-NATO actors in the region. Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) is the catalyst to 
build tangible partnerships across the Mediterranean, with the emphasis on 
promoting mutual understanding and confidence among its members, representing 
its contribution to Mediterranean stability and security. Besides strengthening 
partnerships and dialogues, NATO is also committed with its maritime operations 
in Mediterranean Sea, notably in counter-terrorism operations. OAE has a 
mandate to monitor the ships, on-board inspection and escorting civilian ships to 
avoid any potential terrorist attacks at sea. The mission involves not only member 
states, but also with non-NATO actors of the region. 
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4.5  Post Cold-War: The European Union in the Mediterranean 
NATO is a traditional naval force in Mediterranean, and has significantly 
established its presence in the region since the Cold War era. Nevertheless, after 
the end of Cold War, EU has shown its keen interest in the rise of important new 
challenges to maritime security in the region. Other than NATO, EU is also an 
important multilateral actor involved in fostering maritime cooperation in the 
Mediterranean. Europe and the Mediterranean are more strongly linked today than 
during the Cold War era because crucial security challenges addressed by the 
Europeans are centered in this area and directly affected the security of EU 
member countries. Consequently EU has endeavoured to develop maritime policy 
and strengthening partnerships in the Mediterranean in order to preserve and 
sustain the well-being and security of its members in the region. 
Twenty-eight states belong to the EU, and all of them, as well as the 
European Community (EC), are party to UNCLOS. European seaports are vital 
sea lines of communication for trade, with millions of passengers and billions of 
tons of cargo passing through the waterways per year (Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 
58). After the end of the Cold War, Mediterranean has been identified as a 
fundamental security area because ‘new’ security challenges identified by the 
Europeans are now focusing in the Mediterranean (Germond 2010: 68). The 
Mediterranean provides the main corridor to Europe for transnational threats, such 
as irregular immigration, drug trafficking and terrorism. Consequently, EU has 
strongly involved within the wider Mediterranean area in order to effectively 
respond to these various maritime threats.  
This section of the study focuses on different EU institutions involved in 
shaping the EU’s approach to maritime security. Then the section follows with an 
overview of various instruments and initiatives implemented by the EU in the 
Mediterranean Sea. There are a variety of institutions involved in shaping the 
EU’s approach to maritime security. The key actor among those includes the 
European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Commission. 
European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) and Frontex are also among other 
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relevant agencies of the EU responsible with maritime security approaches in the 
Mediterranean Sea. This study later examines the initiatives and approaches 
shaped by those aforementioned major agencies to maritime security in 
Mediterranean including bilateral agreements, political dialogue and military 
forces. EU strengthened its strategic partnership with the Mediterranean member 
states by introducing the ‘EuroMed Partnership’ (EMP) or better known as 
Barcelona Process in November 1995 to address regulatory and governance issues 
related to maritime security. EU has also launched a number of common border 
control operations through Frontex such as Operation Triton and the establishment 
of EUROSUR framework as well as enhanced cooperation with its partners. The 
study focuses on these initiatives mainly because they are the key instruments that 
demonstrate the efforts and capabilities of EU in policing maritime operations in 
the Mediterranean Sea. 
4.5.1 European Security Strategy (ESS) 
After the end of the Cold-War period, the EU is facing numerous security 
challenges from its immediate neighbourhood as well as further afield. EU has 
been committed to increase cooperation across Europe and enhance its capabilities 
to cope with tangible crisis management. European Council defined the needs to 
fulfill the Petersberg tasks which includes humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace- 
keeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace 
making (Rehrl and Weisserth 2010: 12). Consequently, European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP) was launched in 1999 and has been a foundation for EU 
crisis management.  
The first operational mission of ESDP was initiated in 2003 and since 
then, ESDP has initiated over twenty crisis management operations and addressed 
key threats and challenges facing Europe. In 2009, ESDP was renamed as the 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as part of the Lisbon Treaty (Rehrl 
and Weisserth 2010: 12). CSDP has made significant progress since it was first 
launched. EU has adopted a comprehensive approach to peace and security, which 
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includes maritime security as part of its mandate. CSDP has been greatly assisted 
to equip the EU with the capacity to accomplish military and civilian missions.34 
EU has launched the three main EU strategic documents which formed the 
core of the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), namely the 2003 
European Security Strategy (ESS), the 2008 Report on the Implementation of the 
ESS, and the 2010 Internal Security Strategy (Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 59). ESS 
is a comprehensive strategy which outlines key security concerns from the eyes of 
the EU. ESS was adopted to serve as the overall policy document guiding 
CSDP.35 ESS listed five key threats which have been identified as new emerging 
threats which require robust measures to tackle it; terrorism, proliferation of 
WMDs, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime.36 According to the 
document, terrorist movements have made Europe both the target and base for 
their operations, for instance UK, Spain, Italy, German and Belgium.37 
 ESS also highlighted the EU’s concern over the proliferation of WMDs, 
which it identified as the most largest threat to their security, and the nexus 
between the movement of terrorist and WMDs could exacerbate the security in the 
region. In addition, organised crime is also associated with terrorism activities, 
including human and drug traffickings as well as movement of irregular 
migrations.38 Europe is believed to provide easy access for the immigrants to flee 
from the failed and conflicted states, be it to gain economic opportunity or escape 
from economic hardships and political repression (Marsh 2012: 146). As the ESS 
observed, the Mediterranean area is facing serious problems of economic 
stagnation, social unrest and unresolved conflicts.39 ESS therefore emphasised the 
																																								 																				
34 European Parliament, The Maritime Dimension of CSDP: Geostrategic Maritime Challenges 
and their implications for the European Union, Brussels, 29 January 2013, pp. 62. 
35 European Parliament, The Maritime Dimension of CSDP: Geostrategic Maritime Challenges 
and their implications for the European Union, Brussels, 29 January 2013, pp. 63. 
36 Council of the European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security 
Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, pp. 3-4. 
37 Council of the European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security 
Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, pp. 3. 
38 Council of the European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security 
Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, pp. 4. 
39 Council of the European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security 
Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, pp. 8. 
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importance for EU to continuously make greater efforts in the Mediterranean 
region through the framework of the Barcelona Process for economy, culture and 
security dimensions.40 
 After five years since the inception of ESS, EU has reinforced its 
implementation with the launch of 2008 Report on the Implementation of the 
ESS. This document intended to evaluate the progress has been made throughout 
the ESS framework and seeks ways to enhance the effectiveness of ESS in 
demonstrating the EU’s security interests.41 In the report, EU repeatedly stressed 
its concern over the Mediterranean region, notably with the escalation of irregular 
migration and political unrest, which has lead to another level of bilateral 
cooperation between the EU and several Mediterranean partners to address the 
issues.42 EU has also addressed its concern over a new dimension of maritime 
security, namely piracy which has been a crucial challenge especially in the Gulf 
of Aden and the Indian Ocean, which required immediate response to prevent the 
escalation of the threat.43 ESS has been a significant tool and has played a major 
role for EU’s security policy which has gradually developed over time to prevail 
as the current security situation in the region. 
4.5.2 Blue Book- Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP) 
After the implementation of ESS, EU has adopted its Integrated Maritime Policy 
(IMP) in October 2007 with the vision to integrate the various European policies 
concerning maritime affairs and marine issues as a whole. The integration is 
crucial to assist good conduct at sea and to combat the transnational threats at sea 
(Germond and Grove 2010: 16). IMP is a guideline to ensure that the maritime 
																																								 																				
40 Council of the European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security 
Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, pp.8. 
41 Council of the European Union, Report on the Implementation of the European Security 
Strategy: Providing Security in Changing World, Brussels, 11 December 2008, pp. 7. 
42 Council of the European Union, Report on the Implementation of the European Security 
Strategy: Providing Security in Changing World, Brussels, 11 December 2008, pp. 7. 
43 Council of the European Union, Report on the Implementation of the European Security 
Strategy: Providing Security in Changing World, Brussels, 11 December 2008, pp. 8. 
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security dimension can better address and reaffirm the importance of maritime 
security dimension in EU’s core interests.  
The policy seeks to provide a more coherent approach to maritime issues, 
with increased coordination between different policy areas. It focuses on issues 
that do not fall under a single sector-based policy e.g. "blue growth" (economic 
growth based on different maritime sectors) and issues that require the 
coordination of different sectors and actors e.g. marine knowledge. Specifically it 
covers these cross-cutting policies: (i) blue growth; (ii) marine data and 
knowledge; (iii) maritime spatial planning; (iv) integrated maritime surveillance; 
and (v) sea basin strategies.44 Since its creation in 2007, the Integrated Maritime 
Policy has sought to enhance the sustainable development of the European 
maritime economy and to better protect the marine environment by facilitating the 
cooperation of all maritime players across sectors and borders (Schafer 2009: 1). 
The IMP was created to reassure that maritime dimension has become one 
of the crucial attentions of European Union. IMP was initially set out ocean 
governance related principles and focused only on trade and fisheries, leaving 
behind the maritime security dimension (Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 62). 
Nonetheless, adoption of IMP indicates the EU’s efforts to include the maritime 
dimension in its security policy, as they never had done before. IMP works as a 
cardinal platform to ensure stability and sustainability in Europe. The 
Commission is preparing to provide the best conditions for sustainable economic 
development to come from the sea. Building on those achievements, Blue Growth 
is the objective for the coming years. Blue Growth will drive a second phase of 
the IMP to achieve a healthy maritime economy that delivers innovation, growth 
and sustainability for European citizens.  
The Blue Books has a limited approach to maritime security and is limited 
only to trade and fisheries. Nonetheless, one of the main principles in the Blue 
Books highlights the importance of an interoperable maritime surveillance system 
																																								 																				
44European Commission, Integrated Maritime Policy (Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/policy_en). 
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(Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 62). At the European level, they are committed to 
enhance inter-agency cooperation among the member states and related agencies 
especially in the use of a tracking system used together for marine environmental 
protection and also for maritime migration (Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 63). In 
order to counter the illegal maritime trafficking in people and drugs at sea, 
coordinated maritime surveillance is vital to achieve effective implementation. 
4.5.3 European Union Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) 
EU places great emphasis on strengthening the cooperative tools in the 
Mediterranean to maintain good order at sea. Following the adoption of ESS and 
IMP, in order to better strengthen the cooperation and achieve tangible results, the 
EU has endorsed the EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) in 2014 to enhance 
their efforts to complement existing cooperative tools which are already in force. 
The EUMSS was adopted as a result of a longer process which mainly shaped by 
the Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP) adopted in 2007 (Carrera and Hertog 2015: 
14). EUMSS was adopted to identify the maritime interests of the EU such as 
prevention of conflicts, protection of critical infrastructure, effective control of 
external borders to help secure the Union’s maritime external borders, the 
protection of the global trade support chain and the prevention of illegal, 
unregulated and unreported fishing.45 The new strategy was also developed to 
address the risks and threats the EU and its citizens may be confronted with: 
territorial maritime disputes, maritime piracy, terrorism against ships and ports or 
other critical infrastructure, migration flows, organised sea-borne crime and 
trafficking, as well as potential impacts of natural disasters or extreme events.46  
 EUMSS highlighted the strategy to protect the international maritime 
domain, notably the safety of shipping lanes from any potential risks or threats. 
The Mediterranean Sea provides the vital oil lifeline to Western Europe and North 
America and exposes the strait’s users to numerous maritime threats (Anderson 
																																								 																				
45 Council of the European Union, European Union Maritime Security Strategy. Brussels, 24 June 
2014, pp. 1. 
46 Council of the European Union, European Union Maritime Security Strategy. Brussels, 24 June 
2014, pp. 3.
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and Fenech 1994: 14). The principles and objectives of the EUMSS will be 
embedded in the existing and future regional EU strategies where it covers each of 
the European sea and subsea basins, including Mediterranean Sea.47 
In order to work towards a coordinated approach on maritime security 
issues in an international fora and with third countries, EUMSS through its Action 
Plan, puts into practice four leading principles: a cross sectoral approach, 
functional integrity, respect for rules and principles, and maritime multilateralism- 
including the decision-making autonomy of the EU.48 The Action Plan plays 
important roles as it underlines all the regulations for the member states and 
relevant EU bodies and agencies. The agency that leads most of the initiatives of 
the EUMSS is the European External Action Services (EEAS).  
EUMSS through its Action Plan also highlighted strategies on maritime 
awareness, surveillance and information sharing. Under this strategy, the EU 
seeks to establish comprehensive ‘maritime awareness’ on maritime surveillance 
and maritime security to improve the effectiveness in responding towards any 
early warnings on danger at sea.49 To assure the success of this strategy, relevant 
EU agencies were invited to facilitate inter-agency coordination and cooperation, 
as well as to develop common maritime awareness among them. The relevant EU 
agencies involved including European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), 
European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA), Frontex, European Defense Agency 
(EDA), and Europol.50 All the agencies will coordinate to improve the 
information exchange and optimise the effectiveness of maritime surveillance. 
Information sharing is crucial in order to ensure all the respective agencies are 
responsible for their own designated tasks. This will increase situational 
awareness and reaction capability at the external border of the member states for 
																																								 																				
47 Council of the European Union, European Union Maritime Security Strategy. Brussels, 24 June 
2014, pp. 3. 
48 Council of the European Union, European Union Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS)-Action 
Plan, Brussels, 16 December 2014, pp. 2. 
49 Council of the European Union, European Union Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS)-Action 
Plan, Brussels, 16 December 2014, pp. 8.	
50 Council of the European Union, European Union Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS)-Action 
Plan, Brussels, 16 December 2014, pp. 8. 
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immediate response in detecting, preventing and combatting cross-border crime 
and irregular migration, as well as attempting to ensure the safety of migrants. 
EUMSS aims to address the maritime issue as a whole, with the adoption 
of an Action Plan as its main driver. It aims to deliver cross-sectoral actions in a 
comprehensive and coordinated approach, with the cooperation from all major 
actors in the global maritime domain. Relevant actors at EU and member state 
level should play their respective roles to ensure that operations align with the 
provided strategies. EUMSS, which was adopted after several processes of 
predecessor strategies, indicates the readiness and commitment of the EU to tackle 
the proliferation of maritime security challenges. EUMSS is believed to be the 
stepping-stones towards providing the sustainable growth of the maritime realm, 
not only for the EU but also the member states and international fora. 
4.5.4 Barcelona Process 
EU has adopted its own guidelines in maritime related dimension through the 
implementation of the maritime security strategy. The strategy emphasised the 
importance and the needs for the EU to engage closely not only with its member 
states but also with other multilateral actors. EU therefore initiated its security 
initiative with the launching of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership or Barcelona 
Process. With objectives that were more coherent than those of its predecessor, 
the Barcelona Process was launched in November 1995 to replace the previous 
New Mediterranean Policy (NMP). The Barcelona Process initiated to quickly 
address the issue and policy towards relations with the Mediterranean countries 
(Adamo and Garonna 2008: 74).  
The Barcelona Process is the first ever EU-Mediterranean summit held 
where fifteen EU member states met with eleven Mediterranean countries and 
representatives of the Palestinian Governing Authority (Marsh 2005: 187). This 
conference was principally intended to be the first step towards a Euro-
Mediterranean partnership (Marsh 2005: 187). Barcelona Process generally 
claimed as a huge success in addressing issues between the EU and Mediterranean 
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partners, where greater amounts of EU aid has been allocated for the southern 
Mediterranean states to tackle the problems related to control of migration, crime 
and drugs (Marsh 2005: 187). The aid was also meant for the Mediterranean states 
to address the issue of anti-terrorrism, self-determination and nuclear non-
proliferation (Marsh 2005: 187).   
Despite the great results achieved at the Barcelona Declaration,  
dissappointment has been greatly raised by the Mediterranean countries outside of 
the EU. The fact that EU received greater benefits than the other Mediterranean 
partners through this declaration was seen as a betrayal towards the Mediterranean 
countries (Marsh 2005: 187). Barcelona Declaration believed to be dominated by 
the demands and ideas of the EU negotiators, while on the other hand the 
Mediterranean countries have no choice but to agree with what has been offered 
by the EU (Marsh 2005: 187). Consequently, both the EU and the Mediterranean 
countries envisaged a better cooperation which will benefit both parties in a 
greater way. This initiative has lead towards the relaunch of Union for 
Mediterranean (UfM) in 2008, to replace the Barcelona Process, which mainly 
believe has failed to achieve the aims as agreed between the EU and the 
Mediterranean partners beforehand (Marsh and Rees 2012: 151). 
 
UfM was introduced to address and improve cooperation across member 
countries pertaining to maritime security issues. UfM has seen as a vital platform 
in fostering maritime security operation in the area. It preserves the acquisitions of 
the Barcelona Process and reinforces its achievements and successful elements 
(Adamo and Garonna 2008: 76). UfM is a multilateral partnership of 43 countries 
from Europe and the Mediterranean Sea: the 28 member states of the EU and 15 
Mediterranean partner countries from North Africa, the Middle East and Southeast 
Europe including Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Egypt, Israel, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Palestine, Syria 
(suspended) Tunisia and Turkey with Libya as an observer (EEAS 2016d). 
UfM was adopted in July 2008 under the initiative of President Sarkozy 
and designed with particular interest to strengthen the EU’s regional policy 
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towards its Mediterranean neighbours (O’Donnell 2011: 163). The Union has the 
aim of promoting stability and prosperity throughout the Mediterranean region. 
The Union promotes economic integration and democratic reform across the 
neighbours to the EU’s south in North Africa and the Middle East (Marsh and 
Reen 2012: 150). The relaunch was an opportunity to contribute towards a more 
concrete and visible policy with the initiation of new regional and sub-regional 
projects. The new UfM emphasises the projects that are relevant and bring 
advantages for the people of the regions, such as economy, environment, energy, 
health, migration and culture with particular emphasis to be put on promoting 
regional cohesion and economic integration, as well as to develop infrastructural 
interconnections (Marsh and Rees 2012: 150). 
Since its inception, the UfM delineates a number of pivotal initiatives on 
its agenda, namely (i) the de-pollution of the Mediterranean Sea, including coastal 
and protected marine areas; (ii) the establishment of maritime and land highways 
that connect ports and improve rail connections so as to facilitate the movement of 
people and goods; (iii) a joint civil protection programme on prevention, 
preparation and response to natural and man-made disasters; (iv) a Mediterranean 
solar energy plan that explores opportunities for developing alternative energy 
sources in the region; (v) a Euro-Mediterranean University, inaugurated in 
Slovenia in June 2008; (vi) and the Mediterranean Business Development 
Initiative, which supports small businesses operating in the region by first 
assessing their needs and then providing technical assistance and access to finance 
(EEAS 2016d). 
4.5.5  Frontex 
EU has emphasised the importance to secure its external borders from any 
potential threats and to preserve the free movements of persons, goods, services 
and capitals. Since 1999, the European Council on Justice and Home Affairs 
(JHA) has been working towards strengthening cooperation in the area of 
migration, security and asylum. Consequently, Frontex, the EU Border Agency 
was launched as a result of operational developments in the field of European 
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border surveillance. Frontex was established in 2005 and became responsible for  
a  large maritime role in managing the external borders of the Schengen area 
(Codner 2013: 33). Frontex sea border surveillance operations provide major steps 
for the EU in its efforts to develop common EU rules on maritime surveillance 
(Carrera and Hertog 2015: 1). Maritime surveillance operations do not only 
consists of human mobility, but also focus on the efforts to enforce an effective 
search and rescue at sea and enhance the effectiveness of drug interdictions. 
Frontex has been actively facilitating drug interdiction operations particularly in 
the Western Mediterranean through CeCLAD-M (Codner 2013: 34).51  
 EU is currently facing  the biggest of refugees crisis where the numbers of 
asylum seekers is dramatically increased every year. Irregular migratory flows in 
the Mediterranean Sea become the greatest challenge to the EU with thousands of 
peoples lost their lives during the attempts to cross the sea. At the EU level, they 
mobilise all their assets to deal with search and rescue operations under the aegis 
of Frontex. It includes the interception of ships at sea (also high seas), search and 
rescue and disembarkation, as well as to assist any persons or boats in distress 
(Carrera and Hertog 2015: 10).  
Frontex is currently coordinating several joint operations in the 
Mediterranean, including Hera, Nautilus, and Triton. Operation Triton was 
launched on November 2014 and hosted by  Italy (Carrera and Horteg 2015: 9). 
The operational area only covers within 30 nautical miles off the Italian coast, 
which is approximately 245,000 km2 east and south of Italy and Malta which 
involves 21 member states who participate with personnel deployment and 
maritime assets in the area (Muschel 2015: 2). Recent headline cases of deaths at 
sea in the Mediterranean has also urged EU and national actors to increase their 
cooperations in the area to prevent the escalation of the issue. This has been 
																																								 																				
51 Centre de Coordination pour la Lutte Antidrogue en Mediterranee (CeCLAD-M) based in 
Toulon, is an anti-narcotics law enforcement platform, aimed at intercepting drug trafficking from 
Northern and Western Africa in the Western Mediterranean Sea (Codner 2013: 34). 
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reflected with the development of maritime surveillance systems and 
technologies, namely European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR), the 
maritime surveillance project MARSUR and the Common Intelligence Sharing 
Environment (CISE) (Carrera and Horteg 2015: 1). 
In October 2013, the EU has launched the EUROSUR through Frontex 
where information will be integrated through the National Coordination Centres 
(NCC) (Codner 2013: 33). EUROSUR was launched after the long process of 
negotiation with participation of all member states. EUROSUR is a European 
border surveillance network focused on the integration of common information 
environment for all parties involved including maritime safety to increase 
“situational awareness” and “reaction capability” (Carrera and Horteg 2015: 17). 
Under the aegis of Frontex, EUROSUR will also gather all information from other 
related agencies including Europol, the EU Satellite Centre, the EMSA, EEAS 
and the European Asylum Support Office before entered into EUROSUR for 
further actions (Carrera and Horteg 2015: 17).  
EUROSUR is a multipurpose system where the objectives are to detect, to 
prevent and to combat irregular migration and cross border crime (Carrera and 
Horteg 2015: 17) with an efficient external border surveillance system along the 
Europe’s southern maritime border (Andersson 2016b: 32). It also put particular 
emphasis on protecting and saving the lives of migrants attempting to cross the 
sea (Carrera and Horteg 2015: 17). Under the framework of EUROSUR, Frontex 
is also working closely with EMSA to monitor the movements of the cargo 
vessels to fight against organised migrant-smuggling at sea (Muschel 2015: 3). In 
summary, EUROSUR has a mandate to improve inter-agency cooperation and 
facilitate information exchanges within the agencies. EUROSUR is an essential 
surveillance framework aims to ensure the protection of human rights and actively 
engage in maritime surrveillance to combat transnational crimes at sea, lead by its 
main actors Frontex (Carrera and Horteg 2015: 17).  
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4.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has provided the historical context prior to the case studies in the 
following chapter. It has demonstrated the evolution of security community 
repertoire of practices, particularly through cooperative-security and partnerships 
among NATO and EU in the Mediterranean. Beginning after 9/11 terrorist attacks 
until present day, the initiatives enforced in the Mediterranean demonstrate the 
expansion of the security community through cooperative security practices, by 
which members of the community respond to any external threats collectively.  
Both NATO and EU have explicitly addressed the varied maritime 
security challenges they have confronted within the Mediterranean Sea. 
Possessing different interests in the region, however NATO and EU undoubtedly 
share similar motives and objectives in maintaining the stability and security of 
the Mediterranean Sea from maritime threats. In order to deal with these security 
challenges, NATO and EU have initiated multiple cooperative tools, operations 
and strategies in the name of peaceful passage and good order in the 
Mediterranean. Forums such as the EU’s UfM and NATO’s Mediterranean 
Dialogue remain effective platforms for fostering maritime security cooperation in 
the region. Comprehensive maritime missions have been implemented to address 
the threats in Mediterranean such as OAE to fight against terrorism, and 
EUROSUR to tackle mass irregular migration movements.  
 As a traditional actor in the Mediterranean, the presence of NATO is 
essentially regarded as necessary, albeit at times it is perceived as a power 
projection of the Western countries in the region. Mediterranean states and NATO 
share similar concern over the risk of security threats and instability in the region, 
in which NATO’s MD in this scenario is seen as a stepping stone for both 
organisations to address the issue and simultaneously work together to enhance 
cooperation and provide stability in the region. Through the enforcement of 
political dialogue and regular meetings, MD is an important platform to discuss 
various issue to the security situation in the Mediterranean and to further develop 
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cooperative security tools in the region. Furthermore, the establishment of AMS 
was founded at the crucial time when the region was struggling with the security 
threats derived from the maritime domain, particularly potential terrorist threats 
and regional conflicts. NATO’s maritime strategy delineates five core tasks to be 
achieved, in which one of these tasks focus on the maritime security operations. 
Following this task, two main naval standing forces, SNMG2 and SNMCMG2 
were deployed in the Mediterranean Sea to conduct patrolling and multinational 
exercises on a daily basis. 
 Meanwhile, the EU presence in the Mediterranean is imperative due to the 
fact that the instability in the region will somehow have a direct effect on the 
security of European countries. ESS was launched by the EU with the idea that it 
encompasses a comprehensive strategy that identifies major security concerns 
from the EU perspectives, including, terrorism and organised crime. ESS also 
highlights the migration crisis in the Mediterranean Sea as one of the top political 
concerns for the EU. In line with this, the adoption of EUMSS in 2014 has again 
reflected the comprehensive efforts of the EU to address security threats in the 
maritime domain. EUMSS highlights the EU strategy on maritime awareness, 
surveillance and information sharing. This strategy pledged to improve the 
capability of every member state to respond immediately in any stressing 
situations at sea, facilitated by the EU agencies, including, Europol and Frontex. 
Frontex played a crucial role as an external border agencies responsible to provide 
assistance for the EU member states to manage their external borders, and assists 
with search and rescue activities if necessary. 
 Based on the discussion of NATO and EU initiatives in the Mediterranean 
region, this chapter has demonstrated the link between the concept of security 
community practices with maritime security practices, which embody an 
important sources of community-building in the Mediterranean Sea. For instance, 
MD demonstrates how cooperative security, partnership and confidence building 
measures as a natural practices of the Dialogue have integrated the members and 
partners through their collective collaboration to address security threats. As 
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discussed above, one of the essential requirements needed to be a partner of MD 
is a high level of military integration between members. Moreover, partnership 
between NATO and non-NATO members who’s shared mutual interests is the 
indicator of  security community expansion in the Mediterranean. When a group 
of people who shared similar interests integrate into a political community and 
pursue their cooperation collectively, that is an indication of the presence of 
security community in the region. That said, MD serves as a good example of 
security community expansion in the Mediterranean.  
 Pluralistic security community emphasised on the assumptions whereby 
the member states cooperate collectively to resolve a conflict peacefully while at 
the same time retaining their political autonomy. Security community which 
consists of a group of states whose share similar identity, interest and values 
collaborate accordingly to achieve their interest, in particular to resolve the 
conflict through cooperative security without the presence of military encounter. 
Reflecting on the concept of security community, the link between the repertoire 
of practices and maritime activities in the Mediterranean is visible through the 
implementation of various maritime initiatives as discussed above. Security 
community offers novel alternative theory to link the cooperation between 
countries which previously has been dominated by the liberalism theory. The 
presence of similar values, interests and identity has encouraged the cooperation 
between states, in which it proves that cooperative security could be achieved 
through the common interests and not only to maximize prosperity or economic 
benefits as assumed by liberalists. In addition, the application of the security 
community framework in this chapter has been portrayed through the nature of 
maritime activities, including partnership in Barcelona Process and expansion of 
military arrangement and exercises, particularly through OAE. The enforcement 
of OAE clearly exemplifies the practices of partnerships, military integration 
including exercises and training, as well as confidence building measures. That 
said, the enforcement of OAE conforms how NATO maritime initiatives reflected 
the evolution of security community building in the Mediterranean. 
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 The enforcement of maritime initiatives to combat terrorism in the 
Mediterranean has clearly reflected the evolution of security community building 
among the members. Security community framework has provided understanding 
that collective identities, shared values and shared understandings as regards to 
the threat perceptions are of significant importance for the building of security 
community. Security community framework allows members to share 
understanding and thus respond more effectively to common concerns. In sum, 
without the application of security community framework, one would not be able 
to understand the relations of how members construct securitisations with one 
another as well as how members with shared understandings may respond 
collectively in the security issue area. 
Maritime security cooperation requires collective cooperation from all 
sides, the Mediterranean countries, the EU and NATO. Therefore confidence 
building measures and information sharing among all actors in the Mediterranean 
is of particular importance. A comprehensive and multilateral approach to 
maritime security in the Mediterranean is the key, with both NATO and the EU 
playing critical and complementary roles. In the following chapter, after an 
exensive overview of NATO and EU presence in the Mediterranean and their 
general security strategy discussed above, I will look towards security community 
building through the enforcement of maritime security practices and activities by 
both EU and NATO to combat terrorism in the Mediterranean Sea. The following 
chapter analyses the roles of NATO and EU in counter-terrorism in the 
Mediterranean Sea through  their maritime initiatives. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Combatting Maritime Terrorism: The Roles and Policies of NATO and EU 
in the Mediterranean Sea. 
 
5.1 Introduction 
(Maritime) terrorism is one of the key contested concepts in academic as well as 
policy-making circles (Bossong 2012: 5). Maritime terrorism has always been 
linked to piracy where their characteristics tend to overlap to each other (Nelson 
2012: 16). The concept of maritime terrorism has a lack of definitional consensus 
because the definition may be perceived differently across different states. Despite 
the ambiguity of the definition, some scholars nevertheless propose simple 
definition to understand the concept of terrorism.52  The Council for Security 
Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) also offer a useful definition of 
maritime terrorism. In February 2002, CSCAP defined maritime terrorism as “the 
undertaking of terrorist acts and activities (1) within the maritime environment, 
(2) using or against vessels or fixed platforms at sea or in port, or against any one 
of their passengers or personnel, (3) against coastal facilities or settlements, 
including tourist resorts, port areas and port towns or cities” (Chalk 2008: 3). This 
definition is not limited to but also extends to include the use of the maritime 
domain as a means to smuggle terrorist groups or materials into a country 
(Marlow 2010: 670).  
In comparison to land-based incidents, the number of actual terrorist 
attacks against maritime domain is relatively very minor and only represents a 
very small percentage of overall terrorist attacks (Nincic 2012: 1). According to 
the terrorism incident database by RAND, only 2% of terrorist attacks overall 
have been maritime terrorism incidents over the past 30 years (Murphy 2007: 45). 
																																								 																				
52 Terrorism is a complex term to define. However, Robert Snoddon (2007) proposed useful 
definition of terrorism as ‘ [the] unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against people 
of property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or 
ideological objectives (See Robert Snoddon, 2007. Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: Naval 
Responses to Existing and Emerging Threats to the Global Seaborne Economy. In Peter Lehr (ed). 
Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism, pp. 228). 
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Despite their rarity, the potential of maritime terrorist attacks however poses a real 
threat given a few previous notorious attacks that have taken place at sea. 
The 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States have caught Western media 
attention and raised awareness of the potential terrorist attacks towards nation 
states (Calleya 2013: 71).  After 9/11, there has been evidence of growing interest 
by Al-Qaeda particularly in the acquisition and possible use of WMD (Parashar 
2008: viii). This has brought to the fore concerns of the international community 
over the possibilities for terrorist groups to use container traffic as a mean of 
transport for WMD. There is also growing fear of the possible attacks to the vital 
installations such as ports, oil platforms, oil refineries and nuclear power station in 
vital maritime choke points by terrorists. The immediate response of the US after 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks was to launch the Global War on Terror. Similarly, the 
EU’s response to international terrorism following the 9/11 attacks was also 
brought to public attention and demonstrated the EU’s commitment to addressing 
the terrorism issue. Counter-terrorism has for a long time been a part of judicial 
and domestic policy in the EU (Bendiek 2006: 7). Other than the EU, NATO also 
expressed their concern in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks when they 
invoked Article V for the first time in history, in support of the counter-terrorist 
campaign of the US. 
This chapter focuses on the development of the EU and NATO’s capacity 
to fight against terrorism in the Mediterranean Sea. The analysis focuses on the 
EU and NATO counter-terrorism policies to demonstrate how the security 
community developed through the practice of cooperative security, confidence 
building measures, creations of partnerships and military integration. The analysis 
is threefold. First, this chapter discusses the background and history of maritime 
terrorism incidents particularly in the Mediterranean Sea. In order to provide 
readers with some knowledge about terrorism in general, this chapter introduces 
how incidents of maritime terrorism have evolved from as early as the 1960s not 
only in the Mediterranean Sea, but also in other vital maritime choke points 
particularly in Southeast Asia. Secondly, this chapter examines the evolution of 
cooperation and initiatives enforced by NATO in regards to counter-terrorism in 
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the Mediterranean Sea. I will then scrutinise the counter-terrorism operation’s 
specific kinds of activities. The study investigates how NATO could aspire to 
become a significant counter-terrorism actor in the Mediterranean Sea during the 
formative period between 2001 and 2016. The in-depth investigation throughout 
this period provides important insights into how the security community building 
evolved in the Mediterranean Sea through the crisis management by NATO in the 
case of counter-terrorism.  
The third part of this chapter highlights the analysis of the security 
community building through the EU crisis management in the Mediterranean Sea. 
To establish the connection between security community building and crisis 
management in the basin, I will delve into counter-terrorism operation and 
maritime strategies adopted by the EU to fight against the threats of terrorist 
group in comparison to NATO. With that thought in mind, this chapter will 
provide an extensive overview in regards to security community building in the 
Mediterranean Sea within the practice of counter-terrorism operations. In relation 
to the question of how NATO and EU promote security community building 
through their counter-terrorism operations, OAE and EU counter-terrorism 
strategies are relevant because they indicate how NATO and EU engage with their 
member states in cooperative security practices. Thus, the focus of this chapter 
lies with a detailed narrative of the development of NATO counter-terrorism 
operations and activities together with the EU’s counter-terrorism strategies in the 
Mediterranean Sea. 
5.2 Maritime Terrorism in the Mediterranean Sea 
Maritime terrorism incident is relatively less significant and a rare phenomenon 
constituting only 1-2 per cent of all terrorist attacks (Lehr 2015: 203). However, it 
should be noted that a remarkable number of terrorist attacks at sea have taken 
place. In addition, the increasing numbers of maritime vessels like cargo vessels, 
warships and commercial vessels traversing the major international straits daily 
expose them to the terrorist attacks. The terrorist risk linked to shipping 
operations commonly stemmed from the use of vessels as weapons to support 
terrorist activities (Marlow 2010: 670).  The threat of terrorism has gradually 
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increased with the technology breakthrough including the possession of high-
speed vessels and high technology weapons by terrorist groups (Ronzitti 2012: 
33). The terrorist attacks are directed not only at navigation, but also at other 
maritime activities including oil rigs and platforms on the continental shelf 
(Ronzitti 2012: 33). The principal motives of maritime terrorism are political, and 
incidents usually involve hijacking vessels and hostage-taking (Nincic 2012: 1).  
 The incidents of maritime terrorism date back to the early 1960s with the 
emergence of modern maritime attacks by the Palestinian insurgent (Murphy 
2007: 49). In 1961, the hijacking of Santa Maria has brought to public attention 
the emergence of maritime terrorism. The hijacking of Santa Maria is regarded as 
the first incident of modern maritime terrorism (Greenberg et al. 2006: 20). The 
Santa Maria was hijacked by Portuguese insurgents with political motives to 
overthrow the government at that time. During the attack, officers of the ship were 
killed and other crew members were attacked (Joubert 2013: 118). On 21 
February 1982, the merchant ship Saint Bedan was bombed in Northern Ireland. 
The terrorist hijacked and blew up the ship upon its arrival at Moville pier (Villar 
1985: 57). A year before, a 1393-ton coaster Nellie M was also hijacked and 
bombed by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in a similar way to Saint Bedan in 
Moville pier (Villar 1985: 58). Other terrorist attacks include the bombing of a 
Spanish destroyer in Spain. Basque guerillas claimed responsibility for this attack 
in which they used magnetic mines and explosive devices to hijack the vessel 
(Villar 1985: 58). 
Although the attack of Santa Maria was the first maritime terrorism attack 
in modern history, the Achille Lauro incident also brought far-reaching publicity. 
The hijacking of the cruise ship Achille Lauro in the Mediterranean in 1985 was 
highly notable in the history of maritime terrorism, bringing it to public attention 
and having a significant impact on international relations. The act has remained a 
symbol of terrorism at sea and can be considered as the birth of maritime 
terrorism (Samarasinghe 2008: 75). The vessel carrying more than 750 passengers 
was hijacked by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) off the 
coast of Egypt, en route from Alexandria to Ashdod (Johnson 2007: 145). During 
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the attack, the terrorists took 331 crews and 120 passengers as hostage (Snoddon 
2007: 229). The hijacking took place in attempt to seize the vessel and coerce the 
release of 50 Palestinians being detained in Israel (Greenberg et al. 2006: 20). One 
of the passengers on board, Leon Klinghoffer, was killed during the attack, which 
resulted in great concerns over the security level provided by the owners and 
operators of the cruise company (Johnson 2007: 145). Following the hijacking, 
there was a sharp decline in the Mediterranean cruise liner industry, raising great 
concerns and questions about the security measures taken at ports and aboard 
ships (Simon 1986: 1).   
The attack against Achille Lauro had a great impact especially on the 
international cruise industry, international law and the domestic law of countries 
such as the US (Joubert 2013: 119). Following the incident, the IMO adopted a 
resolution mainly focused on measures to prevent unlawful acts, in order to 
preserve the safety of ships and security of passengers and crew (Ronzitti 2012: 
39). The incident has also led to the proposal for a convention for the suppression 
of unlawful acts in November 1986. The SUA convention proposed that unlawful 
acts against the safety of maritime navigation include the use of force in seizure of 
ships, violence and harmful attacks against safety of the persons on board, and the 
use of any volatile devices which may cause damage to the ships (Bateman 2006: 
89). Held at Rome in 1988, the SUA convention dictates provisions for acts of 
terrorism against fixed platforms on the continental shelf (Ronzitti 2012: 39). 
Through this convention, enforcement jurisdiction of the coastal states has been 
extended beyond the territorial limits. It has also allowed the exercise, in certain 
special circumstances, of enforcement jurisdiction in an adjacent State’s territorial 
sea (Bateman 2006: 89). 
 In South Asia, the region lies between the strategic choke points, Strait of 
Hormuz and Strait of Malacca, which are of great geo-strategic importance to the 
navigation and transport of oil from the Arabian Gulf (Sakhuja 2008: 40). 
Consequently, it has exposed this region to the vulnerabilities of terrorist groups 
attacks. There have been several incidents involving the terrorist group, Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) and Sri Lankan Navy (SLN). The LTTE 
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demonstrated their capabilities against maritime domain when they attacked a Sri 
Lankan naval supply ship Abheeta in November 1991 (Acharya 2007: 79). The 
group also involved in several hijackings at sea, including the attack of the Irish 
Moa in 1995, the Princess Wave in 1996, and the M/V Cordiality in 1997 (Kraska 
& Pedrozo 2013: 357). LTTE is known for its ability to exploit the sea to lethal 
effect for logistics and offensive operations particularly against SLN assets (Sood 
2008: 22). The maritime ability of LTTE is something to be considered with a 
serious approach. According to Sakhuja, the LTTE owns and operates a fleet of 
deep-sea going ships, which is perceived as one of the large-scale maritime 
operations ever conducted in the northeast of Sri Lanka (Sakhuja 2008: 44). The 
LTTE rebel forces again demonstrated their next attack in 1998 against cargo 
vessels, MV Princess Kash which was on its way to Mullaitivu coast of eastern Sri 
Lanka (Sakhuja 2008: 45). Another notorious incident between LTTE and SLN 
was in October 2000, when the LTTE destroyed the Sri Lanka naval craft at the 
Trincomalee naval port (Sazlan 2008: 116). On May 19, 2009, the special force 
team of Sri Lankan Army (SLA) gained control of the rebels. The LTTE founder 
and leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran together with all the top leadership of the 
LTTE were killed and the group was dismantled (Yass 2014: 70). Before the 
defeat in 2009, the maritime wing of the LTTE, the “Sea Tigers” were 
successfully sinking over 30 percent of the small boats in the Sri Lankan navy 
(Kraska & Pedrozo 2013: 357), which made them the most effective maritime 
terrorist organisation in the world. 
 In most but not all cases, the factor that greatly contributes to the attacks 
of maritime terrorism is geography (Murphy 2007: 47). In Southeast Asia, the 
maritime environment of Southeast Asia is highly volatile and has received a high 
volume of maritime traffic every year.53 Its maritime space which connects 
Europe, Middle East, Northeast Asia and the Pacific Ocean nations, is critical to 
international trade and transport of oil (Sazlan 2008: 107). There are relatively 
few terrorist groups acting as principal actors in the Southeast Asia. The Free 
																																								 																				
53 Serves as one of the busiest SLOC with high volume of maritime traffic, Strait of Malacca for 
instance labeled as “the iron highway”. This strait provides important sea-lanes for almost 30 
percent of world trade carrying huge amount of world’s crude oil and liquefied natural gas (Lehr 
2007: ix). 
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Aceh Movement (GAM), the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Jemaah Islamiah (JI) and the Abu Sayyaf Group 
(ASG) have developed as terrorist organisations with high maritime capability in 
the region (Murphy 2007: 65). In 2004, the ASG attacked the inter-island 
SuperFerry 14, a commercial vessel in Manila Bay, carrying 899 passengers and 
was believed to combine with elements from JI (Greenberg et al. 2006: 22).54 The 
attack that caused 116 fatalities reportedly occurred because the ferry operator 
refused to concede a ransom demand by the hijackers (Murphy 2007: 66; Kraska 
and Pedrozo 2013: 744). The incident was marked as one of the worst terrorist 
attacks in Asia since 9/11, only surpassed by the first Bali bombings of 12 
October 2002 (Banlaoi 2007: 121). The ASG has demonstrated both its 
capabilities to terrorise shipping lanes and explode ships at strategic choke points, 
and also how terrorism has greatly expanded at sea.55 This concern has previously 
been shared by higher officials in Southeast Asia, where the attacks are now 
feared to be directed not only towards hub ports, but also shipping. In 2003 during 
Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore’s deputy Prime Minister, Dr Tony Tan expressed 
his concern, and warned of the possibility of the targets shifting from merely hub 
ports to commercial shipping (Acharya 2007: 81). 
In the Gulf of Aden, a few number of attacks by terrorist groups also took 
place. The growing interest among terrorist groups in target assets in the maritime 
domain was evidenced by the highly bold attack on USS Cole on 12 October 
2000. The bombing killed 17 U.S sailors, two terrorists, and 39 others were 
reported injured (Greenberg et al. 2006: 21). The attack against USS Cole 
manifested the capabilities of the terrorist group which extended towards not only 
commercial vessels but also high value maritime assets including naval vessels 
(Acharya 2007: 79). Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility in this attack. After the 9/11 
																																								 																				
54 Other attacks on commercial vessels in Southeast Asia include, among others, the bombing of 
the Philippine ferry Our Lady Mediatrix in February 2000; August 1991 bombing of the ship M/V 
Doulous; and bombing of Indonesian ferry Kailifornia on December 2001 (Bateman 2007:257). 
55 After the attack, ASG claimed responsibility for the attack and warned that it was part of 
vengeance for Bangsa Moro amid the crisis between Philippine government and Filipino muslim 
in Mindanao (Banlaoi 2007: 121). ASG also confirmed that one of the passenger in the vessel was 
the suicide bomber in the attacks. The hijacking of the commercial vessel was an eminent case of 
maritime terrorist attack and demonstrates the capability of ASG to undermine not only hub port 
but also shipping industry. 
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attacks, the possibility of terrorist attacks has been growing in the maritime sector. 
According to Acharya, this has been demonstrated by a number of attacks and 
attempted or planned attacks, which involve several established terrorist groups 
including Al Qaeda (Acharya 2007: 80). As a result of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, 
the potential of terror attacks in the maritime domain became more alarming. The 
attacks demonstrated the capabilities of Al Qaeda to broaden their attack to 
maritime sectors including shipping, port infrastructure, the supply chain and 
container traffic (Acharya 2007: 78). In the Mediterranean, there was an attempt 
to attack British and US merchant and naval vessels in the Strait of Gibraltar in 
June 2002. The attempt however was successfully foiled and the terrorist was 
arrested by Moroccan authorities (Roell 2009: 2).  
Despite the increased awareness of the vulnerability of maritime assets and 
trade safety to terrorist attacks, maritime security did not receive sufficient 
attention until the terrorist attack on 9/11. The reason for this was mainly the low 
numbers of terrorist incidents in the maritime domain, until questions were raised 
as to whether maritime terrorism should be perceived as a clear and real threat or 
otherwise. Despite this ambiguity, a former UK First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval 
Staff (as cited in Nincic) conceived of maritime terrorism as a clear and present 
danger that may imperil the global economy (Nincic 2012: 1). Regardless of the 
rarity and small number of attacks of terrorist groups in the maritime domain, the 
most concerning thing was the issue of how minor maritime attack can cause 
severe damage to major port or maritime facilities. There was also a growing fear 
that the hijacked ship can potentially be used as a delivery platform for WMD 
(Joubert 2013: 111). 
Nonetheless, the subsequent attack on M/V Limburg in October 2002 was 
another milestone event in maritime history. The attack was launched by the 
terrorist group against French tanker M/V Limburg carrying 158,000 tonnes crude 
oil in the Gulf of Aden in Yemen (Acharya 2007: 80). Limburg was bombed using 
a small boat loaded with explosives and caused the spill of ninety thousand barrels 
of oil into the Gulf of Aden (Joubert 2013: 125). The mastermind behind the 
attack of the Limburg, Abd al Rahman al Nashiri, was successfully arrested and it 
	
	
112	
led to the discovery that the ships in the Mediterranean had been a target for Al 
Qaeda for their next attack (Koknar 2005: 2). Al Nashiri also revealed that the 
terrorist group were preparing to launch an attack in the Strait of Gibraltar, 
leading to NATO’s immediate response to enhance security in the western 
Mediterranean, especially around the Strait of Gibraltar (Koknar 2005: 2). There 
was also a growing concern about the potential attack from Al Qaeda across the 
Strait of Gibraltar into Europe, particularly after the bombings attack in Madrid 
(Snoddon 2006: 231). 
Similarly, the attack against M/V Limburg had far reaching implications 
for international security concerns, in particular the maritime security issues in the 
area of Bab el- Mandab, since it was widely assumed there was a link between the 
incident with Al-Qaeda (Praussello 2011: 368). The incident caused great 
calamity to the Yemen, particularly to the tourism sectors given the cost of 
cleaning-up operations and the limited use of the port (Praussello 2011: 368). 
Likewise, the number of monthly container transhipment in Yemen sharply 
declined from 43,000 to 3,000 containers after the incident (Roell 2009: 3). Bab 
el-Mandab is a vital strategic strait that joins the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden 
(Praussello 2011: 368). Any vessels carrying crude oil navigating from the Persian 
Gulf must traverse this strait before entering the Suez Canal (Praussello 2011: 
368). Consequently, should these areas come under attack the potential 
consequences would be devastating and would disrupt the global economy (Luft 
and Korin 2004: 3). 
Following the attack against Limburg, the littoral states, port authorities 
and international organisations have adopted a few security measures to meet the 
requirement by the IMO. One of them is The International Ship and Port Facility 
Security (ISPS) Code. ISPS Code was drafted in late 2002 with the primary 
objective to enhance the security level surrounding ports and protect maritime 
shipping from any potential terrorist attacks (Sazlan 2008: 110). The ISPS Code 
was also meant to provide appropriate security levels and corresponding security 
measures, as well as increasing security awareness on board to help reduce the 
overall vulnerability of the ships (Bateman 2006: 88). ISPS Code entered into 
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force on 1 July 2004 where it required shipping companies, vessels, port 
authorities and contacting governments to meet several security criteria before 
they were given the ISPS code certification (Sazlan 2008: 110). ISPS contains 
detailed security-related requirements for governments, shipping companies and 
port authorities where the ships may be denied the right of entry into one’s ports if 
they failed to comply with the code (Kawamura 2008: 158). According to ISPS, 
ships are subject to a system of survey, verification, certification and control to 
ensure that the security measures are in fully complied with (Kawamura 2008: 
159). The ISPS Code has contributed to a greater awareness of the potential 
maritime security including to maritime industry.56 The enforcement of the ISPS 
Code has also led to a substantial reduction in the number of maritime crime, 
including cargo fraud and cargo pilfering (Bateman 2006: 88). 
In recent years, following the attack on the Limburg, there was only one 
attack against ships, which is the attack on the Japanese large crude oil carrier M 
Star in the Strait of Hormuz in 2010. The Strait of Hormuz is the world’s most 
critical oil chokepoint with a daily oil flow of approximately 17 million barrels 
per day, accounting for about one-third of all global oil traded by sea  (Johnson 
2016: 1). In addition, the strait is a key conduit for ships carrying LNG, 
particularly from Qatar, which made it crucial to the global economy. When 
tankers were frequently attacked in the strait between 1984 to 1987, the shipping 
volume was severely declined which prompted the US to intervene in the area. 
However, this was during the period of the tanker war, a campaign of economic 
attrition and political intimidation during the Iran-Iraq war from 1980 to 1987, 
whereby both nations attacked each other’s oil-tanker shipping frequently in the 
strait. Thus, the decline of oil-export and shipping volume during that period was 
primarily resulted from the tension between Iran and Iraq, not because of the 
terrorist. After the US intervention, the strait since then has been free from any 
																																								 																				
56 In spite of greater acceptance of the implementation of ISPS Code, there is however some 
problems with its effectiveness. First, ISPS only applies to the so-called SOLAS ships, that is a 
commercial vessels over 500 gross tonnage and does not include smaller vessels under 500 gross 
tonnage. Second, ISPS Code is a U.S. code and developing countries are having difficulties to 
accord with the code. Third, the implementation of ISPS Code increase considerable cost for the 
vessel owners. This includes additional cost for extra crew, management and vessels security-
related equipment (Bateman 2007: 251). 
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terrorist group attacks until the incident of 9/11, which triggered the terrorist 
group attack against M Star in 2010. Almost a decade since the deadliest attack of 
the terrorist group against SuperFerry 14 in 2004, maritime terrorism incidents 
have been in a long hiatus hitherto.  
Nevertheless, there is currently an ongoing debate about the growing 
potential of terrorist group attacks on the shipping lanes. On 16 July 2015, the so-
called Islamic State militants have claimed responsibility for the attack of the 
Egyptian coastguard vessel in the Mediterranean Sea near the Sinai Peninsula 
(Nightingale 2015: 1). The attack sunk a 25 meter Swiftships, a fast patrol boat as 
claimed by the IS group. The incident has demonstrated the increased capability 
of the group compared to their previous attack against ship in the Suez Canal 
(Nightingale 2015: 1). Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has also become a 
trend debate these days following their announcement to use Libya as a gateway 
to Europe. Libya is just 300 miles way from Sicily, 250 miles from Malta and 
only 100 miles from Lampedusa, which makes it a strategic gateway to Europe 
(Martino 2015: 1). As a failed state, Libya can easily provide access to the Europe 
for the ISIS, mainly by the Mediterranean Sea. The potential for the fisherman 
boats to be boarded by the terrorist group has become more alarming than before. 
There is also a threat of attacks on maritime targets, such as cruise liners in the 
Mediterranean. Propaganda released by ISIS to hijack immigrant boats from 
Libya crossing the Mediterranean to cause terror has received great concern 
among the international community over the possibility of another destructive act 
of terrorism at sea (The Independent, 2015).  
5.3 NATO Counter-Terrorism Operation in the Mediterranean Sea 
NATO is an active security actor and participates in counter-terrorism measures in 
the Mediterranean through its mission codenamed Operation Active Endeavour 
(OAE). NATO, for the first time in history, invoked Article V on 4 October 2001 
as an immediate response after the terrorist attack in the US on September 11, 
2001 (Feldt 2011: 16). OAE formally began its operation on 26 October 2001. It 
has a mandate to monitor maritime trade routes and provide surveillance activities 
to the ships and vessels in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. Additionally, NATO’s 
	
	
115	
Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED) deployed in the basin 
also focused on monitoring the safety of ports and narrow sea-lanes (Nevers 2007: 
41). In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attack, other than the OAE mission, 
NATO had also provided assistance to the US in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. 
According to Article 33 in the Special Report of the War against Terrorism 2002, 
NATO deployed nine ships and eight-nation task forces in the basin to assist the 
US ships in their mission of counter-terrorism in Afghanistan.57 NATO also sent 
its Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft as part of Operation 
Enduring Freedom to assist in the campaign against terrorism.58 This mission is 
what can be interpreted as a NATO commitment to unite together with the US 
after the terrorist attack in parallel to Article V, which says that an armed attack 
against one ally is considered as an attack against all allies: 
The deployment of the NATO airborne early warning capability to the 
US is to augment the US national capability. It also patrol the sky of the 
US from any other potential air launch attack. The operation was to show 
the idea that the allies are with the US, the allies stand with the US and 
NATO might provide some help with the implementation of our first 
Article V. This is the first time we ever use Article V when there is an 
attack, signifying that we take this issue seriously considering activated 
of Article V. 
(Interview No. 5, Former NATO’s Deputy Assistant Secretary General for 
Operations)  
The OAE was created with two principal aims. Firstly, to detect any 
suspicious or unusual events at sea that are related to terrorist acts; and secondly 
to react immediately to that detection.59 Following the two focal points, the OAE 
mission has focused mainly on deterring, defending, disrupting and protecting 
																																								 																				
57 NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Committee Report on The War Against Terrorism, November 
2002, pp. 6. 
58 NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Committee Report of 2007 Annual Session on The Fight 
Against Terrorism- Impact and Implications for the Atlantic Alliance, 2007, pp. 2. 
59 NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Parliamentary Speech on Operation Active Endeavour: Recent 
Political and Military Developments, July 2007, pp. 2. 
	
	
116	
against terrorist acts at sea.60 In the pursuit of accomplishing the objectives and 
reinforcing legitimate users of the sea, the operational and tactical mission has 
therefore been coordinated in that direction. Calleya (2013) suggests that there are 
four separate elements to the OAE: i) to maintain a deterrence presence and 
surveillance particularly in the eastern Mediterranean, to safeguard the civilian sea 
traffic, and to preserve the security of the area with their inspection capabilities to 
suspected vessels; ii) to carry out regular route surveys in choke points area such 
as Straits of Gibraltar; iii) to provide escort assistance to the vessels requiring it 
while navigating the Straits of Gibraltar; and iv) to strengthen the OAE’s mission 
through the support of Mediterranean Dialogue partners (Calleya 2013: 136). In 
summary, the OAE was established in 2001 as an immediate response to the 9/11 
terrorist attack on the US. However, it also needs to be taken into account that 
NATO invoked Article V for the first time due to concern of the European sides 
as asserts below: 
The second reason to invoke Article V was the concern on the European 
sides. We need to determine what is the threat of the Europe from the 
south and east of Mediterranean. Hence, what we can do is to make sure 
nobody bring weapons, exposes, chemical biological nuclear weapons 
and smuggle the bombs. That’s the scenario we have been looking at. 
(Interview No. 5, Former NATO’s Deputy Assistant Secretary General 
for Operations) 
During the early years since its inception, the OAE focused mainly on maritime 
surveillance in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. However, the OAE has 
significantly evolved since then and has extended its remit to conduct regular 
surveillance not only in the eastern Mediterranean Sea but also the entire 
Mediterranean Sea. The OAE has also extended its mandate to patrolling the 
Strait of Gibraltar in particular, due to the fact that it is a vital choke point in the 
Mediterranean Sea (Cesaretti 2008: 3). 
																																								 																				
60 NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Parliamentary Speech on Operation Active Endeavour: Recent 
Political and Military Developments, July 2007, pp. 2. 
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In this chapter, I organise the missions by OAE into six predominant 
activities as follows. Firstly, the operation conducted through OAE is 
surveillance, tracking and monitoring, which emphasised monitoring any unusual 
acts or movements of vessels in the Mediterranean, particularly in Strait of 
Gibraltar. Secondly, operation of OAE consists of escorting the vessels which 
requested it while navigating Strait of Gibraltar. Next, the operation includes 
compliant boarding and inspection to suspected vessels in accordance with 
international law. In addition, OAE also focuses on active training and exercises 
with key regional actors, such as sharing experiences and conducting tactical 
navigation exercises between naval partners. The fifth operation also includes the 
support of Mediterranean Dialogue partners, in which NATO invited participation 
from any interested Mediterranean Dialogue partners to contribute to the OAE. 
Finally, this section discusses the mission of OAE, which also extended to not 
only maritime surveillance, but also to providing humanitarian assistance and 
support for high visibility events.  
• Surveillance, tracking and monitoring. 
Strategically, the OAE has focused on maintaining a deterrence presence in the 
eastern Mediterranean Sea since it was first established, as well as safeguarding 
the civilian sea traffic. Firstly, the OAE in the Mediterranean has essentially 
aimed to deter any potential terrorist acts at sea by carrying out regular route 
surveys. Since its commencement in late 2001, the OAE began its surveillance in 
the eastern Mediterranean Sea. According to Article 30 in the 2010 Committee 
Report of Maritime Security: NATO and EU Roles and Coordination, the OAE 
has evolved significantly over the years since it was first incepted. Its remit was 
later extended to include the coverage of not only the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, 
but also the entire Mediterranean Sea.61 Due to fears of another attack by Al-
Qaeda following the attacks of the Limburg in 2002, the OAE operation has been 
expanded to cover the entire Mediterranean Sea particularly the Strait of Gibraltar, 
the important choke point for vessels navigation in the Mediterranean Sea. For 
																																								 																				
61 NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Committee Report of 2010 Annual Session on Maritime 
Security: NATO and EU Roles and Coordination, 2010, pp. 4. 
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example, it has been claimed that Al-Qaeda were preparing for acts of violence 
and to launch an attack against western ships crossing the Strait of Gibraltar. 
However, as a result of vigorous surveillance, that attempt has been successfully 
foiled by the Moroccan authorities (The Guardian 2002). It has prompted the 
NAC to agree on February, 4, 2003 to expand this mission with the additional 
mandate of vessel queries, compliant boarding and escorting commercial vessels 
sailing through the straits, for those who request it.62  
In addition, tracking and monitoring also play a vital part in surveillance 
operation. Since the beginning of its operation, the OAE has actively tracked and 
monitored the movements of thousands of merchant vessels sailing through the 
basin. The OAE decided to focus on expanding its intelligence-sharing activities, 
which includes developing a network for tracking merchant shipping and potential 
terrorist movements through the Mediterranean, and committing to share this 
intelligence with all the Mediterranean countries (Nevers 2007: 41). NATO 
committed to share and exchange the information with its partners to enable a 
more comprehensive understanding of merchant shipping in the basin (Cesaretti 
2009: 479). With the ability to monitor the merchant shipping traffic in the 
Mediterranean, it helps law enforcement agencies including other naval forces in 
the basin to exercise immediate and effective response against the problems. The 
regular monitoring of vessel movement in the basin has proven to be one of the 
main factors contributing to the success in keeping the basin free from potential 
terrorist plots. Commenting on the effectiveness of the OAE in the Mediterranean, 
a NATO official was keen to point out that the presence of NATO has greatly 
contributed to this success: 
There is a high volume of shipping in the Mediterranean and they 
normally have to inform when they leave the port and where they are 
going. However they can change for several reasons. So following that 
and knowing what is the maritime situational picture in the 
Mediterranean, it was a success when NATO gets involved there. As a 
																																								 																				
62 NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Committee Report on Progress in the War Against Terrorism, 
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result, there was no terrorist attack launched in Europe from the sea. So 
as the number one measure effect, yes it is absolutely effective.  
(Interview No. 5, Former NATO’s Deputy Assistant Secretary General 
for Operations) 
In addition, the OAE has also reinforced an ‘information-based and 
intelligence-led operation’ where the essential element in the operation has 
focused on information processing. According to Article 30 in the 2010 
Committee Report of Maritime Security: NATO and EU Roles and Coordination, 
the OAE has evolved significantly where it is “focusing on gathering and 
processing information to target specific vessels of interest rather than 
patrolling”.63 To ensure the effectiveness in information collection and 
information sharing, the Joint Information and Analysis Centre (JIAC) is the 
important tool driving the efforts. According to Cesaretti, JIAC is responsible for 
fostering information collection amongst the partners, providing analysis and 
warning, and offering advice regarding the assets deployed in the basin (Cesaretti 
2009: 479). All the partners or agencies can use the information gathered and 
collected in JIAC, if and when required. 
During the NATO Parliamentary Assembly on July 2007, Rear Admiral of 
CC-Mar Naples in his speech stated NATO’s commitment to expand its 
intelligence-sharing activities through developing a network for tracking merchant 
shipping in the Mediterranean.64 NATO’s capabilities in tracking and monitoring 
have improved significantly with the tracking software called Baseline for Rapid 
Interative Transformational Experimentation (BRITE) and FAST2CAP in 
operation.65 BRITE and FAST2CAP are the software used to analyse the 
multitude of tracks vessels and to identify unusual events at sea.66 The use of 
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64 NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Parliamentary Speech on Operation Active Endeavour: Recent 
Political and Military Developments, July 2007, pp. 1.	
65 NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Parliamentary Speech on Operation Active Endeavour: Recent 
Political and Military Developments, July 2007, pp. 10.	
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BRITE and FAST2CAP is greatly complementing the use of the Automatic 
Identification System (AIS) transmitter mandated by IMO and is simultaneously 
enhancing NATO’s ability to track shipping. AIS is compulsory for all the ships 
weighing over 300 tons. All vessels are required to provide information including 
the vessels identity and other related information in order to assist in monitoring 
and tracking the vessels. It enables NATO to get real-time pictures of the 
maritime traffic in the Mediterranean, leading to high alert of any unusual or 
suspicious vessels.67 If they discovered any suspicious vessels at sea which meet 
the specified criteria, a NATO naval will immediately hail it before boarding the 
vessels for inspection. The tracking and monitoring operations are essential for 
identifying any suspicious vessels that may have a connection to terrorist groups 
and to assure there are no vessels carrying suspicious cargo or personnel.68 During 
the hailing operation, NATO naval and aircraft units will contact and question 
suspicious vessels and they are required to identify themselves. These procedures 
have been closely administrated under the authority of Allied Maritime 
Component Command Naples (CC-MAR Naples) since 2004, which is also 
responsible for two immediate response forces, SNMCMG2 and SNMG 2.69 
• Escorting 
Secondly, another vital operation of the OAE is escorting the vessels which 
requested it. As aforementioned, the mandate of the OAE was extended in 2003 to 
also include vessel queries, compliant boarding and escorting commercial vessels 
sailing through the Straits of Gibraltar, which requested it. After NATO extended 
its mandate to include escorting operations, a great number of commercial vessels 
took advantage of this offer to ensure safer navigation in the Mediterranean Sea. 
In 2003, NATO’s Operation Strait of Gibraltar (STROG) was created in the light 
of the goal to offer an assistance to OAE, responsible to controlling the vessel’s 
entry into the western Mediterranean Sea (Alexander 2006: 226). The Strait of 
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Gibraltar provides an entrance to the Mediterranean Sea with thousands of 
merchant vessels and oil tankers passing it every year, which makes the strait a 
crucial choke point. This operation is implemented with heavy reliance on the 
logistics support including a number of naval assets by the NATO member 
countries. Over time, the operation was extended to also include the participation 
of other Mediterranean countries such as Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco. (Ronzitti 
2012: 43). Through the escort operation, by 2007, 488 allied commercial ships 
have been successfully escorted through the Strait of Gibraltar (NATO 2008a: 4). 
• Boarding and inspection 
Thirdly, compliant boarding and inspection of suspected vessels are also an 
essential component of the OAE in furtherance of deterring terrorist attacks in the 
Mediterranean Sea. Through the OAE, the operation in practice involves the 
hailing of the merchant vessels sailing the Mediterranean Sea every day. Since 
April 2003, NATO has been systematically boarding suspect ships. The suspected 
vessels are boarded with the compliance of the ships’ masters and flag states in 
accordance with international law. During the boarding and inspection operation, 
up to eight navy vessels are deployed in strategic locations of the cargo flows, 
which includes the entire Mediterranean basin (Koknar 2005: 5). While the 
boarding takes place, it is crucial that the boarding is consensual, as a NATO 
official explained: 
There were many boardings whereby most of them were consensual. I do 
not think it allows us to do non-consensual boarding. 
(Interview No. 5, Former NATO’s Deputy Assistant Secretary General 
for Operations) 
In practice, during the inspection of the suspicious vessels at sea, the information 
collected from the vessels inspected by the SNMG 2 will be reported to CC-MAR 
Naples and NATO Shipping Centre in England for further actions (NATO 2014b). 
If any irregularities are discovered, a team of 15 to 20 specially trained personnel 
of NATO may board the vessel to inspect the documentation and cargo, with the 
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compliance of flag states and the ship’s captain (Cesaretti 2008: 3). If any 
evidence related to terrorism is discovered in the ships, NATO will then take any 
necessary actions as authorised by the NAC (NATO 2008a: 3). The practice of 
boarding the suspected vessels will not only ensure that there are no terrorist-
related vessels sailing through the basin, but also help to deliver a message about 
the NATO maritime presence in the Mediterranean Sea.70 During the boarding, 
the NATO standing naval forces will collect the information regarding the vessels 
and disseminate to the coastal countries and their allies for further actions in order 
to detect and prevent any potential terrorist attacks. According to Froh, in some 
cases the information is also shared with the Mediterranean Dialogue partners 
(Froh 2016). Since the beginning of the operation until late October 2007, more 
than 89,000 ships have been hailed and approximately 125 have been boarded in 
the eastern Mediterranean (NATO 2008a: 4).  
In the Mediterranean, CC-MAR Naples works directly with the NATO 
naval forces operating in the basin. This cooperation leads to strengthening the 
security of the Mediterranean, particularly in enhancing interoperability and 
immediate response capability to any possible terrorist attacks. For example, in 
June 2003, naval assets of southern-region countries reported a suspicious vessel 
operating in the Mediterranean (Cesaretti 2009: 478). Following this report, CC-
MAR Naples immediately shared the information with relevant partners to raise 
awareness of any possible actions that should be taken following the report. 
Subsequently, the Allies Coast Guard will be able to take necessary steps to the 
same vessel when it enters the country’s territorial waters either to hail or board 
the ships for further inspection (Cesaretti 2009: 478). National authorities will 
begin with a thorough investigation of the particular vessels with all the 
information collected, and this includes diverting the vessels to the nearest port to 
be examined, and sometimes handled by the national authorities, when it is 
necessary. A NATO official explained the whole process, which takes place 
during the boarding: 
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So you hail on the captain, captain will stop and the authorities will go on 
board. Alternatively, they may divert to the port and when it comes to 
national waters, they have the authority to take the ships and move it to 
the port and examine it. They can also report it to the national authorities, 
the French, Italian, Spanish, the Greek, Albanian and other authorities. 
This allowed NATO to have a better understanding of what was moving 
in the Mediterranean.  
(Interview No. 5, Former NATO’s Deputy Assistant Secretary General 
for Operations)   
• Training and exercises 
Fourthly, the next vital operation in OAE is the extensive and forceful capacity 
building between the key regional actor, accomplished by conducting active 
training and exercises. Spain, Morocco and Italy are among the key regional 
players in the Mediterranean and continuously collaborate through joint training 
and exercises with NATO. In pursuit of securing the safe sea-lane in the 
Mediterranean Sea, NATO naval assets conducted regular exercises, trainings and 
port visits in support of the OAE operation in the Mediterranean (Cesaretti 2009: 
483). From time to time, NATO naval assets will make a port visit during its 
deployment in the Mediterranean. This operation is particularly intended to 
increase maritime security levels and readiness in support of the OAE operation. 
The response force responsible in this task is the Standing NATO Maritime Group 
(SNMG 2), which conducts regular port visits and exercises with the Allies 
partners. SNMG 2 is operating in the Mediterranean based on the three-months 
rotation basis in support of this operation (Cesaretti 2009: 483).  
In August 2015, SNMG 2 made a scheduled port visit to Tunisia as part of 
a routine and diplomatic visit to Allied partners. It also intended to manifest the 
NATO’s presence in the region to assure them that the Mediterranean Sea is a safe 
shipping lane for everyone (NATO 2015c). During the assignment in the 
Mediterranean Sea, SNMG 2 is conducting a visit to its partners’ ports as part of 
the OAE operation, in order to reinforce inter-operability training. During the 
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visit, the Commander also meets the high-ranking representatives of the port’s 
nations to discuss the plans of counter-terrorism at sea particularly in the 
Mediterranean. This activity has been a routine for the groups deployed in the 
Mediterranean in support of the OAE operation. 
Similarly, the task of counter-terrorism measures in the Mediterranean is 
also shared by SNMCMG2. For example, on September 5, 2014, seven NATO 
ships assigned to SNMCMG2 made their scheduled port visit in Casablanca. The 
Group’s deployment composed of naval assets of Italy, Turkey, Greece, Spain, 
UK, Germany and Belgium are initially responsible for conducting mine counter-
measures activities, but later also assist in counter-terrorism operations (NATO 
2014a). For example, during port visits, the Group shared its experiences in mine 
warfare operations and participated in a passing exercise and a tactical navigation 
exercise with the Royal Moroccan Navy (RMN) ships. The shared experience is 
certainly useful in conducting counter-terrorism operations since these activities at 
sea are particularly important to increase inter-operability and immediate response 
capabilities between naval partners (NATO 2014a). Later in March 2015, SNMG 
2 also arrived in Casablanca for its scheduled port visit. During the visit, NATO 
and RMN discussed issues of shared importance including cooperation in OAE. 
NATO and RMN committed to enhance inter-operability and mutual 
understanding between naval partners through participation at sea (NATO 2015b). 
SNMG 2 participated in the exercises at sea with RMN including 
“communications drills to improve information sharing between partners, 
manoeuvering drills to practice ship handling in close proximity, and boarding 
exercises between ships” (NATO 2015a). As one of the MD partners, Morocco 
plays an important role in the regional maritime security through its military 
engagement and shared exercises with NATO forces. 
• Support of Mediterranean Dialogue partners 
The fifth element of the OAE also highlights NATO’s commitment to 
strengthening this operation through the support of Mediterranean Dialogue 
partners. At the NATO Summit in Istanbul in June 2004, NATO proposed to 
enhance the effectiveness of the OAE with the participation of NATO partners, 
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including the Mediterranean Dialogue countries (Cesaretti 2008: 5). NATO has 
therefore invited interested Mediterranean Dialogue countries to join the OAE, at 
which three of the Mediterranean Dialogue countries: Algeria, Israel and Morocco 
had expressed their desire and interest to participate in the OAE. These 
Mediterranean Dialogue countries contributed to the operation through an 
individual cooperation programme (ICP), which is based on the needs of the 
operation.71 These countries cooperate in the OAE by providing information about 
any suspicious shipping operations in their waters for further action by the naval 
force operating in the area. In addition, three other NATO partners, Croatia, 
Georgia and Sweden also indicated their interest to join the operation (Cesaretti 
2008: 3). The participation of these countries would be decided on a case-by-case 
basis (NATO 2008a: 5). The OAE has gathered great attention from 
Mediterranean Dialogue partners, not only offering the use of ships or aircraft, but 
more importantly is their interest to exchange information amongst them. It has 
benefited NATO and the partners to gain more understanding about the 
environment where they operate in, leading to more efficient and potent actions to 
be taken in response to any unusual or suspicious actions at sea.72   
In addition, the OAE’s task also extends to involve participation from 
other interested partners. For instance, NATO sought to cooperate with Russia in 
the OAE to allow the mission extension into the Black Sea; however the proposal 
was opposed by Russia (Nevers 2007: 41).73 However, later in 2006 two ships of 
the Russian Navy participated in OAE patrols in the eastern Mediterranean 
(Bebler 2008: 9). Moreover, Ukraine has also joined the operation since April 
2005 to provide support for the OAE. Ukraine deployed their ships in the 
Mediterranean Sea to help with the operation and to increase practical cooperation 
and inter-operability with NATO (NATO 2007). In order to prepare Ukrainian 
ships with comprehensive training to be able to participate effectively in the 
operation, NATO has been sending mobile training teams to Ukraine. This 
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training was intended to ensure that Ukrainian navies could adapt and follow 
standard procedures of the operation (NATO 2007). Furthermore, NATO has also 
conducted several set of training at sea with Ukrainian ships to allow Ukrainian 
naval forces to perform joint operations with NATO, including vessel’s boarding 
and inspection (NATO 2007). 
• Humanitarian assistance and support for high visibility events 
Finally, the sixth element of OAE is not limited to maritime surveillance and 
boarding suspected vessels, but also includes additional counter-terrorist tasks, 
which involve providing assistance and support for high visibility events on 
request.74 The events have included more than thirty events including NATO’s 
Istanbul Summit 2004 and Athens Olympic in 2004 to defend against any possible 
terrorist attacks.75 For such events, NATO employed together its land, air and 
naval assets (NATO 2008a: 5). In the case of the Athens Olympics in 2004, early 
warning aircraft (AWACS) was used to monitor air traffic together with the coast 
guard to conduct surveillance and compliant boarding in international waters 
around the Greek Peninsula in order to ensure maritime security for the Olympic 
Games.76 Providing support for such high visibility events is always conducted 
under the mandate of standing naval forces where they will set up a separate 
command for those activities, as a NATO official explained: 
The standing naval forces would take it on more than likely, it would be a 
ship and a nation might even take their ships out of NATO command and 
have a do that task. We may set up a separate command for them, where 
they may do it independently or may do it under standing naval forces 
mandate. Or otherwise they may also do such activities under OAE. 
(Interview No. 5, Former NATO’s Deputy Assistant Secretary General 
for Operations) 
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Additionally, with the force ready at sea, NATO has acquired the 
opportunity to also participate in a broad range of situations and emergencies. 
Humanitarian operations, search and rescue, and disaster relief operations in the 
Mediterranean are among the broad occasions in addition to combatting terrorism 
missions. For example, NATO ships and helicopters have rescued 84 workers 
evacuated from stricken oil rigs in high winds and heavy seas in December 2001 
(NATO 2008a: 4). Moreover, NATO forces also gave life-saving support to 254 
refugees of a sinking ship in the Eastern Mediterranean off Crete in January 2002 
(Cesaretti 2009: 478). Furthermore, it also needs to be taken into account that the 
responsibility of providing search and rescue is consistent with the law of the sea 
as the NATO official explained: 
Any ship’s captain and ship’s masters who come across somebody in 
need, it is bound by the law of the sea to assist them and provide them 
with enough water and food, as well as enough fuel to go back to the 
land. 
(Interview No. 5, Former NATO’s Deputy Assistant Secretary General 
for Operations) 
5.4 Summary 
While conducting the operation in the Mediterranean Sea, NATO’s OAE assets 
have successfully detected, reported, and boarded hundreds of suspicious vessels, 
which may have related to terrorist activities. In addition to that, while conducting 
counter-terrorist operations NATO naval forces have also encountered unexpected 
benefits such as success in interception of other illegal activities at sea, including 
transport of illegal explosives and WMD, drug smuggling, irregular migration as 
well as human trafficking.77 All the data and information collected during the 
interception are shared with the national authorities for further actions. 
Despite the success of OAE enforcement, it is however limited due to 
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several factors.78 Firstly, the OAE tracking system is heavily dependent on the 
AIS system, which has resulted in a limitation to identify and detect any vessels 
weighing less than 300 tons. AIS signal reception stations can collect this useful 
information, however it is still insufficient. It is reported that data collected from 
AIS is either incomplete or incorrect in 70% of all cases due to the fact that the 
ships are less than 300 tonnes in weight or sometimes the equipment is 
malfunctional (Duquesne 2011: 26). However, the reliance on AIS is not always a 
problem. According to Froh, it is not necessary to know every little rubber boat at 
sea due to the reason that they may not have the same capability as the larger 
vessels have (Froh 2016). Furthermore, the use of AIS is one of the requirements 
for insurance claiming and this will benefit the vessels companies (Froh 2016). 
On another note, General Marc Duquesne suggests it is important to merge data 
collected from AIS with data from other captors including, among others, via 
radars, semaphores and electro-optical sensors (Duquesne 2011: 26).  As the OAE 
is constantly evolving since it was first incepted, this operation has also faced 
limitations due to the insufficiency of assigned refueling ships.79 Since NATO’s 
naval operations in the Mediterranean is under a rotation basis among 
participating members, it is therefore always reliant upon the availability of the 
nation’s ships. These naval ships are usually in high demand for the national 
activities, therefore it will be more advantageous to have additional acquisition of 
refueling ships to facilitate operational capacity and enhance the efficacy of the 
OAE. Nonetheless, NATO practices a concept of ‘fair burden sharing’ among its 
member states to overcome the issue of insufficiency of refueling ships: 
NATO has a fair burden sharing, where each nation should be taking its 
share. If they don’t have a warship, we expected them to contribute in 
another way. Nations do have navies, so we try to influence them and 
they have force-planning goals to develop and feel capabilities that 
NATO need for collective defence. 
																																								 																				
78 NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Committee Report of 2008 Annual Session on NATO 
Operations: Current Priorities And Lessons Learned, 2008, pp. 13. 
79 NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Committee Report of 2008 Annual Session on NATO 
Operations: Current Priorities And Lessons Learned, 2008, pp. 13.	
	
	
129	
(Interview No. 5, Former NATO’s Deputy Assistant Secretary General 
for Operations) 
In the longer term, NATO recognizes that fighting against terrorism at sea 
requires all stakeholders to work together in various degrees of cooperation 
particularly between NATO and its Mediterranean partners. 
The OAE represents the commitment of NATO to continue developing 
comprehensive tools in combatting maritime terrorism with friendly cooperative 
relations with the Mediterranean partners as well as Mediterranean Dialogue 
countries. All the vessels sailing through the Mediterranean Sea are advised to 
remain vigilant towards any potential attacks from the terrorist groups and 
cooperate favourably with the naval vessels operating in the area. The OAE has 
been a very effective tool in countering terrorism in the Mediterranean and with 
consistent cooperation in the operation, there has been no terrorist plot detected in 
the Mediterranean. There were some other illegal activities found in the 
Mediterranean, but nevertheless there has never been any imminent attack or dirty 
bomb by the terrorist group in the basin. The presence of NATO in the 
Mediterranean has benefited to prevent the possibility of terrorist attack and has 
simultaneously succeeded in maintaining safety and security in the basin. 
5.5 The EU Counter-Terrorism Operation in the Mediterranean Sea 
The 9/11 terrorist attacks were not only calls to action for NATO, but also the EU. 
Since 9/11, the EU’s role in combatting terrorism has been considerably boosted 
and they have made tremendous progress in their efforts to combat terrorism. 
Above that, terrorism from the Mediterranean region has also become an internal 
security concern for the EU (Wolff 2012: 161). As a result, the EU has 
systematically introduced and developed a number of strategies, action plans and 
operations for counter-terrorism in the Mediterranean Sea. Member states have 
actively conducted the operations within NATO monitoring operations, such as 
the OAE. Such operations have also been conducted with the cooperation of non-
NATO multinational naval forces, such as the EUROMARFOR. Therefore, in this 
section, I discuss a framework of counter-terrorism measures, which has been 
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introduced by the EU since 2001, including the implementation of the European 
Arrest Warrant (EAW), the EU Action Plan 2001, the Declaration on Combating 
Terrorism 2004, the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy 2005, the Euro-
Mediterranean Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism, the Operation Coherent 
Behaviour 2002, and the European Counter Terrorism Centre. 
• Counter-terrorism strategies  
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the EU has introduced several counter-terrorism 
strategies to address its commitment to the fight against terrorism. Firstly, the EU 
invoked its first key policy in 14 September 2001, which is the European Arrest 
Warrant (EAW) and the framework decision on terrorism. This policy was 
enforced in June 2002 and rightly emphasised the EU’s pledge to improve the 
mutual recognition of judicial decisions among member states in regards to 
criminal prosecutions or detention orders.80 This policy delineates a number of 
acts punishable by the law including terrorism and emphasises the border controls 
among member states.81 The objectives of the EAW are to abolish extradition 
between member states and promote free movement in judicial decisions in 
criminal matters including terrorism.82 
 A further important framework used to respond to the threat of terrorism 
was the EU Action Plan to Fight Terrorism. It was created on 21 September 2001 
and aimed at making fighting against terrorism a top priority for the EU. The EU 
Action Plan affirms the EU’s commitment to work “in concert in all 
circumstances” in the efforts to fight terrorism.83 It pinpoints the following vital 
plans of action: improving police and judicial cooperation (to enhance the 
implementation of EAW, adopting a common definition of terrorism and 
strengthening cooperation and information exchanges between intelligence 
agencies of the EU); developing international legal instruments to fight against 
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terrorism; preventing the continuous funding of terrorism; increasing the level of 
aviation security including “protection of cockpit access”; and coordinating the 
EU’s global action by increasing the consistency and coordination of all the EU 
policies.84 However, in the wake of the terrorist attacks in Madrid in March 2004, 
the EU Action Plan has been revised and the Declaration on Combating Terrorism 
has been adopted.  
The Declaration on Combating Terrorism was created on 18 June 2004. It 
identified seven strategic objectives for the EU to prevent and combat terrorism 
including the following: i) strengthen the international consensus and enhance 
international efforts to combat terrorism; ii) put an end to the financial access and 
other economic sources by the terrorists groups; iii) enhance capacity within EU 
bodies and member states to improve the efficiency to detect, investigate, and 
prosecute terrorists and prevent attacks; iv) improve the security of international 
transport and ensure an effective border control system; v) reinforcing the 
capabilities of the EU member states to deal with the consequences of a terrorist 
attack; vi) identify factors which facilitate radicalisation and recruitment to 
terrorism; vii) focus on EU external relations towards priority third countries, 
where counter-terrorism capacity needs to be enhanced.85 The declaration 
emphasises the strengthening of international consensus and efforts to combat 
terrorism with the capabilities of member states.86 Rather than providing new 
measures, the declaration focuses more on improvising the implementation of the 
existing action plan.  
In addition, the document also reiterates the EU’s commitment to ensuring 
an effective border control system.87 Border control is not only vital in counter-
terrorism measures, but it plays a significant role in countering illegal migrants, 
particularly through Frontex. For example, in the course of conducting illegal 
migrant clampdowns in the Mediterranean Sea, EU forces assigned for Frontex 
also assisted in the prevention of terrorism. Although mainly focused on border 
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control and surveillance, Frontex is particularly relevant for counter-terrorism as it 
helps to prevent terrorist attacks with the stronger European border control 
(Argomaniz 2011: 48). The same idea is shared by Skordeli (2015) in which she 
suggests that terrorism could sometimes be associated with irregular migration, 
hence prevention measures for irregular migration are frequently correlated with 
counter-terrorism measures (Skordeli 2015: 10). As part of the task in the 
Declaration of Combating Terrorism, it provides technical assistance with the 
partners (Wolff 2009: 148). For example, the EU through its counter-terrorism 
capacity building project with Algeria, Indonesia and Morocco attempted to 
synchronise national budgets and the EU budgets under single framework for 
counter-terrorism policy (Wolff 2012: 166). As this project is relatively sensitive, 
very limited information has been released. Other counter-terrorism technical 
assistance which tackles radicalisation in potential identified environments such 
as prison or worship places, border and maritime security, and training on crisis 
management.88 Moreover, Morocco and Algeria also received training on crisis 
management to enhance their competence concerning counter-terrorism measures 
(Wolff 2012: 166). In other ways, the privileged experiences of some 
Mediterranean countries, such as Italy and Spain in maritime security operations 
are fundamental for other partners, in which they could share their expertise to 
achieve their goals in combatting terrorism at sea (Calleya 2012: 136).  
Another series of terrorist attacks in the London bombings of July 2005 
has urged the EU to adopt another extraordinary measure as matter of urgency. On 
30 November 2005, the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy was adopted with the 
approval of the Justice and Home Affairs Council. This document defines 
comprehensively counter-terrorism measures in the aftermath of 2005, and 
declares terrorism a threat to all states and to all peoples.89 This document 
delineates its strategic commitment in the counter-terrorism activities as follows: 
‘to combat terrorism globally while respecting human rights, and make Europe 
safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, security and justice’.90 
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The strategy demonstrates the will of EU to combat terrorism globally to 
make Europe a safer place as well as to maintain the area of freedom, security and 
justice for the well being of its citizens.91 The strategy puts forward the need for 
cooperation at the national, European, and international levels to decrease 
vulnerability to terrorist attacks (Prezelj 2008a: 25). The strategy aims to cover 
four main pillars of work: prevent, protect, pursue and respond.92 The first 
objective is to prevent people from turning to terrorism, hence the EU pledged to 
reinforce the action plan in tackling the root causes leading to radicalisation and 
recruitment into terrorism.93 The second objective of the strategy is to protect the 
citizens and infrastructure from vulnerability to terrorist attacks. Protection is the 
key part of the strategy in which it emphasises the need to improve border and 
transport security as well as other cross-border infrastructures from potential 
terrorist attacks.94 In the pursuit of this pillar, first regulation in the field of 
maritime security was adopted with the objective to secure and enhance the 
security of port facilities and ships (Casale 2009: 105). The regulation emphasises 
the importance of preserving the security of the European community shipping 
and its citizens from any potential unlawful acts such as acts of terrorism, piracy 
or similar (Casale 2009: 105). The third objective of the Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy is to pursue the disruption of terrorist activity and its networks. This 
pillar highlights the importance of adoption of the EAW to pursue and investigate 
terrorists across borders.95 In addition, key priorities on ‘pursue’ also include 
maximising the use of Europol and Eurojust in judicial and police cooperation in 
combatting terrorism.96 The fourth objective of the strategy is to prepare member 
states to deal with the aftermath of the attacks, as well as improving coordination 
with international organisations to respond on the terrorist attacks.97 
 The Euro-Mediterranean Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism is also 
an essential framework designed to improve cooperation between the EU and its 
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neighbours in North Africa and the Middle East. The code was agreed upon at the 
Barcelona Summit of late November 2005 and aimed to enhance cooperation in 
accordance with UN resolutions (Reinares 2006: 4). This code of conduct brings 
the spirit of solidarity of all participating countries to stand against terrorism 
through a legal framework and international cooperation, and condemns it in all 
its forms.98 The Euro-Mediterranean Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism is 
recognised as one of the far-reaching tools to enhance cooperation in combatting 
terrorism in the Euro-Mediterranean region. The partners committed to combat 
terrorism and address all its causes in accordance to UN resolution and Security 
Council Resolutions on Terrorism.99 In addition, the code demonstrated the 
commitment of all partners to continue protecting the people from terrorist 
attacks, in which they will strengthen their aviation field and maritime security.100 
The code also indicates the importance of experience and information changes to 
minimise the consequences of the attacks (Reinares 2006: 4). The Euro-
Mediterranean Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism requires the members to 
strengthen international cooperation with the regulation guidelines to address the 
threat of terrorism particularly in preventing, containing and eradicating terrorism, 
regionally and internationally. 
 While the EU has created a unified counter-terrorism strategy, explicit 
measures in the maritime domain have remained limited particularly in the 
Mediterranean. This is due to the previous documents which are adopted by the 
EU on counter-terrorism measures provide insufficient agenda for terrorist threats 
in the maritime domain compared to land-oriented terrorism. Recently, in the 
wake of the potential terrorist threats to cruise ships in the Mediterranean from 
ISIS, great concern has been expressed to the international community regarding 
the security levels in the maritime domain. Potential areas for the adoption of the 
maritime counter-terrorism policies need to be considered in order to prepare the 
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EU with the possibilities of maritime terrorist attacks which may jeopardise the 
security of its member states. Other areas for improvement within the EU 
framework are better coordination of counter-terrorism implementation and better 
sharing of information to prevent the vulnerability towards terrorist attacks at sea. 
• EUROMARFOR (Operation Coherent Behaviour)  
Despite the limited area of cooperation in maritime counter-terrorism, the EU 
however has been involved in monitoring operations in the Mediterranean Sea 
with non-NATO multinational naval forces, such as the European Maritime Force 
(EUROMARFOR). EUROMARFOR is a naval force adopted in 1995 by France, 
Spain, Portugal and Italy and since then it has worked closely with its regional 
partner including NATO. It has later been enlarged by the participation of Greece 
and Turkey as the observers. The EUROMARFOR has only been activated a few 
times for shorter operations (Hallams 2013: 180). In 2002, EUROMARFOR had 
its first operation, Operation Coherent Behaviour in the Eastern Mediterranean 
from 1 October 2002 until 30 November 2002 (Global Security 2012). The 
operation was a surveillance mission primarily focused on illegal drug trafficking 
and counter-terrorism. This operation was conducted with close coordination with 
NATO in the frame of OAE. Although it was a very short-term operation, this 
operation nevertheless has contributed to OAE in two ways: in a separate 
operation, coordinated with NATO; and as part of NATO operation (Feldt 2011: 
16). Cooperation with OAE may contribute to a long-term strategic partnership 
for Europe (Faleg and Blockmans 2015: 4). EUROMARFOR demonstrated the 
capacity of active EU engagement in order to restore stability in the 
Mediterranean Sea.  
• European Counter-Terrorism Centre (ECTC) 
Following the growing number of terrorist attacks, the EU is currently facing, it is 
particularly important for the EU to strengthen its response to terror, and to 
enhance its strategic understanding of the threats. On this note, Europol has 
launched the European Counter-Terrorism Centre (ECTC) in January 2016 to 
demonstrate their strategic efforts to fight against terrorism more effectively 
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(Europol 2016). The centre serves as a central information hub providing the 
member states with collective support to fight against terrorist attacks (McNerney 
et al 2017: 16). ECTC also provides intelligence sharing among member states, 
enhance the exchange of information between law enforcement agencies, and 
increases inter-operability between member states. As one of the EU officials 
asserts: 
This centre has recently established by Europol. It is basically links up the 
responsible department at Europol. Additionally, the different tools 
Europol provide is data bank and we are trying to push for the member 
states to use Europol more frequently and to insert more data into the 
system or the tools to make it successful. Europol can work to it only if the 
member states are in the search data.  
(Interview No.1, EU Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism).   
 As a central information hub, ECTC serves as a centre of expertise, 
providing analysis for current investigations of terror attacks in the Europe, as 
well as coordinating immediate responses in the event of major terrorist attacks 
(Europol 2016). With the establishment of ECTC, Europol aims to coordinate 
awareness and improve cooperation between different counter-terrorism 
authorities in the EU (Europol 2016). In addition, the EU attempts to connect the 
capabilities used for counter-migration with the established tools and counter-
terrorism (CT) networks of Europol, to give more access to Europol for certain 
databases of the EU, which was originally assigned for migratory crisis, including 
the access to Schengen information system (Europol 2016). 
5.6 Results and Chapter Summary 
Terrorist threat at sea has always been seen as less significant in comparison to 
land-based incidents due to the low number of attacks reported at sea. 
Nonetheless, several previous dreadful terrorist groups attacks at sea particularly 
Achille Lauro and the attacks against shipping and merchant vessels by the 
Islamic State militants in the recent years have demonstrated that terrorism at sea 
presents a real threat. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, NATO promptly launched 
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OAE under Article V with the mandate to monitor shipping lanes and provide 
surveillance activities to the vessels in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. As part of 
the operation, SNMG2 has been assigned in the Mediterranean to support this 
operation, performing the patrolling tasks on a daily basis. The OAE is the 
operation, which encompasses comprehensive strategic tasks to fight against 
terrorism, including surveillance, boarding, inspection and regular training. By 
contrast, the EU’s role in crisis management in the case of maritime terrorism in 
the Mediterranean is somehow still far behind that of NATO. While several 
strategies have been introduced and adopted, they are mainly focused on land-
oriented terrorism. Nonetheless, EU naval forces have indirectly engaged in 
counter terrorism at sea, particularly in the course of conducting counter-
migration operations enforced by Frontex. With the premise that irregular 
migration is strongly interconnected with terrorist activities, Frontex’s 
safeguarding of the external borders will also eventually help to prevent terrorist 
group attacks at sea.  
In addition, a number of strategies and documents were adopted following 
the terrorist attacks in order to tackle radicalisation and recruitment into terrorism. 
Albeit brief, Operation Coherent Behaviour conducted by EUROMARFOR has 
also been part of the EU counter-terrorism operations conducted with close 
cooperation with the OAE. In summary, a more robust EU presence in the 
Mediterranean is particularly essential in the current regional security 
circumstances. Most visibly, the NATO presence in the Mediterranean Sea for 
counter-terrorism operations has positively increased through the enforcement of 
OAE, even though it has remained limited for the EU. The EU perceives 
cooperation with NATO in the fight against terrorism as somewhat difficult due to 
the fact that not all EU member states are NATO member states. There are 
ongoing dialogues, consultations, and general coordination between NATO and 
the EU in general terms on counter-terrorism, nevertheless to what extent it will 
be further developed remains ambiguous.101  
																																								 																				
101 Interview with EU Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, 15 June 2016. 
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The relationship between the EU and NATO regarding counter-terrorism 
policies including security strategies, partnerships and military cooperation 
demonstrates the extent to which both organisations promote security community 
building processes beyond their borders in order to collectively deal with 
maritime terrorism in the Mediterranean Sea. In particular, the findings explain 
how far such cooperation and initiatives constitute an approach to community-
building that eliminate traditional realist approaches to cooperation in 
international relations, but instead suggests the creation of Mediterranean region 
as a rationale ground for cooperation in the notion of security community. Taking 
all factors into consideration, the EU and NATO’s counter-terrorism policies in 
the Mediterranean fulfil the components of security community practices in that 
they not only widespread cooperative security practices but also they seek to 
collaborate collectively to handle terrorist threats. In other ways, the EU and 
NATO as major regional organisations in the Mediterranean promote the 
emergence and sustainability of security community building for civilian crisis 
management with the maritime security practices. The findings implies that there 
is an evident connection between the security community practices with the 
maritime activities of counter-terrorism, ultimately demonstrate that the maritime 
initiatives by the EU and NATO have created a regional community that increase 
security from the terrorist attacks in the Mediterranean.  
As reiterated throughout the thesis, the concept of security community 
emphasises the absence of violence means to settle the conflict, but instead 
promoting cooperation between the members through the implementation of 
strategies and partnerships. For instance, the application of the framework through 
NATO and EU maritime initiatives to combat terrorism is clearly reflected in the 
Mediterranean. Various strategies, declaration and centre for information sharing 
as developed by the EU portrayed the direction of partnerships among the member 
states. The introduction to the EAW and EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy reflects 
the disposition towards creation of transnational security strategies and policy 
coordination as delineated in the security community framework. In addition, the 
implementation of various training and exercises in OAE reflects the practice of 
military cooperation, while at the same time applied the practice of partnerships 
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creation. This can be proven from the involvement of non-members to participate 
in the surveillance and monitoring activities in the Mediterranean Sea, including 
Ukraine. Partnerships has also portrayed through EU counter-terrorism operation 
including the partnerships with Algeria, Morocco and Indonesia to synchronise 
national budgets for counter-terrorism policy. Similarly, Operation Coherent 
Behaviour illustrates the application of security community in the Mediterranean 
through the military engagement, including military cooperation and intelligence 
exchanges with NATO in conducting surveillance activities to disrupt the 
movement of terrorists. In sum, the security community framework provides 
better understanding of how the emergence of shared interests and identities 
among the communities can shape affinity towards identifying the security issues 
for them and understand the development toward a new collective identity of 
states to provide collective security. Further considerations regarding security 
community building within counter-terrorism policies will be discussed in the 
final conclusion chapter.  
In the next chapter, I will analyse the second case study, which is irregular 
migration in the Mediterranean Sea. With many appalling tragedies and incidents 
involving migrants from the Middle East and North Africa crossing the 
Mediterranean to reach Europe, it has topped the EU and NATO’s political 
agendas regarding asylum policies and how to deal with the migration crisis. For 
that reason, it is essential to highlight what the EU and NATO have done so far to 
engage with this pressing situation, and ultimately increase the security and 
reduce crisis around the Mediterranean. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Tackling the Irregular Migration Crisis: The Roles and Policies of the EU 
and NATO in the Mediterranean Sea 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Migration has been one of the most contentious issues in Europe since the end of 
the Cold War. There are various factors that contribute to the influx of migration 
to Europe, including, terrorism, social unrest, extreme poverty, prolonged 
insecurity and authoritarian government in their home countries (Schmid 2016: 6). 
Migratory flows, be the flows of asylum-seekers, labour migrants or irregular 
migrants have become a serious problem, not only in terms of a humanitarian 
challenge but also in terms of a security risk (Lutterbeck 2006: 59). As a result, 
migration has been more of a security issue rather than a socio-economic one 
(Panebianco 2010: 8). There is substantial increase of migration flows particularly 
from the southern European countries towards the North, in which Italy and 
Greece received the peak arrivals of migrants to their countries (Schmid 2016: 8).  
It is important to define what is meant by the term  “migration”  in order to 
better understand this study. According to Schmid (2016), migration defined as 
follows: 
 
Migration refers to the in-[immigration] or out-movement [emigration] of 
(groups of) people from one place to a usually distant other location, with 
the intention to settle at the destination, temporarily or permanently. This 
process can be voluntary or forced, regular (legal) or irregular (illegal), 
within one country or across international borders. Refugees are a sub-
group of international migrants who seek asylum or have obtained 
protection abroad under the terms of the UN Refugee Convention of 1951 
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(Schmid 2016: 14).102 
On another note, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines 
irregular migration as a migration movement that takes place beyond the normal 
regulation forms of the sending, transit and receiving countries as epitomised in 
the following passage: 
Irregular migration is a movement that takes place outside the regulatory 
norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries. There is no clear or 
universally accepted definition of irregular migration. From the 
perspective of destination countries it is entry, stay or work in a country 
without the necessary authorisation or documents required under 
immigration regulations. From the perspective of the sending country, the 
irregularity is for example seen in cases in which a person crosses an 
international boundary without a valid passport or travel document or does 
not fulfill the administrative requirements for leaving the country. There 
is, however, a tendency to restrict the use of the term "illegal migration" to 
cases of smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons (IOM 2011).103 
 
Irregular migration can be classified into four common forms: unauthorised entry; 
fraudulent entry (without valid documents); visa overstaying; and violation of the 
visa’s conditions (Baldwin-Edwards 2007: 115). For most but not all cases, the 
majority of irregular migrants in Europe stem from the latter forms where they 
violate the conditions of the visa and in certain extent, have long been visa over-
stayers in the EU states (Andersson 2016a: 1058). 
Irregular migration is not a novel issue. Significant recent waves started in 
the 1980s when the southern European countries emerged as a countries of 
immigration (Baldwin-Edwards 2007: 115). A large number of migrants boosted 
the workforce in most of the European countries during the period, whether via 
																																								 																				
102 This is a working definition for migration term. For more precise definition of migration, see 
also A.P. Schmid (Ed.). Immigration Policy: A Search for Balance in Europe (Driebergen: 
Synthesis Foundation, 2001). 
103 (Available at: https://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms). 
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Germany’s ‘guestworker’ programme or low skilled labour mobility from former 
colonies into Britain and France (Huysmans 2006: 65; Andersson 2016a: 1056). 
Although in the beginning there was no security concern over the influx of these 
irregular immigration, it has increasingly become a subject of public concern 
because it creates destabilisation of public order (Huysmans 2006: 65). Of 
particular concern, there are multiple causal relations between irregular migration 
and terrorism (Till 2009: 298).104 Irregular migration has become increasingly 
controlled by human smugglers and trafficking networks (Lutterbeck 2006: 74)105 
and largely associated with varied security risks. Migration flow, from merely a 
humanitarian issue has grown into a security issue in which the ‘securitisation of 
migration’ has taken place (Leonard 2010: 231).  
Before we further discuss the migration issue, it is crucial to understand 
how this particular issue became a security issue and jeopardised the safety of the 
states. In order to understand the migration issue in a security spectrum, we can 
draw on the debate of securitisation framework. According to Bueger (2015), 
securitisation of maritime security establishes two possible analyses (Bueger 
2015: 162). First, what are the factors that determine one maritime issue 
recognised and accepted as posing a threat (Bueger 2015: 162). Second, the 
question relies on what are the reference objects that may be affected by these 
maritime security threats and therefore need to be protected (Bueger 2015: 162). 
In other ways, the securitisation of the maritime security agenda determines the 
list of maritime issues that become an existential threats to the intersubjective 
audience, and what are the measures taken to protect the referent objects. In the 
case of migration, the findings suggest that migration is not merely a threat to 
																																								 																				
104 Terrorism attacks with deliberate targets on civilians is a major driver of forced 
migration/irregular migration. Historically, the number of criminal or terrorist in mass migration 
movement is low, but terrorist always have a criminal background. The possibility for migrants 
can be terrorist or vice versa is as follows: (a) some economic migrants are kidnapped and forced 
by terrorist to join the organisations (e.g. by Boko Haram in in Nigeria); (b) the terrorists involved 
in acts of terrorism, including suicide terrorism during the return journey to their home countries 
as part of refugee channel (See Alex P.Schmid, Links between Terrorism and Migration: An 
Exploration (Netherlands: ICCT, 2016), pp. 3-4). 
105 Irregular migration has always associated with human smuggling and trafficking organisations, 
and also other transboundary organised crime. It seems clear that the increasing number of human 
smugglers arrested across external borders of the EU demonstrates that trafficking of person 
involving irregular migration is a serious problems in the EU (Lutterbeck 2006: 74). 
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economy stability, but includes humanitarian perspectives particularly with the 
involvement of trafficking networks. 
The securitisation process of migration has been widely discussed by 
Huysmans (2006) in which he argued that migration is now increasingly being 
related to security (Huysmans 2006: 1). Huysmans argued that both at national 
and European levels, the irregular migration issue has been accepted as an 
existential threat to the security of the EU (Huysmans 2006: 81).106 The core 
reason that demonstrates irregular migration as a security threat is the growing 
number of trafficking organisations that are involved in the irregular migration 
movements (Lutterbeck 2006: 61). The existence of human trafficking networks is 
a major problem because of the difficulties in detecting and arresting the 
criminals.107 In addition, the 9/11 attacks has again redefined how significant 
migration issues have contributed toward security risks to the states and peoples 
(Lutterbeck 2006: 59). The terrorist attacks have been associated with the failure 
of immigration control which has assisted the attacks of 9/11 (Collyer 2006: 257). 
In the aftermath of the terrorist  attacks in 2001, the tightening and strengthening 
of external border control portrayed EU’s pledge to fight against not only 
terrorism, but also to restrict the access of migrants and asylum seekers. 
The 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) emphasises that irregular 
migration is one of the current threats faced by European countries that may 
always be associated with terrorism.108 To this end, the EU has committed to 
strengthen border controls among the member states, which ultimately has led to 
the establishment of Frontex in 2004. Frontex was established with the idea that it 
is one of the ‘extraordinary measures’ deployed by the EU as a tools to tackle 
migration that is largely perceived to be an existential threat to the survival of the 
																																								 																				
106 For a more detailed debate on the securitisation of migration, see among others, Jef Huysmans, 
The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU (New York: Routledge, 2006); 
Claudia Aradau, The Perverse Politics of Four-Letter Words: Risk and Pity in the Securitisation of 
Human Trafficking (Millenium: Journal of International Studies, 33(2), 2004), pp. 251-277; and 
Gabriella Lazaridis and Khursheed Wadia (eds). The Securitisation of Migration in the EU: 
Debates Since 9/11 (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015). 
107 NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Report for Mediterranean and Middle East Special Group: 
Migration in the Mediterranean Region: Causes, Consequences and Challenges, 2009, pp. 1. 
108 European Commission, “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, European Security Strategy, 12 
December 2013, pp. 4. 
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member states. Asylum and migration issues have, ever since, been at the top of 
EU’s political agenda. In 2006, a year after the activation of Frontex operations, 
the late Federal Austrian Interior Minister, Liese Prokop stressed the issue of 
migration as one the security challenges facing by the EU during the conference 
on ‘Media, Migration and Asylum’ (EU Presidency 2006). In his speech, he 
declared that ‘besides the threat from organised crime and terrorism, dealing with 
migration movements is today one of the main challenges facing us [Austria and 
the EU] in terms of security’ (EU Presidency 2006).109 Such developments have 
prompted numerous research projects from scholars and non-governmental 
organisations (NGO) on the subject of migration flows and the threat they pose to 
Europe. Such developments have also largely influenced national and EU policies 
in regards to asylum and migration flows across Europe (Leonard 2007: 5). 
In the case of NATO, they have been attempting to deal with this 
instability for many years. NATO pledged to cope with irregular migration flows 
in and across the Mediterranean Sea with the involvement of NATO naval forces 
since 2002. NATO’s Mediterranean fleet was deployed to the eastern 
Mediterranean under OAE in 2002. As discussed above, OAE primarily fulfills its 
purpose to combat terrorism at sea. Nevertheless, while conducting counter-
terrorist operations, NATO naval forces have also pursued the important mission 
to tackle irregular migration and trafficking of people in the Mediterranean Sea.110 
In 2016, NATO demonstrated its readiness for joint operations with the EU if 
asked to help with the rising problem of irregular migration in the area. Despite 
the lack of operations conducted by the NATO to address the challenge of 
irregular migration in the Mediterranean it represents an acknowledgment that 
NATO is now ready to actively contribute to deter irregular migration and human 
smuggling in the Mediterranean Sea. 
This chapter analyses the development and evolution of the EU and 
NATO operations that engage with the migration crisis and human trafficking in 
																																								 																				
109 EU Presidency. Press Release on ‘Interior Minister Liese Prokop opens CoMMA Conference’, 
2006. (Available at: http://www.eu2006.at/en/News/Press_Releases/April/2104prokop.html). 
110 NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Report for Mediterranean and Middle East Special Group: 
Migration in the Mediterranean Region: Causes, Consequences and Challenges, 2009, pp. 4. 
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the Mediterranean Sea. The analysis is threefold. First, this chapter examines the 
overview of irregular migration in the Mediterranean Sea in detail. The movement 
of irregular migration in the Mediterranean Sea is described from a historical and 
contemporary perspective. It provides a narrative of the migration and trafficking 
of people in Europe. The section examines closely the pattern or recent trends of 
migration flows in the Mediterranean. The second part concentrates on the 
evolution of operations and initiatives implemented by the EU to tackle the issue 
of irregular migration and human trafficking in the Mediterranean Sea. This 
section will scrutinise varied EU operations at sea which demonstrate the spread 
of security community practices, in particular, cooperative security, development 
in partnerships creation and advancement in military engagement. This includes 
joint operations at sea under the aegis of Frontex and Operation Sophia to disrupt 
smugglers’ business model. In the latter section, accordingly, I will discuss the 
main features of NATO enforcement and the breadth of their measures to tackle 
the migration crisis and to combatting human trafficking, particularly through the 
implementation of surveillance activities and capacity building. The analysis 
demonstrates that practicing cooperative security as crisis management helps to 
promote the development of security community building in the Mediterranean. It 
implies a means for NATO to engage member states and also non-members in 
cooperative security practices. 
6.2 Irregular Migration in the Mediterranean Sea 
A major humanitarian and security challenge for the Mediterranean region is the 
movement of people (Boyer 2007: 78). Over the past decade, the Mediterranean 
Sea has become a hotbed for irregular immigration particularly from the African 
continent toward Europe. In recent years, irregular migration in the Mediterranean 
Sea has been Europe’s greatest challenge and regarded as the largest migrant 
movements across Europe since the Second World War (McNerney et al 2017: 5) 
The major transit routes in the Mediterranean Sea include the Strait of Gibraltar 
(through the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla), from the Canary Islands, 
from Libya and Tunisia (via island of Lampedusa), and across the Adriatic from 
Greece (Andersson 2016a: 1057; Boyer 2007: 78). In 2015, the Greek islands of 
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Lesbos, Chios and Samos have been the top receiving shores for migrants 
primarily from Syria. In April 2015, almost 400 migrants drowned after their boat 
capsized in the Mediterranean Sea. The boat was loaded with about 550 people 
from Syria making their way to the island of Lampedusa (The Guardian 2015b). 
Following the incident, the issue of migrants at sea once again made headlines 
across the world when over 700 migrants were feared dead following a series of 
shipwrecks in the Mediterranean Sea (The Guardian 2015a). This issue is not 
something new, rather it has been a long-established challenge faced by European 
countries. 
 There are three main patterns or trends of migration routes in the 
Mediterranean Sea. Firstly, the most common and current trend of migration 
flows is the Eastern Mediterranean route, consists of south-north movements 
mainly from North African countries to southern European countries, primarily 
Italy, Greece and Turkey. The migrants that arrive via this route are primarily 
departed from countries of origin such as Syria, Afghanistan and Somalia 
(Frontex 2016a). The second pattern through Western Mediterranean routes 
originally involve migrant movements from Morocco and Algeria to Spain, 
particularly via Melilla and Ceuta. However, with the increasing instability and 
conflicts in sub-Saharan countries in recent years, the number of migrants 
departing from countries such as Syria, Nigeria, Sudan, South Sudan, Mali, Chad 
and the Central African Republic has exponentially increased. In 2015, migrants 
from Syria recorded the highest number to reach Europe through this particular 
route (Frontex 2016d). Meanwhile, the third route of migration movement is via 
the Central Mediterranean routes. The popular destination countries for this route 
are Italy and Malta, where the migrants originally coming from Libya, Syria, 
Tunisia, Somalia, Nigeria, Eritrea, Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana, among others.111 In 
2014 alone, more than 170,000 migrants arrived in the island of Lampedusa which 
is believed to have a link with the political unrest in Libya and civil war in Syria 
(IOM 2015b). The majority of these irregular migrants arriving in Italy are known 
as ‘economic migrants’, in this case they come to Europe to seek a better life and 
job opportunities. By contrast, irregular migrants from Eritrea arriving in Italy are 
																																								 																				
111	Interview with Ewa Moncure, 15 July 2016, Warsaw.	
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primarily categorized as asylum seekers, that have fled their country to seek 
protection from the oppressive regime.112 As one interviewee at Frontex asserts: 
The majority of migrants coming to Italy, 95% of them are Africans. 
Majority of them we called as economic migrants. But we also have 
asylum seekers primarily from Eritrea, which known with very repressive 
regime and also not a big country. For years so many Eritreans left Eritrea 
and seek asylum in Europe, which around 25% or 30% is asylum seekers.  
(Interview No. 3, Spokesperson of Frontex) 
The arrival of migrants via Central Mediterranean and Eastern Mediterranean 
routes  dramatically increased in 2014, rising by more than 300% compared to the 
previous year. Nevertheless, 2015 marked the significant changes in migration 
phenomena. The deadliest shipwrecks accidents were reported in the 
Mediterranean Sea involved hundreds of thousand immigrants. The number of 
arrivals for irregular migrants particularly via Eastern Mediterranean routes 
showed a sharp increase compared to the previous year, which accumulated 
around some 885, 386 (Frontex 2016a). The graph below illustrates the patterns of 
migrant flows for aforementioned routes in the Mediterranean Sea from 2008 until 
2016 respectively. 
																																								 																				
112 Interview with Ewa Moncure, 15 July 2016, Warsaw. 
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Source: Frontex (2016) 
Since 2002, a great number of migrants predominately from the Horn of 
Africa dominated the irregular migrant movement across the Mediterranean Sea 
trying to enter Europe (Calleya 2012: 85). Among these, the Libyan coast has 
recently been the main transit route from which the migrants departed  toward the 
European coast, particularly Italy and Spain (Delicato 2010: 1). Illegal movement 
of people across the Mediterranean Sea toward Europe has been greatly facilitated 
by the geography factor between North Africa and the Europe. In most cases, 
irregular migrants flee their homes driven by numbers of factors, mainly as a 
result of conflict and political instability, as well as severely poor economic 
situation. Mediterranean Sea provides a gateway for irregular migrants from 
Maghreb, North Africa and Middle East to the Europe in which Greece, Italy and 
Spain as the main destination countries. Greece has been the main destination 
country for irregular migrants since 2000 with approximately three million of 
them recorded to arrived illegally in Greece (Giuliani 2015: 1). The number of 
irregular migrants crossing the Aegean Sea has dramatically increased each year 
where more than 10,445 irregular migrants reportedly arrived in early 2015 
(Giuliani 2015: 1). A substantial number of irregular migrants have also been 
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recorded travelling via Turkey through the archipelago of islands in Greece to 
reach Europe by sea. Various islands mainly in eastern Greece provide the main 
departure point for irregular migrants to the smugglers’ ships that help the to cross 
the sea to the Europe (Giuliani 2015: 1). 
 Besides Greece, Italy also provides an opportunity to enter Europe for 
irregular migrants from North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and Indian sub-
continent in particular to the Sicilian coasts. In 2008, almost 35,000 migrants 
arrived at the Sicilian coasts alone (Delicato 2010b: 3). The number, however, has 
dramatically decreased the year later when just 6,588 persons arrived in Sicily as a 
result of strengthened border controls implemented by Frontex (Delicato 2010b: 
3). Main routes toward Italy that are commonly used by the irregular migrants 
include that from Libya to the Sicilian coasts, from Tunisia to Sicily and from 
Algeria to Sardinia (Delicato 2010b: 3). The number of migration flows however 
showed a sharp increase in 2013 as a result of  regional instability resulting from 
the Arab revolts. In 2013, more than 500 people reportedly drowned off the Italian 
island of Lampedusa trying to reach Europe from North African coast (Amnesty 
UK 2015). The incident was a wakeup call to Italy about the needs to strengthen 
their border controls to restrict the access of migrants to their country as well as to 
take various measures in a bid to curb the influx of migrants flow. As a result, the 
Italian government launched Italian Navy-led operation Mare Nostrum on 18th 
October 2013 after the humanitarian tragedies off the Italian island of Lampedusa 
(Gour 2015: 6). The main task of this operation was to combat illegal activities 
including trafficking, but more importantly focus on search and rescue activities 
in the Strait of Sicily (Mungianu 2016: 199). During one year of its operation, 421 
operations were conducted and some 150,810 migrants were rescued in its 
operational area (Mungianu 2016: 199). The Mare Nostrum was halted in October 
2014 and later replaced by Frontex’s Joint Operation Triton. 
Between January to September 2014, a total of 134, 272 irregular migrants 
reportedly crossed Italian coasts, mainly from Libya and Syria trying to flee the 
instability and violence in their home country (Giuliani 2015: 1). In the same year, 
the number of shipwrecks laid at nearly 700 resulted to 3,500 people drowned 
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from the incidents trying to cross the sea and more than 200,000 migrants were 
rescued over the same period (BBC 2015). The situation has urged Italy to declare 
irregular migration as a threat to the entire EU due to the fact that irregular 
migration not only raises economic concerns but also poses a potential security 
threat in terms of terrorist and criminal infiltration to the whole Europe (EUrActiv 
2015). 
 In the Western Mediterranean, Spain has been the primary destination 
country for irregular migrants, mainly from struggling African countries such as 
Mali. Since 1995, irregular migrant flows via Ceuta and Melilla have become a 
crucial issue for Spain (Andersson 2016a: 1057). Irregular migrants trying to 
reach Ceuta and Melilla via the Strait of Gibraltar due to the fact that the strait is 
geographically strategic for boat people. Portugal, Senegal, Sahara and Morocco 
are also facing the same pressure from the migration flows, given the fact that the 
narrow Strait of Gibraltar offers a good opportunity for small boats or ships 
carrying irregular migrants to reach Europe. Nevertheless, intensified controls 
enforced on shore especially in Ceuta and Melilla has contributed in decline of 
migrants’ number crossing Straits of Gibraltar (Germond and Grove 2010: 15). In 
addition, with the agreements made between these countries to tackle and counter 
trafficking networks, the number of irregular migrant arrivals in the area remained 
at a relatively low number (Giuliani 2015: 1). The increased number of irregular 
migrants trying to reach Europe via the sea has also lead to the proliferation of the 
trafficking networks (Lutterbeck 2006: 74). Mediterranean Sea is mainly 
controlled by trafficking networks that make business by smuggling irregular 
migrants fleeing violence and conflict in their country to the Europe. Each year, 
thousands of vessels smuggle irregular migrants across the Mediterranean toward 
Europe with highly paid fees ranging from two and six thousand euros (Boyer 
2007: 78). The irregular migrants are smuggled across the Mediterranean Sea in 
the overloaded poor quality boats that result in hundreds of migrant deaths every 
year as a consequence of the shipwrecking and accidents at sea. With the EU’s 
active border controls in the Mediterranean Sea, a total of 2,641 smugglers have 
been successfully arrested in 2014 (Giuliani 2015: 1). It has also led to a 
remarkable number of rescues from the shipwrecks carrying irregular migrants of 
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over 40,000 in 2014 (Giuliani 2015: 1). 
In the recent years, Mediterranean Sea has witnessed significant numbers 
of accidents and shipwrecks involving the irregular migrants and refugees trying 
to reach Europe by sea. In April 2015, the deadliest shipwreck accident in the 
Mediterranean Sea took place in which more than 800 people lost their lives at sea 
en-route to Europe (Amnesty UK 2015). The shipwrecks and traffickers 
exploitation of migrants draws most of the attention particularly for EU and 
NATO. Even though a number of traffickers were successfully intercepted every 
year, the business of human trafficking remains precarious in the Mediterranean 
Sea and involves thousand of deaths every year. The continuous movement of 
migrants has also become a security challenge in the Mediterranean Sea and also a 
challenge for the EU’s countries to cope with the population of irregular migrants 
that has increased significantly over a very short time. This incident was therefore 
a wakeup call for the EU and NATO to play a more positive role to curb the 
problem of migration flows and also the issue arise from the traffickers of the 
migrants. To this end, the fight against migrant smuggling has been top of the 
political agenda for the EU in their policy to tackle irregular migrants at sea.  
Irregular migration flows across sea primarily in the Central and Eastern 
Mediterranean Sea has recorded significantly increased numbers in recent years. 
In 2014, the flow of irregular migrants via the sea recorded a remarkable number 
beyond 220,000 migrants, which indicated the increase of 310% from the 
previous year (Frontex 2015a). In addition to the figures, it has been reported that 
around 3,000 migrants have lost their lives in the Mediterranean Sea while trying 
to cross the sea (UNCHR 2015). In the first half of 2015, the number of irregular 
migrants reaching Europe across the Mediterranean has reached above 103,000 
(UNHCR, 2015). The majority of the migrants arrived in Italy with almost 54,000 
of them, followed by 48,000 in Greece, 91 in Malta and 920 in Spain (UNHCR 
2015). During the same period, 6000 migrants and refugees reported have been 
rescued in a major operation conducted by the Italian Coast Guard with the 
cooperation of Frontex and safely disembarked at the southern Italy (UNHCR 
2015). Large numbers of the migrants and refugees are from Syria, Afghanistan, 
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Iraq and Eritrea who are fleeing violence, repression and economic hardships in 
their home country (McNerney et al 2017: 5). 
In addition to Italy, Greece has also received the unprecedented inflows of 
migrants and refugees particularly in Aegean islands (Frontex 2016c). The 
number of migrants arrived in Greece up until September 2015 reached more than 
710,000, within which the Syrian migrants remain the dominant nationality to 
have arrived in Greece (Frontex 2016c). Among the factors that contribute to the 
influx of migrants in Greece is geographic proximity to conflicting countries 
including Syria and Iraq. This geographic factor has facilitated the migrants’ 
crossing of the Mediterranean Sea to reach wealthy countries of Europe 
particularly Greece which provides a gateway and transit points for migrants 
(Dickinson 2017: 100). The total number of irregular migrants and refugees that 
arrived in both in Greece and Italy in 2015 has increased to 1.04 million, which 
was more than five times the number of the previous year (Frontex 2016c). Table 
1 below illustrates the overall number of arrivals to Europe and deaths of migrants 
and refugees throughout 2015. Following the table below is the map of migratory 
routes in the Mediterranean Sea for said year. The map clearly shows that Greece, 
Italy and Spain remained were the top receiving countries for migrants in 2015, 
whereas Malta has gradually become a popular destination country for migrants, 
with the numbers of arrivals increasing year on year.  
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Table 1: Arrivals by sea and deaths in the Mediterranean Sea (2015) 
Country of Arrival Arrivals Deaths 
Greece  853,650 806 (Eastern 
Mediterranean route) 
Cyprus 269 
Italy 153,842 2892 (Central 
Mediterranean Route) 
Malta  106 
Spain 3845 72 (Western 
Mediterranean and 
Western African routes) 
Estimated Total 1,011,712 3770 
 Source: International Organization for Migration (2016) 
Map 1: Mediterranean Migration Routes 2015 
Source: International Organization for Migration (2015) 
	
	
154	
The number of arrival of irregular migrants and refugees has steadily 
increased every year. The first quarter of 2016 shows that a remarkable number of 
migrants and refugees arrived in the two top countries, Greece and Italy with 
around 68,778 and 5,898 respectively (IOM 2016b). The number has grown 
rapidly in the following months due to good weather and continued flows of 
migrants from Libya (Frontex 2016c). By the end of 2016, some 363, 348 migrant 
arrivals were reported in the main destination countries, including Greece, Italy, 
Cyprus and Spain. Table 2 below illustrates the number of arrivals and deaths of 
migrants trying to reach Europe from January until December 2016 according to 
the yearly report by IOM. Following the table, the figure illustrates the dominant 
nationalities for migrants arriving in Europe in 2016, in which Syria remained as 
the dominant nationalities, this continues a pattern from the previous year with 
47% of the total numbers. The map of migratory routes in the year 2016 also 
demonstrates that there is no significant changes in migration routes from 2015, 
by which Greece, Italy and Spain remain primary destinations countries for 
irregular migrants in 2016. 
Table 2: Arrivals by sea and deaths in the Mediterranean Sea 2016 
1 January 2016- 31 December 2016 
Country Arrivals Deaths 
Italy 181, 436 4576 (Central 
Mediterranean route) 
Greece 173, 561 434 (Eastern 
Mediterranean route) 
Cyprus 189 na 
Spain 8162 69 (Western 
Mediterranean route) 
Total 363, 348 5079 
Source: International Organization for Migration (2017). 
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Source: International Organization for Migration (2016) 
Map 2: Mediterranean Migration Routes 2016 
Source: International Organization for Migration (2016)  
47%	
28%	
16%	
3%	 2%	 4%	
0%	
5%	
10%	
15%	
20%	
25%	
30%	
35%	
40%	
45%	
50%	
Figure	2:	Main	countries	of	origin	for	migrants	arrivals	
in	2016	
Main	countries	of	origin	for	
migrants	arrivals	in	2016	
	
	
156	
In response to the growing migrant crisis in the Mediterranean Sea, the EU 
established a number of significant naval mission and operations. Those 
operations and naval mission aimed to enhance and strengthen the border control 
off Europe’s shores as well as to disrupt the traffickers’ business of smuggling 
irregular migrants across the Mediterranean Sea. EU also aimed to strengthen its 
search and rescue to save the lives of irregular migrants at sea from any 
shipwrecking and accidents. To this end, the EU is working on the EU Action 
Plan Against Migrant Smuggling, with a focus to enhance prevention measures 
and restrain the influx of trafficking networks (European Commission 2015a). 
The Action Plan aspired to strengthen cooperation with both origin and 
destination countries, enhance intelligence sharing, investigation capacities and 
reinforced legal frameworks in order to counter the trafficking networks.113 The 
next section discusses in detail the operations at sea implemented by the EU to 
tackle irregular migration in the Mediterranean Sea. 
6.3 EU Counter-Migration Operation in the Mediterranean Sea 
Irregular migration flows have become a security concern in the Europe, which 
has led to various measures and initiatives by the European countries designed to 
strengthen border controls and restrict access to irregular migrants. In the last few 
years, the EU has developed a number of operational initiatives and naval 
missions aimed to tackle the influx of migration flows at sea. One of the 
remarkable initiatives is the establishment of the European agency, Frontex in 
May 2005, which is responsible for coordinating cooperation at the external 
borders of the EU member states. Frontex has long established before the 
migration crisis of the Mediterranean in 2015, however after the crisis started the 
roles of Frontex have become intensified than it has before. Within Frontex itself, 
several joint operations were conducted such as Hera, Nautilus and Triton. These 
joint operations are focused primarily in the Central Mediterranean and designed 
to support member states struggling with the influx of irregular migrations’ 
																																								 																				
113 European Commission. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The 
Council, The European Economic And Social Committee And The Committee Of The Regions: A 
European Agenda on Migration, 13 May 2015, pp. 2.  
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arrivals in their territories. In addition, EU also introduced its surveillance system 
called EUROSUR in 2013 to improve situational awareness and to save live at 
sea. In 2015, another operation took place in the Mediterranean Sea,  
EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia pledged to fight against human traffickers 
at sea. This section discuss how EU efforts to tackle irregular migration have 
generated numbers of significant operations in the Mediterranean Sea and how it 
has helped to decrease the number of irregular migrants’ arrival to Europe. This 
section provides some critical discussions about the nature and specific tasks of 
Frontex such as those related to joint operations and its surveillance system, as 
well as the naval mission conducted through EUNAVFOR Med to ensure the 
protection of lives at sea. 
6.3.1 European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at 
the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex) 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External 
Borders of the Member States of the European Union (hereinafter Frontex) was 
established on 1 May 2005 with the principal purpose to ‘improve the integrated 
management of the external borders of the Member States of the European 
Union’.114 In addition, it also aims to improve coordination and cooperation in 
managing border control capabilities amongst the member states, be it at sea, land 
or air borders (Gour 2015: 5). The responsibility for external borders of the EU 
always remains with the member states and Frontex was created to support the 
member states.115 Frontex provides assistance for member states particularly 
related to technical and operational issues in managing the EU’s external borders 
(Trevisanut 2016: 216). Elaborating the main task of Frontex, an official from 
Frontex pointed out their responsibilities below: 
Frontex is a mechanism that was created when the member states were 
facing pressure at the external borders. They can be helped by the 
																																								 																				
114 Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004, Establishing a European Agency for the Management 
of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, 
European Community Official Journal. 26 October 2004, pp. 3. 
115 Interview with Ewa Moncure, 15 July 2016, Warsaw. 
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deployment of border guards and equipment from another country. But the 
responsibility for the borders will still remain and a responsibility of the  
member states. We are a border agency, and when we deploy, we deploy 
for border control purposes. So with maritime operations, we deploy 
vessels, we deploy helicopters that support the maritime assets of the 
member states in their border control efforts. The first priority and 
responsibility for everybody at sea, be it coastguard, Frontex, leisure boat, 
fishing boat, or tankers is to give help to those who are in stress at sea. 
 (Interview No. 3, Spokesperson of Frontex).  
 Frontex has its headquarters in Warsaw and became operational in 2005. 
The headquarters serves as the administration office, responsible for risk analysis 
and provides a centre for all the reports and information reported by member 
states. Here they are validated and can be distributed for further action.116 
Cooperation between the EU member states in regards to the external control of 
borders has been established since 1985 with the development of Schengen 
Agreement. Originally, the agreement was only signed by five member states; 
France, Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands agreed to abolish 
internal border checks.117 The Schengen Area promotes the idea of free 
movements between these EU countries for their citizens.118 This so called 
‘Schengen acquis’ was incorporated into the EU frameworks on 1 May 1999, 
following the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty (Leonard 2010: 233). The 
Schengen Area gradually expanded to nearly every member state and to date, 26 
European countries (of which 22 are EU states) are part of this agreement.119 
																																								 																				
116 Interview with Ewa Moncure, 15 July 2016, Warsaw. 
117 European Commission, The Schengen acquis - Convention implementing the Schengen 
Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic 
Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of 
checks at their common borders, Official Journal of the European Communities,19 June 1990, pp. 
1. 
118 European Commission, The Schengen acquis - Convention implementing the Schengen 
Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic 
Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of 
checks at their common borders, Official Journal of the European Communities, 19 June 1990, pp. 
1.	
119 European Commission, Europe Without Borders: The Schengen Area, 2014, pp.4. 
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United Kingdom and Ireland however opted to be excluded from this agreement. 
The Schengen agreement also adopted an essential framework including increased 
police and judicial cooperation among member states to preserve and guarantee  
security within the Schengen area.120 
Map 3: Schengen Area (as of 2013) 
Source: European Commission, 2016b 
Frontex was established to reinforce cooperation regarding the control of 
the external borders among the member states. The efforts to strengthen border 
																																								 																				
120 European Commission, The Schengen Area and Cooperation, August 2009, pp.1. 
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controls are mostly driven by the desire to restrict the access of migrants and 
asylum seekers to their territory (Leonard 2010: 234). In addition, this effort also 
signifies a contribution in the fight against terrorism particularly after the 9/11 
attacks (Argomaniz 2011: 48). In order to regulate Frontex, there are several EU 
legal frameworks used to govern it, including the Schengen Borders Code.121 The 
Schengen Borders Code, was established in 2006 and intended to improve the 
legislative part of the integrated border management of the EU policy. It set out 
the rules on the control of persons crossing EU external borders and on the 
temporary reintroduction of border controls at internal borders.122 The Schengen 
Borders Code emphasises that effective border control is paramount in helping 
combatting irregular migration and human smuggling.123 In 2010, the EU Council 
approved Decision No. 2010/252 to supplement this Code with external border 
surveillance within the range of Frontex’s operational cooperation (Di Filippo 
2013: 60). 
  Frontex was created as a result of a visible relationship between migration 
and borders, as well as security and terrorism. On 20 September 2001, the Justice 
and Home Affairs (JHA) Council called ‘the Commission to examine urgently the 
relationship between safeguarding internal security and complying with 
international protection obligations and instruments (Council of the European 
Union, 2001). The call has put forward the idea of a clear relationship between 
migration and asylum with security. It reiterated the assumption that the failure to 
control undocumented migration flows has affected the security of the states and 
therefore increased the risk of terrorism (Neal 2009: 339). To this end, Frontex 
introduced the idea to implement the concept of ‘integrated border management’, 
which places an emphasis on coordination between all public authorities of the 
																																								 																				
121 Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004, Establishing a European Agency for the Management 
of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, 
European Community Official Journal, 26 October 2004, pp. 3. 
122 European Commission, Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council- Establishing a Community Code on the Rules Governing the Movement of Persons 
Across Borders (Schengen Borders Code), 15 Mac 2006, pp. 1. 
123 European Commission, Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council- Establishing a Community Code on the Rules Governing the Movement of Persons 
Across Borders (Schengen Borders Code), 15 Mac 2006, pp. 1. 
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member states, particularly related to border surveillance, including border checks 
and risk analysis at the borders (Leonard 2010: 234). 
Frontex highlights six main tasks of its operation in strengthening external 
border controls; (1) to coordinate operational cooperation between member states 
in external borders management; (2) to assist member states with the training of 
national border guards, including the establishment of common training standards; 
(3) to carry out risk analysis; (4) to follow up on the development of research 
relevant for the control and surveillance of external borders; (5) to provide 
assistance for member states requiring technical equipment and operational 
assistance for border surveillance; and (6) supporting member states in organising 
joint return operations (EU, 2004).124 In the early stages of the establishment of 
Frontex, it  promoted a pilot project initiating a network of national contact points 
among member states to assist in surveillance of the external maritime borders in 
the Mediterranean (Rijpma and Vermeulen 2015: 457). The next section discusses 
the core tasks of Frontex to fulfill its mandate to improve the integration of 
external border control of the EU member states. 
• Operational coordination between member states 
The first task of Frontex is to coordinate operational cooperation amongst member 
states in managing external borders. This requires the agency to bring together 
technical equipment and capacities from member states, as well as border forces 
to incorporate into one unit to implement border controls in its territory. This task 
required Frontex to coordinate all joint operations at air, sea and land external 
borders as proposed by the member states or by the agency itself.125 The Agency 
should also evaluate the success of the joint operations, and has the authority to 
restructure the operations in order to improve the efficiency of the future 
																																								 																				
124 Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004, Establishing a European Agency for the Management 
of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, 
European Community Official Journal, 26 October 2004, pp. 4. 
125 European Commission, The Frontex Agency: Evaluation and Future Development, 13 February 
2008, Brussels. 
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operations.126 In order to assist with the deployment of technical equipment from 
various member states, the database to manage the operation of Frontex called the 
‘Central Record of Available Technical Equipment’ (CRATE)127 was introduced 
in 2007 (Frontex 2010).128  This database provides information on the technical 
equipment available to identify and organise equipment of surveillance that are 
available to use for operations upon the request of Frontex for a certain period of 
time. Member states are required to provide data on the types of technical 
equipment they possess, different profiles of experts include document experts, 
surveillance experts, medical team, maritime experts, briefers, screeners, and 
border guards, among others that might be available for the operations.129 One of 
the interviewees at Frontex explained in greater detail the scope of CRATE and its 
functions, as further epitomised below: 
We have a database where we ask member states to enter the types of 
technical equipment that might be available for our operations. So we 
know how many people or different profiles that are available. There is a 
very clear define requirement that everybody needs to speak English, they 
have to have the expertise in a certain area for technical equipment. There 
are also requirement in terms of inter-operability. This means that they can 
talk to each other, they have to have a system that is compatible. During 
deployment it is a very important factor. 
(Interview No.3, Spokesperson of Frontex). 
In summary, CRATE was purportedly aimed to foster the implementation of 
‘burden sharing’ between member states and to enhance the efficacy of operations 
at external borders by providing an early overview of the assets availability by the 
																																								 																				
126 Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004, Establishing a European Agency for the Management 
of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, 
European Community Official Journal, 26 October 2004, pp. 4. 
127 Central record of Available Technical Equipment (CRATE) is a record that lists items of 
surveillance and control equipment that member states are willing to put at the disposal of another 
member states for a temporary period of time. At the beginning of 2010, the CRATE comprised of 
26 helicopters, 113 vessels, 22 fixed wing aircrafts and 476 other items such as vehicles, mobile 
radar units, thermal cameras, and mobile detectors (European Commission, 13 February 2008). 
128 Frontex, 2010. General Report of 2010 (Available at: http://frontex.europa.eu/ 
Annual_report/2010.pdf). 
129 Interview with Ewa Moncure, 15 July 2016, Warsaw. 
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member states to support operations at sea (Leonard 2010: 239).  
Frontex had also established a Frontex Situation Centre (FSC), located at 
its Warsaw headquarters, which is principally responsible for acting as a crisis 
centre and mechanism for emergency response (Argomaniz 2011: 49). The FSC is 
a centre where all the information received regarding the operations from different 
parts of the external borders will be visualised and validated. The FSC is 
responsible for verifying the number of incidents that take place at sea with the 
number of people involved before compiling all the information together to be 
shared with all the participating member states.130 Even though the FSC serves as 
a crisis centre that is responsible for distributing information with all the member 
states after being validated, however, operations at sea are still coordinated locally 
by member states. Every operation is conducted according to an operation plan, 
which defines the scope of the operation, the aim of the operation, the operational 
area and the duration of operation.131 In the case of Greece for example, the 
coordination centre is located in Piraeus where there is a liaison officer together 
with Hellenic coast guard, Hellenic police and all the national officers of 
Greece.132 In another case, for example if Norwegian boats are deployed at the 
island of Lesbos for search and rescue activities, on every boat there will be a 
Greek officer on board for coordination and decision making purposes. 
Another vital framework created to strengthen the management of external 
borders within Frontex is the Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABITs). 
RABITs were introduced in 2007 and it offers assistance by specially trained 
experts from member states who can be deployed by Frontex should any of the 
EU state’s national border guards need assistance in urgent crises on a temporary 
basis (Argomaniz 2011: 49; Trevisanut 2016: 222). RABIT operations are 
implemented in accordance with  the principle of ‘compulsory solidarity’ which in 
this context is defined as a requirement for the member states to ensure its border 
guards are available for a RABIT deployment if requested by the Agency, ‘unless 
there is an exceptional situation affecting the discharge of national tasks’ 
																																								 																				
130 Interview with Ewa Moncure, 15 July 2016, Warsaw. 
131 Interview with Ewa Moncure, 15 July 2016, Warsaw. 
132 Interview with Ewa Moncure, 15 July 2016, Warsaw.	
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(Baldaccini 2010: 235; Trevisanut 2016: 223).133 RABIT is a Joint Operation that 
is deployed overnight to address immediate crises at the member states’ external 
borders.134 In previous years, Frontex has needed to send a request to the member 
states every time there is a crisis situation that requires immediate asset 
deployment at the external borders. However, Frontex currently has a pool of 
1,500 officers from all member states that are available for immediate deployment 
as part of a  RABIT. The 1,500 officers are ready to use by Frontex at all times 
during crisis situations and will take three to five days to be deployed to the 
operation area.135 In addition, a significant number of RABIT exercises were 
conducted by Frontex in particular training sessions relating to the operational 
cooperation. These training activities aim to increase the competence of national 
border guards as well as to develop common standards to be implemented during 
joint operations (Leonard 2010: 241).  
• Training and exercises 
The second task of Frontex is to assist member states with the training of national 
border guards across Europe, including the establishment of common training 
standards. Under this task, Frontex is required to provide assistance for national 
border guards particularly when dealing with unforeseen circumstances such as 
mass illegal border crossing. For example in 2014, the highest number of illegal 
border crossing was recorded in the Mediterranean Sea since Frontex was 
established. The remarkable number of irregular migrant arrivals particularly in 
the Central Mediterranean has urged Frontex to increase its operational activity 
with the national border guards to curb the rising tide of migrants. To this end, 
Frontex launched Joint Operation Triton with 18 member states to help Italy, 
which received the largest number of irregular migrants during that period of 
time. JO Triton aims to improve border control through joint patrols using the 
assets provided by the participating member states.136 Other training programmes 
include a specialized training regime for border guards in the use of night vision 
																																								 																				
133 See also Regulation 863/2007 of Frontex Regulation Article 4 (3). 
134 Interview with Ewa Moncure, 15 July 2016, Warsaw. 
135 Interview with Ewa Moncure, 15 July 2016, Warsaw.	
136Frontex, 2014. General report of 2014 (Available at http://frontex.europa.eu/ 
Annual_report/2014.pdf, pp. 17). 
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goggles during nightime helicopter patrols. Another training programme 
conducted by Frontex is the VEGA children, in which training focuses on 
providing  border guards with the best practices to identify potential victims of 
trafficking of children at the airport.137 In addition, Frontex also expanded the 
range of training for member states particularly in the area of border control. The 
interviewee point out the available training tailored for member states as follows: 
We created several years ago what we called Core Common Curriculum 
for border guards across the EU. We call it Border Guard Basic Training 
(CCC BASIC) and it was introduced in 2008. The requirements- because 
we have the common border, are that our border guards have to be trained 
in the same way to have common standards. Now we have taken it a 
couple steps up, where you can actually have sectorial qualification in 
border guarding. We created a Masters programme for border guards 
across Europe and an international Masters. So it is an opportunity to 
create highly qualified border guards with a European profile to 
understand how borders are managed.  
(Interview No. 3, Spokesperson of Frontex). 
The training for border guards encompasses four main pillars, including a general 
part and different modules of air, land and sea border operations (Frontex 2008a). 
• Conducting risk analysis 
The third task of Frontex is to conduct risk analysis. Risk analysis is one of the 
key tasks in Frontex which covers all external borders of the EU member states 
and tailors reports based on an analysis of situational changes, potential risks or 
other possible threats on the security of the EU’s external borders (Argomaniz 
2011: 49). Frontex analyses various potential threats to EU borders including the 
evolution of irregular migrations and the proliferation of human smuggling into its 
territory (Leonard 2010: 242). These risk assessments lead to operational 
recommendations and provide a basis for a strategic work plan between member 
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states before being implemented in the joint operations (Argomaniz 2011: 49). 
Within Frontex, the Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN) was introduced in 
2006 to be a platform of information and intelligence exchange between member 
states (Andersson 2016a: 1061). This may help to increase knowledge and prepare 
the member states with better operational activities to address the situational risk 
faced by the EU.138 For instance, cooperation between Frontex and its partners 
under the Western Balkans Risk Analysis Network (WB-RAN) is seen as a 
benchmark for the beginning of cooperation between Frontex and its Balkan 
neighbours in assessing the risk of irregular migrations in that area.139 
Additionally, Frontex also cooperate closely with other third countries such as 
Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus through the establishment of the Eastern European 
Borders Risk Analysis Network (EB-RAN) to improve situational awareness on 
external borders.140 
• Research development 
Another main task of Frontex is to follow up on developments in research relevant 
for external border controls and surveillance. Under this particular task, Frontex 
shall conduct additional training courses and seminars related to surveillance of 
external borders to member states and may also conduct training in their 
territories. In addition, any further development and progress in research related to 
surveillance of external borders shall be disseminated to other member states and 
the European Commission (Leonard 2010: 243).141  
 
 
																																								 																				
138 Frontex, 2014. General report of 2014 (Available at: http://frontex.europa.eu/ 
Annual_report/2014.pdf, pp. 19). 
139 Frontex, 2014. General report of 2014 (Available at: http://frontex.europa.eu/ 
Annual_report/2014.pdf, pp. 13). 
140 Frontex, 2014. General report of 2014 (Available at: http://frontex.europa.eu/ 
Annual_report/2014.pdf, pp. 14). 
141 Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004, Establishing a European Agency for the Management 
of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, 
European Community Official Journal, 26 October 2004, pp. 4. 
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• Support to Member States Requiring Operational Assistance and 
Technical Equipment at External Borders 
The fifth task of Frontex is to provide support to member states that require 
technical and operational assistance during the surveillance at external borders. 
According to Article 8 in Council Regulation of establishing a European Agency 
for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the 
Member States of the European Union, any member states that require technical 
and operation assistance shall request it from the Agency. In return, the Agency 
shall provide the member states with support in terms of experts or technical 
equipment’s to facilitate member states conduction of border surveillance.142 
Under this mandate, Frontex is responsible to respond promptly when the member 
states required additional assistance during their operations at sea, including 
surveillance and search and rescue.143 In this situation, Frontex will deploy its 
assets and experts to the member states to assist with the control and surveillance 
of external borders in order to enhance the efficacy of their operations. Moreover, 
Frontex is responsible for coordinating the cooperation and operation between two 
or more member states at the external border to avoid any issues of overlap during 
the surveillance activities.144 In certain circumstances, Frontex is also ready to 
deploy their assets in order to provide assistance with search and rescue conducted 
by national authorities.145 In other ways, Frontex is responsible to provide 
technical equipment and operational assistance as well as prepared to deploy its 
assets in a situation where the member states need support at the external border 
during maritime operations and border surveillance. 
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of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, 
European Community Official Journal, 26 October 2004, pp. 5. 
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• Joint return operations 
The final task of Frontex is to provide assistance to member states for joint return 
operations. Within this task, the EU return policy aims to send the irregular 
migrants back to their country of origin or asylum seekers whose applications 
have been rejected by the EU member states (Leonard 2010: 245). Frontex may 
assist the member states through providing them with charter flights to carry 
irregular migrants back to their country of origin.146 Following the huge flow of 
migrants from Turkey to Greece since early 2016, an agreement was signed 
between the EU and Turkey on 18 March 2016 to halt irregular migration from 
Turkey to the EU. The agreement aims to address the enormous number of 
migrants travelling from Turkey to the Greek islands. The agreement is a bilateral 
readmission agreement, which serves as the basis for Greece to return to Turkey 
all the new irregular migrants who arrived in Greece after 20 March 2016.147 The 
agreement also stipulates that Turkey will take any measures to prevent any 
possibilities of sea or land routes that may be used by the irregular migrants from 
Turkey to the EU.148 As of September 2016, 460 migrants were returned to 
Turkey after arriving in Greece, primarily arrived from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri 
Lanka, India and Africa.149 
In sum, establishing stated tasks within Frontex is of critical importance 
and enable the agency to strengthen its surveillance and border control, as well as 
enhance coordination among the member states notably their assets deployments. 
Frontex proposes that improved maritime border surveillance and member states’ 
cooperation has led to an increase in the effectiveness in combatting people 
smuggling and preventing the loss of lives at sea during their perilous journey 
toward Europe (Gour 2016: 5). The next section will detail several lead joint 
operations at sea conducted within Frontex’s authority.  
 
																																								 																				
146 Frontex, 2014. General report of 2014 (Available at: http://frontex.europa.eu/ 
Annual_report/2014.pdf, pp. 21). 
147 Interview with Ewa Moncure, 15 July 2016, Warsaw. 
148 European Commission, Press Release on EU-Turkey Agreement, 19 March 2016, Brussels. 
149 Interview with Ewa Moncure, 15 July 2016, Warsaw. 
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Frontex Joint Operations at Sea 
Since its establishment, Frontex has coordinated several joint operations at sea to 
provide assistance for the member states to strengthen their external borders and 
to engage with irregular migration crisis and human smuggling. These operations 
may take place on the high seas, in the territorial waters of the member states or 
within the territory of the third country (Trevisanut 2016: 231). The operations of 
external border surveillance need to be conducted according to the operational 
plan. The operational plan includes interception, rescue operations at sea and 
disembarkation (paragraph 17).150 While most of the operations are particularly 
focused on the Central Mediterranean due to the huge numbers of migrants 
travelling between Italy and Malta, some other operations also take place in other 
parts of the Mediterranean Sea to assist with increasing numbers of migrants 
notably from sub-Saharan countries. The following are some of the vital 
operations at sea that have been conducted since 2006, the year Frontex became 
operational.  
• Joint Operation Hera 
Joint Operation Hera started on 17 July 2006 and lasted until 31 October 2006. 
This operation has been coordinated and co-financed by Frontex and initiadivided 
into two phase that is Hera I and Hera II. Operation Hera was established to assist 
Spanish authorities that were struggling with the enormous numbers of migrants 
arriving on fishing boats to the Canary Islands from African coasts (Carrera 2007: 
21; Baldaccini 2010: 239). The first phase of this operation involve experts from 
France, Italy, Portugal and Germany that assisted with the identification process 
of irregular migrants who arrived at the Canary Island without legal documents 
(Baldaccini 2010: 239). The experts also cooperate with the Spanish authorities to 
interview the migrants in regard to the process of crossing the sea and asking if 
the journey had been facilitated by any parties (presumably the trafficking 
																																								 																				
150 Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014, 
Establishing Rules for the Surveillance of the External Sea Borders in the Context of Operational 
Cooperation Coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, 15 May 2014, 
pp. 3. 
	
	
	
170	
networks) (Frontex 2006). With the information established from interviews, the 
top nationalities identified were migrants from Senegal, Gambia, and Ivory Coast 
(Frontex 2007a). The first phase recorded remarkable numbers of almost 19,000 
migrants who were successfully identified by the experts together with the 
Spanish authorities and 6,076 migrants were sent back to their  countries of origin 
(Baldaccini 2010: 239). 
 The second phase of this operation (Hera II) started on 11 August 2006 
after Frontex received a request from Spanish authorities. This operation was 
carried out by Italy, Portugal and Finland. All three member states they offered 
their assets such as vessels and aircrafts to help Spanish authorities to patrol the 
coastal areas of Mauritania, Senegal, Cape Verde and Canary Islands (Frontex 
2007a). During this operation, the main mission was to detect any boats or ships 
departing towards the Canary Island and to divert them back to the departure point 
(Frontex 2007a). More than 3,500 migrants were successfully intercepted close to 
the African coast during this operation and diverted to their countries (Frontex 
2007a). This second phase finished on 15 December 2006, however due to the 
pressing situation of massive migration flows towards the Canary Islands, the 
operation was continued with the Operation Hera III. 
 A follow-up Operation Hera III started on 12 February 2007 and lasted for 
two months. During this operation, the number of migrants that arrived on the 
Canary Island was reported to be very low with only 585 migrants arriving during 
that time (Frontex 2007a), and a total of 1,167 of migrants were successfully 
diverted back to their origin departure points from West African coast (Baldaccini 
2010: 240). Effectively, this operation aims to establish the identity of the 
migrants and to prevent the migrants from risking their lives with the long journey 
at sea with the aim to reduce the loss of human life (Frontex 2007a). The 
operation involved joint patrols by aerial and naval assets from several member 
states including France, Luxembourg, Italy and Spain along the coast of West 
Africa (Frontex 2007a). Operation Hera is so far the longest operation coordinated 
by Frontex, in which the operations are conducted in several phases throughout 
the year. During Operation Hera 2008 started from February to December 2008, 
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some 5,969 migrants were sent back to their countries and 360 individuals 
believed to be involved in facilitating the journey were arrested (Baldaccini 2010: 
240). The migrants were dominantly from Mauritania, Senegal and Guinea. 
Operation Hera succeeded in preventing most migrant boats carrying clandestine 
migrants from West African coast to the Canary Islands and diverted them back to 
their countries of origin. 
• Joint Operation Nautilus 
In October 2006, Frontex launched Operation Nautilus, an operation focused in 
the Central Mediterranean designed to tackle the increased flow of irregular 
migration from Libya and the Tunisian coast to the island of Lampedusa, 
Panteleria, Sicily and Malta (Ifantis 2014: 10). The first phase of Nautilus took 
place in June and July 2007 and ended in October 2007 with the aim to strengthen 
the border control in Central Mediterranean and to support Malta authorities with 
technical and operational assistance to deal with the influx of irregular migration 
in their territory (Frontex 2007b). The operation was hosted by Malta and Italy, in 
which every member state participated and assets from the member states were 
deployed for the operation. During this phase, the participating countries are 
Germany, Spain, Greece and France.  
During the first phase 464 migrants were detected or intercepted and a 
total number of 166 migrants were rescued (Frontex 2007b). The main 
nationalities involved were migrants from Eritrea, Somalia, Ethiopia and Nigeria 
(Frontex 2007b). The other nationalities of the migrants for this route were also 
reported to be from Tunisia, Bangladesh and Ghana (Baldaccini 2010: 240). 
According to the Frontex Annual Report 2007, the total cost for operation 
Nautilus is 5,080,053.00 euros (Frontex 2007b). Initially, the operation was 
delayed and interrupted due to uncertainties over the effective roles of Libya to 
manage irregular migrants originating from their country (Calleya 2012: 89). 
However, Operation Nautilus has finally successful to launch its first operation 
after the agreement between Italy and Libya, in which Libya affirmed to clamped 
down as a transit point for the migrants (Calleya 2012: 89). The mission has also 
been strengthened with close cooperation between Italy and Libya focused on 
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coordinating the operational coordination at their external borders effectively 
(Rijpma and Vermeulen 2015: 456).  
 The first phase of operation Nautilus was regarded as a success with the 
remarkable decrease in the number of irregular migrants to Malta. Following the 
success, phase two was continued in May 2008 until October 2008, with Italy and 
Malta remaining as the host countries. Participating members states included 
Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal, Romania, Spain and 
United Kingdom (Frontex 2008b). The second phase of Nautilus aimed at 
coordinating risk analyses in managing external borders control based on 
operational cooperation between Member States. To achieve the mission, surface 
and air patrolling assets provided by the participating member states were 
coordinated to ensure that it worked effectively in the operation. The coordination 
effectively helped the member states to detect and intercept irregular migrants as 
well as traffickers responsible for organising the movement of the migrants via the 
sea (Frontex 2008b). The Nautilus 2008 operation cost the EU of around 
6,818,134.50 euros (Frontex 2008b).  
Operation Nautilus was continued from April 2009 until October 2009 
with the total cost of 3,561,361 euros (Frontex 2009). Malta remained as a host 
country; meanwhile the member states that participated in this operation consisted 
of Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and 
Romania. Every member state deployed significant assets to support the 
operation. Nautilus 2009 was focused in Central Mediterranean with the objective 
of increasing the capacity for border surveillance by the cooperation of member 
states to detect and intercept irregular migrants flow trying to enter the Schengen 
area via boats from Libya (Frontex 2009). Following the operation, Frontex 
reported a decline in irregular border crossing in 2009 with 165,700 clandestine 
migrants were detected, a 22% decrease from the previous year (Ifantis 2014: 31). 
 Frontex experienced some limitation in its operation due to the fact that 
they had very limited access to the assets deployed in the operations. During 
Operation Nautilus 2007, Frontex only acquired two German helicopters, the 
occasional presence of Greek and Spanish vessels, and the Italian patrol aircraft 
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(Calleya 2012: 89). Another limitation faced by Frontex during its operation has 
been the lack of Libyan participation particularly in detecting the migrants upon 
their departure from Libyan coast (Calleya 2012: 89). It is vital to have more 
active participation from Libya as Libya is the main migration transit point 
between Africa and Europe across the Mediterranean Sea. Active participation 
and cooperation with Libya will greatly assist in decreasing the amount of migrant 
flows. Despite the lack of participation from Libya, Malta has been actively 
lobbying to strengthen Frontex contingency planning to tackle the mass migrant 
movements from Africa to Europe (Calleya 2012: 90). This is due to the fact that 
Malta has been receiving large numbers of irregular migrants and asylum seekers 
than any other European country in a very short period of time, forcing it to adopt 
an immediate approach to tackle the problem. In December 2007, Libya and Italy 
finally reached an agreement on joint maritime patrols between those two 
countries, whereby Italy offered its technical expertise and border control 
equipment to Libya (Calleya 2012: 90).  
• Joint Operation Triton 
Another Frontex operation is the Joint Operation Triton, which has been officially 
introduced in November 2014 to replace the previous Mare Nostrum Operation. In 
the beginning of the operation,  the operational cost each month was 2.9 million 
euros, however the cost added up to 26.25 million euros for 2015 (Mungiany 
2016: 200). JO Triton was designed initially to operate in its operational area not 
extending beyond 30 nautical miles from the Italian coast, however later extended 
to 138 nautical miles south of Sicily (Mungiany 2016: 200). JO Triton was set to 
focus in providing assistance and additional support to the member states in 
search and rescue activities in the Mediterranean Sea, particularly for Italian 
authorities as well as to provide support to manage their border surveillance.151 
Such operation also focused on tackling the rising of irregular migration flows in 
the Central Mediterranean. During an interview with the official from operation 
Triton, Mr Florea Ganea explained the mandate of JO Triton as follows:  
																																								 																				
151 Interview with Florea Ganea, 14 July 2016, Warsaw. 
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Triton operation is the biggest Frontex operation ever. We are monthly 
deployed in Italy with six big vessels with special so called operational 
vessels with huge vessels capacity to stay at up to seven bay ten bay, 
where they can do search and rescue activities. In addition, we also 
conduct a border surveillance which is our mandate. The mandate of 
Operation Triton is to provide additional supports to Italy when it comes to 
border surveillance. We help the boat to search and rescue, to implement 
this operational activity and coordinate surveillance to control this 
irregular immigrations towards the EU. But to tackle cross border crime 
that means to help border security to help with the operational cooperation. 
The most important is the contribution to search and rescue, exchange 
information between participants (we have 27 member states), to identify 
possible threats, establishment of structure and then training and so on.  
 (Interview No.2, Operational Manager of Joint Operation Triton). 
Additionally, JO Triton also involved in second line of activity implemented 
within the ‘hotspot’ area. ‘Hotspot’ concept is a concept that was introduced by 
the European Commission on the agenda of migration in 2015 to provide support 
to member states that are grappling with this migration crisis.152 Mr Florea further 
explained the operational task of JO Triton in the ‘hotspot’ area particularly in 
aiding assistance for Italy as below: 
Not only border surveillance but support for search and rescue, plus it is a 
second line activities dimension that we are doing in the hotspot, that is 
identification, fingerprint and document checks. In case of Italy, the 
hotspot is the embarkation area where migrants are being disembark and 
where we are doing the enforcement. All the EU agencies support the 
Italian authorities in their line of expertise. So Frontex is present in the 
hotspot to help with the identification of people with so called ‘screen 
activity’. Then we check document and we conduct fingerprint activities. 
And then Europol is helping the Italian authorities with this. So the 
																																								 																				
152 European Commission, 2015, Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council: Progress Report on the Implementation of the Hotspots in Italy, pp. 2. 
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coordination tools of all these activities within the hotspot area which is 
called EURTF Catania, the European Union Regional Task Force of 
Catania are present to coordinate the experts and then to support Italian 
authorities from the frontline.  
(Interview No.2, Operational Manager of Joint Operation Triton). 
JO Triton has the primary mandate for border surveillance, nevertheless it also 
provides additional support for member states to tackle other cross-border crime 
as summarised by Mr Florea: 
Not only this but also Triton is a multi-purpose operation, particularly 
when we come across or when we detected the smuggling of goods. So 
even though it’s not our mandate, but we are the enforcement agencies and 
we take action with national authorities cooperating. We have discovered 
lots of drugs especially hashish, human smuggling and illegal fishing 
activity that we report to our partners. 
(Interview No.2, Operational Manager of Joint Operation Triton). 
This operation cover the operational area includes territorial waters of Italy and 
also involved in SAR for Italy and Malta (Frontex 2014a). Frontex assisted the 
Italian authorities by collecting and providing crucial information about criminal 
networks operating in Libya particularly, as well as other transit countries. In 
addition to that, coastal patrol boats also used regularly to deal with small 
intervention and boarding of suspicious vessels at sea.  
As mentioned above, the main mandate of JO Triton is to support Italian 
authorities with border surveillance and also to provide additional support in 
search and rescue activities in the Italian territorial waters. On one hand, search 
and rescue activities are the responsibility of the country in search and rescue area 
where the incidents occurred, which means coastal states and national authorities 
are always responsible for coordinating these activities. Frontex on the other hand 
is always prepared to deploy their assets to support the existing assets of coastal 
states who are in need of support. As in 2016, Frontex has the availability of 
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around 15 or 17 boats available to be deployed for search and rescue activities to 
support Italian authorities.153 In 2015, JO Triton recorded a remarkable 
achievement when it saved more than 3,000 migrants in the Mediterranean Sea 
during the search and rescue (Frontex 2015b). The migrants were departed mainly 
from Sub Saharan Africa towards Italy using the rubber inflatable boats that 
carried more than 100 people on board, which exposed them to the possibility of 
shipwrecks and drowning at sea. 
In conclusion, Frontex was particularly designed to coordinate and 
integrate the EU member states’ national maritime patrol to address the issue of 
irregular migration. In addition, there are also a number of essential Frontex 
instruments used for border surveillance. The most important among these are the 
Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABIT, a pool of experts deployed in 
exceptional situations) and the Central Record of Available Technical Equipment 
(CRATE, a database of border surveillance equipment). With these two 
instruments, it has helped Frontex to effectively coordinate various equipment 
provided by the member states. Frontex has provided significant assistance to the 
member states in order to help them enhance their efficacy in managing and 
strengthening external control borders, and simultaneously help to sustain the 
security of Mediterranean Sea from the mass migration flows as well as 
proliferation of human smugglers at sea. 
In addition to counter-migration operations, Frontex is also moving 
towards developing a multi-purpose operation. Although Frontex principally aims 
to tackle the migratory pressure, they will also extend the tasks to detect and 
intercept other potential crimes in the Mediterranean Sea, including terrorism.154 
Frontex emphasised that all the information gathered with one asset will be used 
for different purposes including processing personal data such as names, vehicle 
identification numbers and phone numbers of suspected personnel that will later 
be reported to other EU agencies involved, such as Europol for further 
investigation.155 With access to the Schengen information system, visa 
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154 Interview with Ewa Moncure, 15 July 2016, Warsaw. 
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information system and Europol database of stolen/lost documents, Frontex will 
be able to analyse other potential crime at the border and simultaneously 
contribute towards increasing the security at the EU external borders. 
6.3.2 European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) 
Efficient border control is essential to prevent irregular migrants from entering 
European countries. In order to tackle irregular migration and human trafficking, a 
more effective protection of external borders is particularly required by the EU 
and its member states. Consequently, the EU has introduced an effective and 
integrated border management (IBM)156 as one of its policy priorities to increase 
the security level at their borders. The concept of IBM is principally defined as a 
‘national and international coordination and cooperation among all the relevant 
authorities and agencies involved in border security and trade facilitation to 
establish effective, efficient and integrated border management systems, in order 
to reach the objective of open, but well controlled and secure borders’.157 IBM 
emphasises that sufficient response to migration issue is paramount in order to 
cope with this crisis effectively (Carrera 2007: 1). 
As a result, the EU developed a surveillance system with the main goals of 
coordinating better border management and to save lives at sea. The surveillance 
system known as European Border Surveillance System (hereinafter EUROSUR) 
was officially launched in December 2013 with the principal purpose to improve 
cooperation between national guard forces and to simultaneously strengthen the 
management of external border controls for member states (Rijpma and 
Vermeulen 2015: 454). EUROSUR is related to the second task of Frontex as 
																																								 																				
156 JHA Council on 4-5 December 2006 has concluded that the conceptual framework of IBM is to 
include the following dimensions: i) border control (checks and surveillance) including risk 
analysis and crime intelligence; ii) detecting and investigating “cross-border crime” in cooperation 
with all the relevant law enforcement authorities; iii) the four-tier/filter access in third countries of 
origin or transit, cooperation with neighbouring countries, measures on border control at the 
external borders and control measures within the common area of free movement; iv) inter-agency 
cooperation in border management including border guards, customs and police, national security 
and other relevant authorities; and v) coordination and coherence at the national and transnational 
level (See Council of the European Union, Justice and Home Affairs, 2768th Council Meeting, 
Brussels, 4-5 December 2006, Press Release, 15801/06). 
157 See European Commission, 2004, The Guidelines for Integrated Border Management in the 
Western Balkans, Brussels, pp. 17. 
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mentioned before, which is to assist member states in national border guards 
including establishing common training standards.158 On the one hand, Frontex 
remains a central hub of the external border system, while EUROSUR on the 
other, is essentially an information-exchange and surveillance system focused on 
irregular migrations that provides immediate data for situational changes or risk at 
the external borders (Rijpma and Vermeulen 2015: 454; Andersson 2016b: 32).  
EUROSUR became operational on the 2 December 2013. EUROSUR was 
established with the idea of addressing the challenges of cross-border crimes, 
irregular migration and to rescue migrants at sea. This includes the active 
involvement of the member states in maritime borders surveillance and 
information exchange (European Commission 2013a). Through information 
exchange and interagency cooperation between member states’ authorities and 
Frontex, the objectives of EUROSUR are threefold. First, EUROSUR aims to 
enhance the effectiveness in migration flows control and simultaneously to reduce 
the number of undetected irregular migrants entering Europe.159 EUROSUR 
provides the member states’ authorities with timely and relevant information 
allowing them to detect and intercept irregular migrants promptly before they 
enter Europe (Bellanova and Duez 2016: 28). Second, EUROSUR will protect 
and save lives at the external borders. This can be achieved with EUROSUR 
technology capacity, in which improve the competency to detect small boats in 
the open sea and simultaneously assists in search and rescue activities at sea 
(Rijpma and Vermeulen 2015: 459). Third, EUROSUR will prevent cross-border 
crime at the external borders by increasing the internal security of the EU 
(European Commission 2013a). In other ways, border surveillance is not only the 
prevention of illegal border crossings, but also includes other related cross-border 
crime such as terrorism, trafficking of people, narcotics smuggling and arms 
trafficking. 
Under the EUROSUR mechanism, member states’ authorities involved in 
																																								 																				
158 Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004, Establishing a European Agency for the Management 
of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, 
European Community Official Journal, 25 November 2004, pp. 4. 
159 European Commission, 2013. EUROSUR: New Tools to Save Migrants’ Lives at Sea and Fight 
Cross Border Crime, Press Release, Brussels, 19 June 2013. 
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border surveillance (border guards, coast guards, police, customs and navies) are 
encouraged to exchange information with neighbouring countries while 
conducting maritime surveillance (Article 20.1), while other related international 
organisations shall also provide relevant information to Frontex for border 
surveillance (Article 18.1).160 Surveillance for the external land and sea borders 
should include monitoring, detection, identification, tracking, prevention and 
interception of unauthorised border crossings (Article 2.1).161 This is perfectly in 
accordance with the purpose to prevent and combat irregular migration and cross 
border crime, to ensure more lives could be saved at sea. The use of the 
EUROSUR tools is strictly subject to the respect of fundamental rights and in 
compliance with the principle of non-refoulement (Article 2.4).162 The EUROSUR 
regulation emphasises several guidelines to ensure Frontex and the member states 
comply with those principles. These include prioritisation to the special needs of 
children, unaccompanied minors, victims of human trafficking, persons in need of 
urgent medical assistance, persons in need of international protection, persons in 
distress at sea and other persons in a particularly vulnerable situation (Article 
2.4).163  
Under the EUROSUR mechanism, the vital component is the enforcement 
of border surveillance and its regulations are very much emphasised on the 
primary objective of saving lives at sea (Frontex 2013).164 According to the 
European Commission, EUROSUR is the new tool to save migrants’ lives and 
prevent cross border crime in the EU borders as follows:  
																																								 																				
160 European Commission, 2013. Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council- Establishing the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur), 22 October 
2013. 
161 European Commission, 2013. Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council- Establishing the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur), 22 October 
2013. 
162	European Commission, 2013. Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council- Establishing the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur), 22 October 
2013.	
163 European Commission, 2013. Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council- Establishing the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur), 22 October 
2013. 
164 European Commission, 2013. Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council- Establishing the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur), 22 October 
2013. 
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EUROSUR will make an important contribution to saving lives of those 
who put themselves in danger to reach Europe’s shores. It will also equip 
the EU and its Member States with better tools to prevent cross-border 
crimes, such as trafficking in human beings or trafficking in drugs, while 
at the same time detect and provide assistance to small migrant boats in 
distress (European Commission 2013b).165 
EUROSUR is designed to provide the member states with infrastructure and tools 
required to improve situational awareness and capacity to respond immediately at 
the external borders in order to detect, prevent and combat irregular migrations 
and cross-border crime.166 In order to strengthen the surveillance of border 
controls, EUROSUR delineates frameworks which will help the efficacy of border 
surveillance at sea. The framework consists of the following components: (1) 
national coordination centres; (2) national situational pictures; (3) a 
communication network; (4) a European situational picture; (5) a common pre-
frontier intelligence picture; and (6) a common application of surveillance 
tools.167  
The most important component of EUROSUR is the National 
Coordination Centres (NCCs). The main role of the NCC is to coordinate the 
border surveillance activities on a national level and operate as a hub for the 
information exchange among the member states (Article 5.1).168 NCCs consist of 
multiple entities from the member states involved, including border guards, 
(border) police, national guards, minister’s office, the coast guard and the armed 
forces (Carrera and Hertog 2015: 17). Principally regarded as the essence of 
EUROSUR, NCCs play an important role to ensure timely and relevant 
information between all national authorities for border surveillance to enable them 
																																								 																				
165 European Commission, 2013. EUROSUR Kicks Off: New Tools to Save Migrants’ Lives and 
Prevent Crime at EU Borders, Press Release, Brussels, 29 November 2013. 
166 European Commission, Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council- establishing the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur), 22 October 2013. 
167 European Commission, Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council- establishing the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur), 22 October 2013. 
168 European Commission, Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council- establishing the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur), 22 October 2013. 
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to take immediate action to deal mainly with search and rescue activities. In 
addition, NCCs establish and maintain the national ‘situational awareness’169 as 
well as to ensure better management of resources and personnel for search and 
rescue activities (Article 5.3).170 
 EUROSUR represents an ‘intelligence-driven approach’ for the border 
surveillance system which gathers ‘situational pictures’ of the external borders 
and as of the pre-frontier (Andersson 2016b: 33). EUROSUR is considered as a 
backbone of Frontex’s operations at sea (Bellanova and Duez 2016: 25). One of 
the examples of how EUROSUR acts as a surveillance tool is with the 
development of the Spain’s coastal radar system- Spanish Sistema Integrado de 
Vigilancia Exterior (SIVE) along the coast of Andalusia and later extended to 
Canary Islands (Andersson 2016b: 1059; Bellanova and Duez 2016: 28) ). The 
system is designed to monitor and control irregular migration flows at sea with 
mobile radars and sensors (Bellanova and Duez 2016: 28). According to Spanish 
navy guards, the system has successfully detected the movement of irregular 
migrants in the Straits of Gibraltar, and hence decreased the number of irregular 
migrants arriving in Spain (Bellanova and Duez 2016: 28). EUROSUR also has a 
capacity to detect the early movement of irregular migrants and their boats at sea, 
and therefore has contributed to the process of search and rescue effectively. It has 
also lead to a significant decrease in the number of shipwrecks, drowning and loss 
of life at sea (European Commission 2013b). 
 The EUROSUR framework outlines the three phases of its operational 
plan. The three phases are [i] upgrading and extending national border 
surveillance systems and interlinking national infrastructures in a communication 
network; [ii] developing and improving the performance of common tools and 
sensors for border surveillance; and [iii] to gather all relevant data from national 
surveillance, new surveillance tools, European and international reporting systems 
as well as intelligence sources to be shared between relevant national authorities 
																																								 																				
169 Situational awareness measures how the authorities are capable of detecting cross-border 
movements and finding reasoned grounds for control measures (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2008). 
170 European Commission, Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council- establishing the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur), 22 October 2013.	
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(Bellanova and Duez 2016: 30). During the first phase, the surveillance systems of 
the member states shall be interlinked and streamlined (Rijpma and Vermeulen 
2015: 460). In this process, NCCs as well as the national surveillance systems 
would be upgraded and Frontex plays an important role as an intelligence sharing 
and gathering hub. The next step under the first phase also involved supports to 
the third countries to develop their border surveillance infrastructure, to enhance 
their efficiency in migratory flows management (Commission of the European 
Communities 2008). This includes the setup of NCCs in the eight member states 
of the EU southern maritime borders in the Mediterranean Sea and the southern 
Atlantic Ocean.171 The second phase emphasises the development and 
improvement of surveillance tools and sensors for border surveillance at the EU 
level (Rijpma and Vermeulen 2015: 460). Satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAV) should be developed for deployment in the ‘pre-frontier’ areas such as the 
open sea and third country territories.172 The third phase aims a creating a 
common information sharing environment for the EU maritime domain. To 
develop such a system, all related reports and data of traffic monitoring and 
activities at sea will be gathered and disseminated between national authorities. 
The first step of such integration however is limited to the Mediterranean Sea, the 
southern Atlantic Ocean (Canary Islands) and the Black Sea.173  
 In conclusion, the EUROSUR framework has resulted a good outcome in 
detecting irregular migrants in Spain coastal area. With the modern technology of 
radar and sensors used by EUROSUR, it will help if the surveillance system can 
also cover the whole Mediterranean Sea. Although the number of fatalities remain 
high, the EUROSUR framework has demonstrated that it could potentially 
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assisted to save more lives at sea in the future. 
6.3.3 EUNAVFOR MED- Operation Sophia 
Following the deadliest shipwreck incident off the Libyan coast in April 2015 
which involved almost 800 deaths, the EU has immediately responded by setting 
up its naval mission called EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia (hereinafter 
Operation Sophia). The operation was established on 22 June 2015 and has a 
mandate of “identify, capture and dispose of vessels as well as enabling assets 
used or suspected of being used by migrant smugglers or traffickers, in order to 
contribute to wider EU efforts to disrupt the business model of human smuggling 
and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean Sea” (EEAS, 
2015).174 The mandate of Operation Sophia is further explained by one of the 
official at Eunavfor Med: 
Our mandate is very clear and it is written in the council decision dated 18 
May 2015. Undertake systematic efforts to identify, capture and dispose of 
vessels and enabling assets used or suspected of being used by migrant 
smugglers or traffickers, in order to contribute to wider EU efforts to 
disrupt the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks 
in the Southern Central Mediterranean Sea. That is very clear. We have a 
strong valid mandate focus on the smugglers and traffickers, so the 
migrants are not our targets, but the traffickers and smugglers are our 
target. Of course, it is limited geographically because we can operate only 
in the southern central Mediterranean Sea, according to the mandate. 
There is only one mission focus on targeting the smugglers and traffickers- 
the only mission is Operation Sophia. 
(Interview No. 4, Spokesperson and Chief of Media Cell Eunavfor Med) 
Although the main mandate is to target human smugglers and traffickers, 
Operation Sophia also has a mandatory task and legal responsibility under 
international law to rescue people at sea and participate in search and rescue 
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activities.175 
The operation became operational in one month after the decision made by 
the Council of European Union on 18 May 2016 to launch a military operation for 
the international law enforcement. This indicates an effective and solidarity of the 
EU member states to stop migration crisis and to fight against human smuggling 
and criminal networks at sea. On the 26 of June 2016, the first vessels began their 
operation in the Central Mediterranean. Operation Sophia focuses primarily to 
respond immediately for search and rescue, reduce the loss of life at sea, prevent 
the proliferation of human smugglers and ultimately disrupt the traffickers’ 
networks at sea.176 It also determine to address the root causes of irregular 
migrations with cooperation of countries of origin and transit, such as poverty, 
political unrest, and civil wars.  
 The operational headquarters of EUNAVFOR MED are located in Rome, 
Italy and the total personnel deployed for the operation, as to date, almost 1,300 
people from 22 EU countries.177 The enforcement of EUNAVFOR MED 
demonstrates the EU’s commitment to fight against human traffickers at sea.178 
The operation Commander for Operation Sophia is Rear Admiral Enrico 
Credendino and to date, the operation assets include seven ships (Italian light 
aircraft carrier, GARIBALDI serves as the task force’s flagships) and three air 
assets (Luxembourg, France, Spain).179 The direction of this operation is divided 
into several phases and liases closely with other partners, namely IOM, UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and also its regional partners, the AU 
(Faleg and Blockmans 2015: 2). The first phase of this operation focuses on 
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surveillance and assessment of human trafficking as well as trafficking networks 
in the southern central Mediterranean.180 This phase is an intelligence phase in 
which Operation Sophia analyses the modus operandi of the smugglers network 
and simultaneously integrates their forces together ready for the operation.181 The 
second phase focuses on the search and seizure of suspicious vessels if necessary. 
The third phase pledges to dispose vessels and smugglers’ assets and ultimately 
seizes the smugglers in compliance with international law.182 The fourth phase is 
the completion of the operation and withdrawal of forces from the area of 
operation. The duration for the initial mandate is for one month and the cost is 
approximately 11.82 million euros. This operation renamed Operation Sophia in 
September 2015.183 
 The initial mandate for Operation Sophia is for one year involving three 
active phases. However, following the success of the operation, on 20 June 2016 
the Council extended the operation until 27 July 2017 with two additional tasks 
supporting the core existing mandate. The two additional tasks introduced to 
reinforce the operation’s mandate are: i) training for the Libyan coastguards and 
navy; ii) contribute to the implementation of the UN arms embargo on the high 
seas off the coast of Libya (European Council 2016).184 The training for the 
Libyan coastguards and navy focuses on the management and control of territorial 
waters, including training on the implementation of search and rescue activities, 
training on cooperation with the police activities, and finally training on the 
procedures to tackling the smugglers operating in the territorial waters.185 The 
training allows the Libyan coastguards and navy to become involved actively in 
their territorial waters; improve their capability to tackle the smuggling and 
trafficking in the Libyan shores (Libyan coastguards and navy have very limited 
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capabilities and assets to operate at its territorial waters due to its civil war in 
2011); as well as to improve the security of Libyan territorial waters from the 
threat of criminal networks.  
The second additional task of Operation Sophia is to provide the Libyan 
authorities with information sharing and the implementation of the UN arms 
embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya in accordance to UN Security 
Council Resolution 2292 (European Council 2016).186 Operation Sophia is 
responsible for preliminary tasks including boarding vessels suspected of 
smuggling arms on the high seas and then diverting these vessels to another port 
of destination for further investigation by the national prosecutors.187 The request 
made by the Libyan authorities requesting for assistance in training demonstrates 
a promising future and stimulating the next step for better cooperation in the 
Mediterranean Sea. 
 The first phase of this operation took place from July until September 
2015 and focused in the south west of the Mediterranean Sea as this region 
maintained the highest migration movement. This area is located between the 
Libyan towns of Zuwarah and Misrata, and the waters offshore towards the island 
of Lampedusa.188 During the first phase, the operation focused on developing 
understanding and awareness about the maritime traffic and merchants’ profiles in 
the area. In addition, the operational plan during this period also emphasised 
attaining information of the migration vessels’ flow, identifying the patterns of 
traffickers routes and analysing the operational structure of the smugglers 
networks.189 With this knowledge, the operational force of Operation Sophia has 
better understanding of the smugglers modus operandi at sea and their business 
models, which has greatly facilitated in reducing the number of human smuggling 
in the Mediterranean Sea, particularly from Libya. According to the six-month 
report of Operation Sophia, more than 3,000 migrants were successfully rescued 
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by the end of the phase 1.190 
 The second phase (Phase 2A) entered into force in October 2015. This 
operation took place in the high sea particularly across the Lampedusa triangle in 
order to disrupt the smuggling and trafficking business model.191 In order to assist 
with the operation, various assets from member states were deployed including 
nine surface units, a submarine, five helicopters, three fixed wing maritime patrol 
aircraft and one tactical UAV.192 This phase coordinated all land, sea and air 
assets by providing the force with real time situation to enable them to respond 
immediately and effectively during interception at sea. With the military assets, 
Operation Sophia is able to monitor migrants movement efficiently and tracking 
the smugglers at sea. Any boats suspected of human smuggling will be monitored 
using the air assets and the materials, and subsequently evidence and facts 
concerning the smugglers will be sent to the prosecutor before the 
apprehension.193 In accordance to international law particularly Palermo Protocol 
2000,194 it permits the assets to be coordinated effectively to board and arrest the 
suspicious vessel. During this second phase, Operation Sophia successfully 
rescued 8,336 migrants and diverted them to the nearest safe port.195 The second 
phase 2(B) extends the operation into territorial waters only when it fulfills the 
requirement of necessary conditions; i) invitation of the legitimate government of 
Libya (currently is GNA); ii) upon the release of applicable UN Security Council 
Resolution (UNSCR) authorise them to operate in the territorial waters; iii) 
consent from the Political Security Committee (PSC) thereby all 28 member states 
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approved the transition to the next phase.196 In other words, Operation Sophia 
requires political authority of all member states to transit to the next phase of 
operation. 
 During the first six months of its operation, Operation Sophia had its first 
transition of operations into the high seas. The operation consists of ships and air 
assets provided by the member states. During that period, 46 suspected smugglers 
were arrested and 67 boats used for smuggling were disposed.197 Following 
intense and continuous rescue operations by Operation Sophia, more than 2,000 
lives were rescued in the central Mediterranean Sea, mostly migrants who tried to 
cross the sea using the rubber or wooden boats (EEAS 2016a). Operations 
conducted by the Operation Sophia are also assisted by Frontex joint operations at 
sea such as Operation Triton. With extensive assets including medical capabilities, 
high speed satellites data transmission and specific systems have enabled 
Operation Sophia to respond immediately in urgent situations at sea as well as 
help with humanitarian and disaster relief operations effectively (EEAS 2016a). 
Operation Sophia has shown significant success with the remarkable decline in 
numbers for migrant’s arrival from Libya from 1 January 2015 until the end of 
June 2015. Before Operation Sophia became operational, the migration flow was 
50% from Libya and 50% from the Balkan route, however, in the second part of 
the year, the number declined to only 16% migrants arriving from Libya after 
Operation Sophia began its operation in the area.198  
 In addition to naval operations and activities, Operation Sophia also 
committed to establish relations with main international and regional actors for 
information sharing purposes. Consequently, the Shared Awareness and De-
confliction in the Mediterranean (SHADE-MED) was established on 26 
November 2015. SHADE-MED provides a platform for interested nations and 
organisations engaged in maritime operations to coordinate and de-conflict their 
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activities.199 The seminar was attended by more than 80 representatives including 
the armed forces of the coastal states of the Mediterranean, United Nations (UN), 
the EU and other organisations that were directly involved with rescue operations 
pertaining to irregular migration across the Mediterranean Sea. This seminar was 
established to promote better understanding between different agencies involved 
in the Mediterranean Sea and to enhance interaction among them in relating to the 
cooperation mechanism for counter-migration and counter-trafficking.200  
The second meeting was hosted by the Italian Navy in Rome on 12 May 
2016 where more than 140 representatives from 35 different countries were 
present.201 SHADE-MED is working towards arranging eight working groups, 
providing an opportunity for participants to exchange opinions and share 
information. These working groups include, i) operational working groups; ii) 
communications and information systems; iii) legal working groups (to propose 
best practices in countering smuggling activities at sea); iv) shipping working 
groups (discuss on issues to mitigate impact on shipping company); v) migration 
working groups (managing data related to the migration movements); vi) search 
and rescue working groups (to identify safe place for irregular migrants); vii) 
smugglers business model working groups (to discuss issues pertaining to 
smugglers business models structure and technical and tactical procedures (TTPs); 
and viii) effects on countering smugglers business model working group (EEAS 
2016b). In addition, Operation Sophia also maintain good relations with other 
actors, including IOM, International Red Cross, UNHCR and NGOs such as Save 
the Children, among others. Operation Sophia signed the MoU procedure with 
Save the Children, in order to establish best principles of managing the migrants, 
notably the children.202 All the crew of Operation Sophia will receive training 
from the UNHCR and Save the Children before joining the forces to equip them 
with the best possible practices of migrant management. 
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 While maintaining good relations with other organisations, Operation 
Sophia is always working closely with the EU agencies, such as Frontex. The 
cooperation with Frontex includes information exchange203, mechanisms of 
communication, and the deployment of Frontex Liaison Officers within Operation 
Sophia structures and vice versa.204 This is to enable the coordination of their 
assets and personnel while operating at sea, particularly through Operation Triton 
by Frontex. Additionally, Operation Sophia also use Frontex’s experience and 
protocol as a major benchmark for their operation, for instance the mechanism 
and best practices to approach the migrants; as well as the procedures established 
with the Government of National Accord (GNA) of Libya. Furthermore, 
Operation Sophia is also dedicated to improve cooperation with other EU 
agencies, such as Eurojust and Europol particularly for information exchange 
related to trafficking networks in the area.205 Cooperation with Europol is on a 
daily basis, notably concerning information exchange, as Europol is the agency 
responsible to investigate the business model ashore.206 
Operation Sophia has achieved significant results in its first year of 
operation. The number of migration flows using the central route towards Italy 
and Malta has decreased by 9% for the first time in three years as a result from 
continued efforts of this operation in the area.207 In October 2015 after four 
months of the operation, it successfully transitioned to the second phase or phase 
2A (High Seas) and now focuses on the counter-smuggling operation. Statistics 
until July 2016 show that Operation Sophia has successfully rescued a large 
number of irregular migrants and arrested the smugglers with the assets of 
Operation Sophia as the interviewee of Operation Sophia asserts below: 
Until now more than 21,000 lives were saved by the Sophia assets. 81 
suspects were apprehended and delivered to Italian prosecutors, and 241 
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boats were disposed. You can see how many rubber boats compared to 
wooden boats because wooden boats are quite difficult be accessed. The 
rubber boat you can buy from the outside because it is very cheap, but they 
are very weak and very unprofessional. You can also consider 35,000 
more people rescued by other organisations but with our help. For 
example, normally we have three airplanes, three helicopters patrolling, so 
maybe we are the first one who are locating a migrant boats before they 
sink. Then, we will give alarm to other organisations about the incident. 
That is why we have to consider the other 35,000 more to this number. 
(Interview No. 4, Spokesperson and Chief of Media Cell Eunavfor Med) 
Although primarily aimed a disrupting the business model of human smugglers 
and traffickers, Operation Sophia also provides assistance in search and rescue 
activities and collaborates with other operations in the Mediterranean, including 
JO Triton. Elaborating on their coordination during search and rescue activities, 
the interviewee further explained the process as below: 
The rescue activity is coordinated by the competent Italian maritime 
rescue coordination centre. That is a centre here in Rome controlled by the 
Italian coastguard, due to the international law, is the one responsible to 
coordinate all the units of rescuing people. So it is under their 
coordination. So normally the first alarm is sent to them. And then they 
control before they send the other ships, helicopters or patrol boats belong 
to other organisations.  
(Interview No. 4, Spokesperson and Chief of Media Cell Eunavfor Med) 
During the summation of the discussion of Operation Sophia, the official from 
Eunavfor Med concludes the whole breadth of Operation Sophia in the 
Mediterranean Sea:  
Operation Sophia is an international law enforcement using military assets. 
Because military assets have the tools and the expertise, as well as the 
experience to be use also in the civilian activities like enforcing their law 
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at sea. The police boats, the coastguard boats, and all the other units can 
stay days at sea. Sophia also have technical equipment and radar system to 
monitor the situation, so that the people can get there faster with 
motorboats. So this is the reason why I can classify Operation Sophia, an 
international law enforcement using military assets. 
(Interview No. 4, Spokesperson and Chief of Media Cell Eunavfor Med) 
In spite of the success of the operation, Operation Sophia however also 
encountered some drawbacks in conducting the operation at sea. The main 
challenges are in regards with time and the speed.208 With the absence of a 
permanent structure of a naval command and fleet, it is challenging in fact that the 
vessels for the operation are mainly contributed by the member states based on a 
rotation basis. Nevertheless, the effective routine operation by Operation Sophia 
in the international waters has contributed to interrupt the smugglers networks, 
particularly from Libya. The continuous patrol of Operation Sophia in the 
international waters has prevented the smugglers to operate in the high seas.209 
Simultaneously this situation also contributes to reduce the number of irregular 
migrants departing from Libyan shores in particular. 
6.4 Summary 
In summary, the EU has been actively involved in counter irregular migrations 
and human trafficking operations since 2001. Italy and Malta, the most popular 
destination countries for irregular migrants have been constantly flooded with 
large numbers of migrants’ arrivals every year. In addition, Spain and Greece 
have also recorded a remarkable number of migrants’ arriving in their countries 
and the number has been constantly growing each year dominated by migrants 
from Sub Saharan Africa and North African countries. In order to combat this 
problem, the EU has introduced Frontex in 2005 which was primarily focused on 
tightening and strengthening border control amongst the member states. Their 
roles have been intensified particularly after the fatal shipwreck accident in 2015 
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in the Mediterranean Sea. Frontex also introduced essential surveillance systems, 
known as CRATE and RABIT to assist with the coordination of assets and 
equipment provided by the member states. Within Frontex, several joint 
operations were conducted at sea. These include Operation Hera, Operation 
Nautilus and Operation Triton. These operations are designed primarily with the 
objective to enhance capabilities of border control and identify the movement of 
irregular migrations, and ultimately to stop mass migration movement in the 
Mediterranean Sea. These operations show remarkable achievement, successfully 
contributing to the decline in the number of irregular migrants crossing the border 
of European countries. These operations have also been successful in search and 
rescue activities and have saved more than a thousand live from any fatal 
accidents at sea.  
The adoption of a surveillance system known as EUROSUR in 2013 is 
seen as a great system for border control in the Mediterranean Sea. EUROSUR is 
responsible for information-exchange and provides immediate data for any 
potential risk at the external borders. EUROSUR has demonstrated its capabilities 
as a significant component of border surveillance and has helped to save lives at 
sea. The final component of EU counter irregular migration is the set up of its 
naval forces known as EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia. This operation, 
established in June 2015 was designed with the mandate to identify, capture, and 
dispose vessels, which were believed to have connection with the smugglers 
networks. The EU has also emphasised its commitment to the protection of lives 
of migrants crossing the sea during search and rescue operations within the range 
of Operation Sophia. The challenge of irregular migrants across the 
Mediterranean cannot be eliminated, however it must be controlled and regulated. 
With the continuous and active efforts by the EU, is hoped to help decrease the 
number of irregular migrants trying to reach Europe, and ultimately eradicate the 
trafficking networks in the Mediterranean Sea. 
6.5 NATO Counter-Migration Operation in the Mediterranean Sea 
Unlike EU, the current role of NATO in counter-migration in the Mediterranean 
Sea is limited in certain aspects. NATO’s role in maritime security in the 
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Mediterranean primarily focuses on the integration of military tasks across the 
members and amongst relevant partners. NATO has no specific operations for 
counter-migration at the Mediterranean Sea, however since 9/11 NATO has taken 
on counter-terrorism as a task, assisted under the operation of Active Endeavour. 
According to NATO, in the course of conducting counter-terrorism operations in 
the Mediterranean Sea, the OAE has had a visible effect on security in the 
Mediterranean. For instance, NATO ships and helicopters assigned for OAE have 
intervened on several occassions to rescue people from sinking ships (Cesaretti 
2008: 4). During the counter-terrorism operation in 2006, the ships assigned for 
OAE have assisted Greek authorities to stop the irregular migrants from reaching 
the Greek coast (Ryan and Mitsilegas 2010: 273). In the process, NATO has 
contributed to maintaining peace and stability in the region. The presence of 
NATO has also had a significant impact for those criminals and trafficking 
networks that may have otherwise used the Mediterranean Sea for crime activities, 
including irregular migration.  
 Although NATO’s role in counter-migration is limited than those of the 
EU, however in 2016 NATO has expressed its commitment to actively engage in 
tackling the problem of irregular migration and deterring human smuggling in the 
Mediterranean Sea. During the Defense Ministers’ meeting in Brussels, NATO 
pledged to expand its naval forces operation and to deploy its assets in the Aegean 
Sea in effort to assist with disruption of human smuggling networks from Turkey 
to Europe (McNerney et al 2017: 10). NATO began to deploy its Standing 
Maritime Group in the Aegean Sea in its counter-trafficking mission at the end of 
February 2016 (NATO 2016b). The operation is not focused on rescue activities, 
rather it is conducting ‘reconnaisance, monitoring and surveillance activities’ of 
illegal crossing in the Aegean Sea to tackle smuggling and irregular migrants 
(EEAS 2016c). In this process, NATO’s naval forces cooperate with the EU’s 
border agency, Frontex to provide relevant information to the Greek and Turkish 
coast guards. The information will help both Greece and Turkey to deal with 
illegal human smugglers and simultaneously save lives at sea (NATO 2016b). 
Turkey is currently confronting a new mass of refugees along its border with 
Syria, while Greece struggles with huge numbers of refugees who have fled 
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violence in Iraq, Afghanistan and other conflict countries. In addition, the 
operation in Aegean Sea is not only limited to monitoring and surveillance, but 
NATO is also bound by the law of the sea to provide humanitarian assistance 
including search and rescue for immigrants who are at risk at the sea. According 
to Froh (2016): 
For humanitarian assistance, if we come across immigrants moving in 
danger, we tried to drag them back to where they came from or to a safe 
harbor. But if necessary, we bring them on board and a lot of our ships 
had hundreds of the immigrants onboard. 
(Interview No. 5, Former NATO’s Deputy Assistant Secretary General 
for Operations) 
 Deployment of NATO’s naval forces in the Aegean Sea does not serves as 
a national coast guards, rather NATO provides support and assistance for Turkey 
and Greece authorities to carry out the operations to combat human smuggling in 
the area (NATO 2016b). It is conducted in close cooperation with these 
authorities, subject to full respect of national sovereignty and in full accordance 
with the international law (NATO 2016b). NATO’s presence in the Aegean Sea 
helps to provide greater information exchange between Turkey and Greece for 
immediate and timely action upon distress at sea. NATO Shipping Centre serves 
as a good platform for information sharing on shipping, which also has good links 
with the civilian industry, the shipping industry and the insurance company (Froh 
2016). The information gathered will be disseminated to the coastal nations for 
further actions. The information is not only important to help with irregular 
migration, but also substantial to stop potential terrorist plots (Froh, 2016).  
NATO is also signalling that they are ready to get more involved in the Central 
Mediterranean to assist with the existing operations in the area. During the NATO 
Summit in Warsaw on 8-9 July 2016, NATO has announced their transition of 
OAE, the operation in the Mediterranean to fight against terrorism, to a non-
Article 5 maritime security operation (Article 91).210 The operation is now known 
as Operation Sea Guardian and will be able to perform maritime security 
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operation tasks, if necessary. This is an effective contribution to existing 
operations conducted in the Mediterranean Sea to tackle the flows of irregular 
migration in that area. According to Article 93 in the Warsaw Summit 
Communique, NATO agreed to provide full support to complement Operation 
Sophia including to enhance capabilities through intelligence sharing; logistics 
support; contribute to capacity building of the Libyan coastguard and navy, if 
requested with close coordination with the EU.211 During an interview with 
NATO official, he further explained the broader mandate of Operation Sea 
Guardian in comparison to OAE: 
OAE really did maybe one part of two maritime task. But Operation Sea 
Guardian is doing three with the possibility of doing the other two, so 
potentially a much broader mandate. The important part is looking at the 
Eastern Mediterranean and Central Mediterranean. I don’t think there is 
much in the Western Mediterranean but I think they have the authority if 
necessary going to Western Mediterranean and do a broader range of 
task. 
(Interview No. 5, Former NATO’s Deputy Assistant Secretary General 
for Operations) 
Operation Sea Guardian was created to conduct any of the seven maritime 
security operational tasks, as needed. These include i) maritime situational 
awareness; ii) freedom of navigation; iii) maritime interdiction; iv) countering the 
proliferation of WMD; v) protecting critical infrastructure; vi) conducting 
counter-terrorism operation at sea; and vii) maritime security capacity building 
(NATO 2016b). Operation Sea Guardian is currently conducting three core 
missions in the Mediterranean that is broader than the previous OAE.212 The first 
core mission is to provide support to maritime situational awareness and logistical 
support to the EU’s Operation Sophia. This task focuses on information sharing 
between NATO and the civilian agencies, including information about the 
movement of vessels at sea and details of the vessel’s original departure port 
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212 The principal aims of OAE are to detect any suspicious or unusual events at sea that is related 
to terrorist acts; and to react immediately to that detection. 
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(Froh 2016). Secondly, this operation provides support to maritime counter-
terrorism similarly as the previous OAE mission. This task includes the planning 
to detect, deter, disrupt and defend the vessels from potential maritime terrorist 
activities (NATO 2016b). The third mission of Operation Sea Guardian in the 
Mediterranean is the maritime security capacity building. In this particular task, 
NATO will provide assistance to both military and non-military authorities, 
including assisting coast guards and other navies (NATO 2016b). The capacity 
building includes variety of assistance as epitomised in the following passage: 
We could be doing a lot of capacity building with the other nation’s coast 
guard. For the training, we produce the ships, we give training for the 
crews to work on the structure, and we trained them about the command 
structure, the communications for passing information and how to do it 
right. We also give them help to setting up the programs and the systems 
they use to command control. We also give training for them about the 
maintenance of the equipment so they can maintain and store it properly. 
Capacity building is about building everything up so they have the 
capacity on their own, so we don’t have to deal with them. 
(Interview No. 5, Former NATO’s Deputy Assistant Secretary General 
for Operations) 
In this regard, Operation Sophia welcomed the presence of NATO in the 
area of operation, determined that the more number of ships patrolling the area 
indicates better capability of operations at sea.213 The presence of NATO ships 
will help Operation Sophia enlarge the area of controlling and monitoring to 
tackle the irregular migrants more effectively. However, very little cooperation is 
available between Libya and NATO. NATO has received a request from Libya to 
assist them with the defence planning but the request is very specific nonetheless 
(Froh 2016).214 NATO provided support to the Libyan government by providing 
them the training about board force planning, supplies system, commanding 
control and building integrity in new government. In spite of this cooperation 
																																								 																				
213 Interview with Antonello de Renziz Sonnino, 9 August 2016, Rome.	
214 Interview with Richard Froh, 30 November 2016, Cardiff. 
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between NATO and Libya, it is still uncertain whether there will be more 
improvement in cooperation between them in the future as explained in the 
following clause:  
Well the cooperation with Libya is still possible. With Libya we did say 
we worked, but they were very specific. However we don’t know 
because of the history. What happened in 2011, it may be more difficult 
for NATO to involve. But NATO nations are still there and NATO 
probably watch closely. 
(Interview No. 5, Former NATO’s Deputy Assistant Secretary General 
for Operations) 
Nonetheless the EU sees NATO involvement in this operation as necessary 
assistance to them dealing with the migration crisis. NATO also expressed its 
desire to work closely with the EU and believes that this cooperation is a good 
start towards a greater cooperation between the EU and NATO in the 
Mediterranean. NATO is committed to providing assistance to the EU when it is 
necessary as explained by the NATO official: 
Therefore, when the EU asked for help with the illegal immigration, 
NATO had a force that are able to reposition. Operation Sea Guardian is 
providing intelligence, the ships are available to use, and they are gaining 
information from people. The big improvement of this new operation is 
getting the NATO nations to support the EU. The EU agreed that it is a 
joint effort and then we have to work much closer with Frontex. And by 
the time I saw a huge improvement and much better cooperation with the 
EU, and I’m hoping we can even gone along farther. 
(Interview No. 5, Former NATO’s Deputy Assistant Secretary General 
for Operations) 
 In conclusion, the deployment of NATO’s naval forces in the Aegean Sea 
marks NATO’s first intervention in the irregular migration crisis, which 
previously has been managed mostly by the EU. Dedicated to assist Turkey and 
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Greece to deal with the substantial numbers of irregular migrations’ arriving in 
their borders, NATO also committed to curb the expansion of human smuggling 
networks in the region. NATO vessels will continue to monitor the waterways and 
provide relevant data for prompt action by the EU and other relevant authorities. 
In the process, NATO also committed to patrol the waterways and enhance its 
surveillance at the Turkey-Syria border to monitor the movement of irregular 
migrants and smugglers activities. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg 
emphasised that NATO is doing their best to tackle the problem and to work 
closely with the EU in the most pressing issues (NATO 2016b). The NATO 
counter-migration in the Mediterranean is obviously very limited, and it is 
therefore at present, difficult to evaluate. The intervention of NATO in this issue 
may not be the solution to the recent migrant and refugee crisis, however it 
demonstrates the efforts NATO to partake after so many years to engage more 
actively in the Mediterranean Sea. 
6.6 Results and Chapter Summary 
Irregular migration in and across the Mediterranean Sea is a long-established 
phenomenon of the region. The migration and refugee crisis have been years in 
the making and until present day there is no solution to resolve the problem. 
Nevertheless, the EU and NATO have worked continuously to engage and address 
the challenge of irregular migration and human smugglers in the Mediterranean 
Sea, particularly with the establishment of maritime operations. This chapter has 
explored various maritime operations conducted by the EU and NATO to engage 
with migration crisis in the Mediterranean. On the one hand, Frontex play a key 
role in migration crisis management, which responsible to assists member states in 
managing their external borders. Furthermore, various joint operations conducted 
under the aegis of Frontex, such as Hera, Triton and Nautilus have contributed to 
reduce the number of migrant’s arrivals to the European shores. In addition, the 
implementation of EUROSUR as a surveillance system in the region has provided 
assistance for the member states to receive prompt and accurate information of 
any irregular movements and human smugglers at sea. On the other hand, NATO 
has also stepped into the crisis for the first time, which has otherwise been 
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managed predominantly by the EU. Through intelligence and surveillance 
activities, NATO determined to disrupt human smuggling networks particularly in 
the Aegean Sea with the cooperation of Frontex, including the provision of 
relevant information in regards to migrant’s flows to the Greek and Turkish coast 
guards. Another major transition by NATO has taken place in July 2016 when 
Operation Sea Guardian were first adopted following the existing OAE in the 
Mediterranean. This operation has the mandate to provide support for Operation 
Sophia to curb human trafficking and arms smuggling, and at the same time to 
identify potential maritime terrorism at the early stage. While there is no quick 
solution to this issue, we can expect Europe’s migrant crisis to persist for the 
foreseeable future. On this note, the EU and NATO’s role is essential to 
continuously control, regulate and cooperate closely with each other to stop the 
migration issue and human smuggling in the Mediterranean Sea, and ultimately 
preventing the further loss of life at sea.  
 The findings imply that a spectrum of practices in counter-migration 
activities link to the security community practices, and therefore demonstrates the 
evolution of community-building in the Mediterranean Sea. These activities 
including joint operations, cooperative security, capacity building and military 
cooperation demonstrate the development of security community practices 
through communities of practitioners that is EU and NATO. These maritime 
security practices are useful to evaluate the roles of the EU and NATO as a 
security community-building institutions in the Mediterranean Sea through 
migration crisis management.  
 In this chapter, the application of security community framework can be 
seen clearly through various maritime activities implemented by the EU and 
NATO. The first initiative by EU that is Frontex reflects the spread of security 
community practices within counter-migration initiatives. This includes the 
transnational cooperation and partnerships with various EU agencies and the EU 
member states. Frontex is conducting various cooperative operations at sea 
including with Operation Triton, Operation Nautilus and Operation Hera whereby 
Frontex provides a joint training and exercises to enhance the effectiveness in 
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regulating migration flows to Europe. The advancement of military cooperation 
and training reflects the building of security community which exhibited in these 
maritime activities. In addition, the enforcement of Operation Sophia and 
Operation Sea Guardian reflects the application of security community framework 
through their activities. For instance, NATO is committed to enhance cooperation 
with the EU to address the migration problem in the Mediterranean, which 
includes information sharing, intelligence exchanges and maritime security 
capacity building. NATO provides the assistance to the EU including assisting 
coast guards and other navies in the Mediterranean. This activities reflect two 
practices of security community framework, that is cooperative-security and 
implementation of confidence building measures. These activities evidenced that 
security community practices featured in counter-migration, thus serve as a 
vehicle for security community-building in the Mediterranean Sea. Further details 
on the evolution of security community-building through the implementation of 
counter-migration practices will be discussed in the next conclusion chapter. 
 The application of security community framework in this chapter provides 
better understanding of how the framework shapes the formulation of cooperative-
security and various partnerships among the members states of NATO and EU. 
The framework has extended the understanding on shared values and interests 
which play a dominant role in influencing the cooperation, interactions and 
mutual engagement of the communities. Security community is therefore useful to 
induce the study of the practices in which members interact with one another, 
build shared repertoires  and increasingly developed joint projects. In this chapter, 
the enforcement of maritime initiatives has been clearly constructed with the 
shared interests and values as its core tenet. NATO and EU shared common 
concerns of how migration can be a threat to their interests, thus respond in a 
collective way particularly through the development of partnerships and 
cooperative security.  
 In the following chapter, a comparison will be made between this case 
study and the previous case study on counter-terrorism initiatives in the 
Mediterranean Sea. The comparison will help to justify the extent to which 
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security community-building process has evolved and expanded, in particular 
through security community practices, the two case studies. The next concluding 
chapter revisits the fundamentals of security community practices which expands 
in greater details of how actors cooperate in maritime security. The concluding 
chapter provides more substantial discussion on the relations between security 
community practices and a spectrum of maritime practices in the Mediterranean 
Sea as been explored in the case studies chapters. This way, a broad conclusion 
can be drawn regarding the development of security community practices to 
tackle transnational threats in the Mediterranean Sea, in particular, of counter-
terrorism and counter-migration initiatives. 
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CHAPTER 7 
The Spread of Security Communities: Maritime Security Practices in the 
Mediterranean Sea and the Academic Contribution of the Framework 
7.1 Introduction 
This thesis has developed a security community framework and applied it to the 
maritime security studies, in particular, of counter-terrorism and counter-
migration practices enacted by the EU and NATO in the Mediterranean Sea. In 
the preceding chapters, the thesis has explored in details the roles the EU and 
NATO play as the most important regional actors in the Mediterranean Sea in 
addressing terrorism threats and irregular migration. This thesis has also 
scrutinised the relations between the concept of security community, in particular, 
of security community practices, to maritime security activities of the EU and 
NATO. The findings from the two case studies have demonstrated that security 
community-building has evolved through the implementation of counter-terrorism 
and counter-migration initiatives in the Mediterranean Sea. These practices 
include, training and exercises, capacity building, cooperative security and 
military integration. 
 In this conclusion chapter, I provide an overview of the preceding 
chapters, discussing the main contents in each chapter. The chapter also 
summarises the main findings from the research questions, probing the relations 
between the security community practices and maritime security initiatives by the 
EU and NATO in response to terrorism and irregular migration issue in the 
Mediterranean Sea. The chapter explores the contribution of this research in the 
academic field, particularly the spread of the security community within maritime 
security activities in the Mediterranean Sea and the new insights into the 
dynamics of security community research. The chapter ends by proposing a set of 
recommendations that can be developed for future research endeavours. 
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7.2 Maritime Challenges in the Mediterranean Sea Post Cold War: A 
Chapter Summary 
This thesis has explored the initiatives carried out by the EU and NATO as part of 
their counter-migration and counter-terrorism policy notably after the 9/11 
attacks. This thesis has also developed a detailed security community framework, 
which has been used as an analytical tool throughout the thesis and explain the 
findings from empirical case studies. 
 Chapter two examined the security community framework and its 
components, including, the conceptual vocabulary of the security community; two 
types of pluralistic security community, loosely coupled and tightly coupled; 
meaning of community; cognitive regions; repertoires of practices and the three 
stages of security community formation as comprehensively discussed by Deutsch 
(1957) and later, further refined by Adler and Barnett (1998). It claimed how the 
formation of the security community led to the absence of interstate war, but a 
peaceful means as a way to resolve conflicts (Adler and Barnett 1997: 6). 
Although the concept was not prevalent during the Cold War era, it began to 
revive after the end of Cold War when states began to become members of the 
political community. States attempt to construct institutions and improve 
cooperation in order to protect their survival and create the conditions for a stable 
peace through international community. In the early establishment of the security 
community concept, Deutsch introduced two types of security community; 
amalgamated and pluralistic. Deutsch emphasised that the presence of any war or 
military actions signal the breakdown of the community (Deutsch 1957: 7). 
 Adler and Barnett proposed a refined and definition of the security 
community, due to the lack of theoretical, methodological and conceptual 
treatment in Deutsch’s original concept (Adler and Barnett 1996: 73). Adler and 
Barnett proposed the distinction of security community; loosely and tightly 
coupled pluralistic security community. This chapter explored the security 
community practices, which are the essential indicators to explain the 
development of security community. Additionally, attention was given to the 
contemporary issues to understand the relations between the security spectrum 
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and the community itself. It is essential to highlight the conceptual foundations of 
the security community in order to understand how the security community 
shapes and explains the behaviour of the members. In this thesis’s empirical 
research involving the EU and NATO counter-terrorism and counter-migration 
policy in the Mediterranean Sea, the security community framework allow the 
evaluation of the relations between maritime security practices and community-
building.  
 Chapter three discussed the methodology and methods involved in 
conducting the research. This thesis involved a primarily qualitative approach 
with which rigorous data collection involving textual analysis has been conducted. 
This includes the use of institutional documents, policy proposals, official reports, 
press releases and various sources from archives including ministerial meetings, 
official journals and summit reports. These textual sources have provided the best 
sources in analysing the case study and ultimately answering the research question 
of the thesis. While the bulk of this research is centred on documents and its 
analysis, interviews were also applied as the research progressed. Interviews with 
high level officials from both the EU and NATO were conducted to collect 
additional information and data, which were not available from the textual 
analysis. These interviews provide useful data particularly some recent statistical 
data and valuable information related to the maritime operations in the 
Mediterranean Sea. The data obtained from these interviews offers not only 
beneficial statistical information, but also provides a nuance insights that helped 
to understand the responses and level of cooperation of both organisations in 
dealing with terrorism and irregular migration. The chapter also discussed the 
justification of the case studies selection and the rationale to exclude other 
potential threats in the Mediterranean Sea. In addition, other aspects also took into 
consideration to justify the selection that includes the evident presence of security 
community practices within the maritime initiatives of counter-terrorism and 
counter-migration. 
Chapter four provides a broad overview of the EU’s and NATO’s 
initiatives and approaches in the Mediterranean. This overview was essential to 
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establish a historical chronology of how both organisations began to make their 
presence in the Mediterranean Sea known in order to address the changes in the 
security spectrum after the Cold War. NATO’s presence in the Mediterranean Sea 
started in the post-Cold War period, principally to contain the Soviet Union’s 
influence in the basin (Germond and Grove 2010: 5). Nonetheless, the increased 
instabilities and political violence in the region have been the driving forces for 
the Alliance’s enlargement in the Mediterranean to conform to the new security 
challenges. AMS (2008) is the key strategy developed by NATO to generate 
maritime policies and achieve their goals in the maritime domain. AMS highlights 
five fundamental roles to accomplish its missions; deterrence and collective 
defence; crisis management; cooperative security; building partnership capacity; 
and maritime security operations (Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 49). Under the 
maritime provision, SNMGs and SNMCMGs were established responsible for 
designated area of operations at sea and their work tasks. SNMG2 and 
SNMCMG2 have been assigned for patrolling activities in the Mediterranean to 
ensure NATO’s readiness to respond and react immediately at the time of crisis 
(Morse 2010: 48). The AMS has performed as a guideline for maritime operations 
for NATO and enabled NATO to maximise the use of its capabilities. 
NATO has introduced Mediterranean Dialogue in 1994, primarily to 
contribute to regional security and stability, as well as to promote better 
understanding and good relations with countries across Mediterranean (Bin 2008: 
726). The Mediterranean Dialogue is currently joined by seven non-NATO 
countries of the Mediterranean region who share and pursue similar interests in 
security-cooperative tools enforced by NATO in the region (McNerney et al 2017: 
15). Based on political dialogue and practical cooperation, the Mediterranean 
Dialogue functions as a platform for the members to discuss security situations in 
the region and develop further cooperation with NATO (Santis 2003: 180). In 
addition, Operation Active Endeavour is the fundamental NATO’s maritime 
operation in the Mediterranean since 2001 after 9/11 attacks. Serving as NATO’s 
sole maritime operation in the Mediterranean, Operation Active Endeavour has 
certainly contributed to ensuring stability at sea identifying none potential terrorist 
group attacks during its operation (Germond 2010: 69). Although the main 
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mandate is to counter-terrorism, this operation has also provided other assistance 
during its operation, including humanitarian assistance and search and rescue. 
Chapter four also extensively discusses the initiatives of the EU to address 
the security challenges in the Mediterranean. The most visible is the 
implementation of ESS, which highlights the key security concerns of the EU 
(Rehrl and Weisserth 2010: 12). Among the EU’s principal security concerns are 
terrorism and organised crime. IMP is also another essential policy by the EU 
which aims to integrate various European policy related to maritime affairs and 
marine issues. The integration is crucial to enhance better coordination between 
different policy areas, including, among others, economic growth and sea basin 
strategies (Germond 2010: 16). After the success of the ESS and IMP, 
subsequently EUMSS was introduced in 2014, focusing on maritime interests of 
the EU, particularly on the management of external borders control (Council of 
the EU 2014: 8). The Action Plan functions as the main driving force, 
highlighting essential maritime strategies for the EU and ensuring all regulations 
are upheld by the member states and related EU agencies. While EUMSS 
concentrates on maritime strategies, UfM on the other hand, functions as a 
platform to foster maritime cooperation between the EU and other Mediterranean 
countries while promoting stability across the Mediterranean (Adamo and 
Garonna 2008: 76). This chapter also explored briefly the roles Frontex play in the 
Mediterranean. At present, Frontex is conducting several joint operations in the 
Mediterranean Sea to provide assistance for mass migration flows via the sea, 
including, Hera, Nautilus and Triton. This chapter is useful from a historical 
perspective to chart the gradual community-building of maritime practices within 
the EU and NATO, before embarking on the empirical case studies. 
Chapter five analysed the first case study, maritime terrorism. This chapter 
explored the background of the maritime terrorism cases globally and importantly 
described terrorism situation in the Mediterranean Sea. Although terrorist activity 
in the Mediterranean is relatively very low and does not pose a real threat unlike 
in other regions, the political unrest and instability in the region have nevertheless, 
increased the potential for a terrorist attack in the Mediterranean (McNerney et al 
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2017: 14). The threat of ISIS is imminent particularly after a series of ship attacks 
in 2015 near the Sinai Peninsula. ISIS also claimed that they will use Libya as a 
gateway to Europe via the Mediterranean Sea, it is therefore important to note that 
ISIS in the future will pose a new threat to the safety and security in the 
Mediterranean Sea (Nightingale 2015: 1) 
Chapter five explored in detail the development of the EU and NATO in 
combatting terrorism at sea within their strategies and counter-terrorism 
operations. NATO has launched an immediate naval operation in the 
Mediterranean Sea known as OAE to provide assistance to the United States to 
contain terrorist threats after the 9/11 attacks (Feldt 2011: 16). Initially, OAE 
carried the main mandate to monitor maritime trade routes and provide 
surveillance activities in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, but the mandate has been 
extended to the entire Mediterranean Sea with aim to disrupt any terrorist acts at 
sea. The OAE is responsible for six core tasks within its mandate, including 
surveillance and tracking; escorting ships; boarding and inspection; the provision 
of training; support to MD partners; and the provision of other humanitarian 
assistance including search and rescue (Calleya 2013: 136). Rigorous operations 
and surveillance of OAE has assumed to be effective in countering terrorism 
whereby Mediterranean Sea has been safe from terrorist plots (Cesaretti 2008: 2). 
The NATO presence in the basin has assisted in providing security and stability in 
the Mediterranean Sea not only from terrorist threats, but also other illicit 
activities. 
The number of counter-terrorism measures implemented by the EU in the 
Mediterranean Sea are relatively low compared to NATO. Nevertheless, the EU 
has adopted several counter-terrorism measures to address the threats of terrorism, 
including counter-terrorism strategy, Declaration on Combating Terrorism and 
European Arrest Warrant. European Arrest Warrant is the first policy introduced 
by the EU in relation to framework decision on terrorism, principally to promote 
free movement in judicial decisions and eventually provides easy access for 
extradition among member states (Council of European Union 2002: 1). In order 
to enhance the effectiveness in combatting terrorism threats the EU has introduced 
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the Declaration on Combating Terrorism in 2004 with seven strategic objectives. 
This declaration emphasises the role the EU and its agencies play to coordinate 
cooperation with their partners in capacity building projects, including Algeria 
and Morocco (Wolff 2012: 166). Following the horrific terrorist attacks in London 
bombing in 2005, the EU stepped up with extraordinary measures to respond to 
the attacks. The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy was adopted in 2005 with four 
main pillars; prevent, protect, pursue and respond (Council of the EU 2005: 6). 
This strategy aims to tackle the root causes of radicalisation and ultimately 
preventing further terrorist recruitment. Another EU operation that took place in 
the Mediterranean Sea for counter-terrorism is Operation Coherent Behaviour. 
This operation was a brief naval operation in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, 
conducted with close cooperation with NATO within the frame of OAE. Although 
it was brief, Operation Coherent Behaviour was primarily focused on counter-
terrorism and also aimed to intercept drug traffickers operating in the basin (Faleg 
and Blockmans 2015: 4). In addition to the aforementioned strategies, Europol, 
the main EU agency addressing terrorist threats launched the European Counter-
Terrorism Centre in 2016. The centre functions as an intelligence sharing hub, 
providing analysis for terror attacks in the Europe and enhancing better 
coordination among the member states (McNerney et al 2017: 16). 
Chapter six explored the second case study, that of EU and NATO 
counter-migration policies in the Mediterranean Sea. This chapter scrutinised the 
main trends of migration routes via the Mediterranean Sea, notably the Central 
Mediterranean, Western Mediterranean and Eastern Mediterranean. On the one 
hand, the Central Mediterranean received the highest numbers of migrants 
particularly from Libya, Tunisia and Algeria en-route to Italy, including island of 
Lampedusa and Sicily coasts (Moncure 2016). On the other, the Eastern 
Mediterranean route via the Aegean Sea towards Greece and Turkey received 
unprecedented numbers of migrants from Syria, Afghanistan and Somalia who 
fleeing their conflicted countries. Western Mediterranean is the popular route for 
migrants originate from African countries such as Mali towards Spain via Strait of 
Gibraltar (Frontex 2015a). In addition, the issue of irregular migrants trying to 
illegally embark to Ceuta and Melilla has been a long overdue crisis which Spain 
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has been confronted with since 1995. Nonetheless, with effective cooperation 
between Spain and Morocco has successfully decreased the number of irregular 
migrants trying to reach Spain via Ceuta and Melilla.  
This led to the advancement of the EU and NATO counter-migration 
initiatives. Frontex has been a key player as the main EU agency dealing with 
migration crisis in the Mediterranean. The main mandate of Frontex is to manage 
the external borders of the Europe in order to restrict the access for irregular 
migrants, and providing assistance for member states during the crisis (Leonard 
2010: 234). Several joint operations are currently conducted under the aegis of 
Frontex, including Hera, Nautilus and Triton. Operation Triton is primarily 
launched to tackle the mass migration influx in the Central Mediterranean and 
provide support to the Italian authority whenever needed (Gour 2015: 7). The 
support includes information sharing, boarding the suspicious vessels, as well as 
provides assistance for search and rescue activities.  
Analysis then moved on to another EU initiative, that is Operation Sophia. 
This operation was launched immediately following the shipwreck incident off the 
Libyan coast in 2015. After one year in operation, this operation has been 
extended for another year after the remarkable success achieved in intercepting 
human smugglers and reducing the number of irregular migrants crossing the sea. 
With the initial mandate to dispose vessels used by smugglers and to disrupt 
human trafficking, Operation Sophia has successfully decreased the numbers of 
migrant’s arriving into Europe and also has saved a remarkable number of lives 
during its operation (Council of the EU 2016). In addition, Operation Sophia also 
enhances cooperation with Libya, in an effort for Libya’s clamping down as a 
migration transit point between Europe and Africa. This included the inclusion of 
training for Libyan coastguards on the management of territorial waters, the 
implementation of search and rescue activities and the training to handling the 
smugglers apprehended in their territorial waters (De Renziz Sonnino 2016). In 
order to enhance the effectiveness of the operation, Operation Sophia is working 
closely with Frontex in terms of information exchange and liaison officers’ 
deployment to improve the mechanism of communication. 
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Unlike the EU, NATO has very limited initiatives for counter-migration. 
Nevertheless, NATO deployed naval ships in the Aegean Sea in 2016 to provide 
assistance to the EU in the migration crisis (McNerney et al 2017: 19). The 
deployment also provides assistance for search and rescue activities and supports 
Turkish and Greek authorities in combatting human trafficking in the area. In July 
2016, NATO has again reiterated its commitment to become more involved in the 
Central Mediterranean and provide assistance to existing EU operations in the 
area. That said, NATO has announced the transition of OAE to a new operation 
known as Operation Sea Guardian. Such operation is primarily established to 
conduct maritime security operational tasks, including, maritime security capacity 
building and maritime situational awareness (McNerney et al 2017: 10). During 
the operation, Operation Sea Guardian cooperates with EU, Turkish and Greek 
navies as well as providing assistance to the coast guards to monitor the maritime 
situation. The case study findings strongly demonstrated that the EU and NATO 
counter-migration initiatives exemplify the security community practices, thus 
embody the community-building in the Mediterranean Sea. 
7.3 Results  
The research question asked what are the initiatives and approaches that have 
been implemented by the EU and NATO to address terrorism and irregular 
migration in the Mediterranean Sea. In order to explore the EU’s and NATO’s 
approaches in managing these security threats, the historical analysis in Chapter 
four explored the development of security community practices, through the 
implementation of maritime operations, security dialogues, cooperative security 
and partnerships by the EU and NATO. It detailed important maritime strategies 
and operations that were in force to combat the maritime threats in the 
Mediterranean in a broad overview. This was explored further in the empirical 
chapters five and six that specifically focused on the two case studies with 
detailed narrative of the EU’s and NATO’s maritime security practices to fight 
against terrorism and irregular migration. The findings demonstrated that both 
organisations play a crucial role in tackling these problems. Nevertheless, while 
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the EU seems to be more competent in their counter-migration policies, 
meanwhile NATO is more advanced and capable in its counter-terrorism policy. 
 The core objective of the thesis, nonetheless, was to examine the security 
community building in the Mediterranean Sea, through security community 
practices of counter-terrorism and counter-migration. In Chapter Two, extensive 
discussions were explored in regards to the security community framework. This 
chapter will therefore examine the relations between security community practices 
and maritime initiatives in the Mediterranean Sea. Deploying the notion of the 
security community, this section discusses a detailed analysis of the EU and 
NATO, their activities and forms of cooperation forming both organisations 
practices and addresses maritime challenges in the Mediterranean. Below I 
provide a detailed comparison between the terrorism and irregular migration case 
studies. I examine how the security community practices exhibited in the activities 
of both cases. It emphasises the roles played by maritime activities in security 
community building and analyses how the EU and NATO became security 
community building institutions in the Mediterranean Sea. The findings will allow 
justify the purpose of this research to understand regional cooperation in the 
maritime challenges epistemic community.  
7.3.1 The Spread of Security Community Practices in Counter-Terrorism 
Initiatives 
The core research objective intended to answer the question of the expansion of 
the security community framework through the implementation of maritime 
security practices. In other words, it analyses the extent to which the security 
community practices exhibited within counter-terrorism and counter-migration 
activities in the Mediterranean. As has been explored in Chapter Two, there are 
six essential repertoire of practices, which help to sustain a security community 
mechanism. This set of practices is the indicator which demonstrates the existence 
of a security community and the level of integration experienced between 
members of the communities. In the analysis of counter-terrorism initiatives in the 
Mediterranean Sea by NATO and EU, it is evident that practices of a security 
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community are visible and observable through the employment of their maritime 
activities. 
In the case of NATO, the OAE has a long tradition counter-terrorism 
operation. The array of activities conducted during this operation includes training 
and exercises, escorting and surveillance for commerce vessels upon request, 
boarding and inspection to the suspected vessels, as well as providing support to 
the Mediterranean Dialogue partners. According to the range of practices 
demonstrated within the frame of OAE, it is evident that the process of security 
community-building has evolved in the Mediterranean Sea. Through these 
activities, it seems clear that one of the indicators of a security community 
mechanism, the establishment of confidence building measures including training 
and exercises, military cooperation and intelligence exchanges, is present within 
the exercise of OAE. 
Among the core activities conducted within the OAE is training and 
exercises, which involves NATO forces and the naval coast guards of member 
states. NATO naval assets are constantly conducting training, exercises and port 
visits during its operation in the Mediterranean Sea to offer skills and experience, 
sharing with other naval coast guard to enhance their capability in conducting 
counter-terrorism operations at sea. For instance, NATO during its port visit to 
Morocco conducted exercises and shared tactical navigation training with the 
Royal Moroccan Navy ships (NATO 2015b). The security community framework 
proposes that the tightly-coupled pluralistic security community exist when a high 
level of military cooperation, joint planning and exercises are present between the 
members of community. In other ways, members of the communities develop 
these practices as a nature in their way of communication and cooperation. 
Therefore, the implementation of exercises, training and military cooperation 
between NATO and Moroccan navies in OAE clearly exemplifies the presence of 
security community practices. In order to implement the OAE for counter-
terrorism, NATO does not only perform cooperation with the member states, but 
also extends their collaboration with other relevant actors in the region to assure 
the efficiency of OAE in combatting terorrism at sea. These exercises within 
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counter-terrorism which particularly concentrates on practices of joint planning 
and exercises, intelligence exchanges and military cooperation implies the link 
between security community practices as an important sources of community-
building in the Mediterranean Sea.  
Moreover, another security community practices delineated the behaviour 
of member states who align consciousness in the direction of partnerships. OAE 
has not only served as a means for NATO members to cooperate among each 
other, but it is also increasingly important as a means to involve non-members. 
This is evident with the creation of partnership between NATO and its 
Mediterranean Dialogue partners whose interested to participate in the operation. 
The partnership includes the involvement of the partners through individual 
cooperation programme with the aim to enhance the effectiveness of OAE in 
combatting terrorism. Other than that, NATO also provides support for the 
Mediterranean Dialogue countries through information exchange in order to 
improve the understanding of all partners regarding the maritime environment. In 
short, NATO promotes the form of partnership with the relevant partners in order 
to support the enforcement of OAE in the Mediterranean. Several Mediterranean 
Dialogue partners have expressed their interest to participate in OAE particularly 
to cooperate in deterring and intercepting suspicious shipping operations in their 
waters, including, among others, Algeria and Morocco. In addition, other 
interested partners such as Ukraine and Russia also participated in supporting the 
OAE, by deploying their ships in the Mediterranean Sea to enhance practical 
cooperation and inter-operability among all partners (Bebler 2008: 9). Also, this 
partnership includes the participation of Ukraine in vessels’ boarding and 
inspection activities together with NATO. These attributes of partnership, 
activities and cooperation between NATO and its partners epitomises the 
expansion of the security community practices through the utilisation of counter-
terrorism activities. Consequently, the prospective partnership between actors are 
feasibly high within their interaction, ultimately benefitting the members as a 
whole. 
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By contrast, the EU has limited capacity and are relatively less competent 
to perform counter-terrorism operations in the Mediterranean than those of the 
NATO. Nevertheless, the EU has developed several essential strategies for 
counter-terrorism ranging from counter-terrorism strategies to military 
cooperation. For the EU, Operation Coherent Behaviour which has been 
conducted under the auspices of EUROMARFOR conforms to the characteristics 
of security community practices that is military cooperation and confidence 
building measures. This operation was conducted in close cooperation with the 
OAE for one month before its dismissal. Although brief, such operation 
demonstrates that the EU enacted military integration as a form of cooperation 
with its partners, thus encourage the development of community-building in the 
Mediterranean Sea. Also, this operation conducted intelligence exchanges 
between NATO naval forces and EU maritime forces in the course of conducting 
counter-terrorism to accustom themselves with standard procedures of the 
operation and enhance their communications (Feldt 2011: 16). These descriptions 
demonstrate the relation of security community practices to EU military practices 
of Operation Coherent Behaviour, and consequently manifested the spread of 
security community-building. Cooperation between the EU and NATO now 
involves wider military integration to coordinate and execute their policies which 
aid to sustaining the security community mechanism.  
In addition, the establishment of the ECTC which serves as a central 
information hub for counter-terrorism in the Europe also indicates the expansion 
of security community in the Mediterranean Sea. As a central information hub, the 
ECTC supplies the member states with information such as real-time data and 
intelligence sharing between law enforcement agencies and the member states in 
order to enhance inter-operability (Europol 2016). The following activities 
illustrate the implementation of confidence building measures including 
intelligence sharing and policy coordination as highlighted within the security 
community practices. This explains the relationship between these EU activities 
with security community practices. The findings suggest that these practices 
evidently are important source of community-building within EU and NATO in 
the Mediterranean Sea.  
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The findings from counter-terrorism measures by the EU also 
demonstrates the enforcement of cooperative security practice, which is a natural 
security practice of security community. It has already been noted that the 
Declaration of Combating Terrorism was adopted in 2004, signalling a stronger 
commitment of the EU to enhance international efforts to combat terrorism and 
ensure effective border control system. For instance, EU through its external 
border agency, Frontex provides technical assistance and supports for the member 
states to manage their external borders. Moreover, the EU also increased its 
counter-terrorism capacity building project with Morocco, Indonesia and Algeria 
to coordinate budgets for counter-terrorism policies (Wolff 2012: 166). This 
cooperation also includes the training for crisis management and border control. 
The implication that follows from these findings has a clear significance with the 
security community framework. It demonstrates that non-military threats and 
transboundary challenges need to be managed through cooperative security within 
the communities of practitioners. It is therefore evident that development in 
cooperative security, coupled with the creation of partnerships for counter-
terrorism measures by the EU promote the spread of community practices. Indeed, 
the security community-building is expanding in the Mediterranean Sea.  
Another activity for counter-terrorism by the EU, the formation of Euro-
Mediterranean Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism 2005 also demonstrates 
the expansion of security community practices in the Mediterranean Sea. The 
code was created primarily to address the threat of terrorism with focus to prevent, 
contain and eradicate terrorism regionally and internationally. The code also 
worked to establish a partnership and further cooperation between the EU and its 
neighbours, particularly the Middle East and North Africa (Reinares 2006: 4). The 
code of conduct has increasingly important as a means for the EU members to 
involve non-members to promote the fight against terrorism. This reaffirms the 
presence of security community practices, when the members disposed towards 
spreading the community through the creation of partnerships. In other ways, the 
EU seeks to enhance partnerships and cooperative security with not only EU 
member states, but also their non-members in the course of conducting counter-
terrorism. This is an important finding in a relation to the question of how the EU 
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promotes security-community building through its security practices. It seems 
evident that these activities of counter-terrorism serve as an important sources of 
community-building in the Mediterranean Sea. Through these cooperation, the EU 
members reinforce their capabilities to prevail against the potential of terrorist 
attacks.  
In conclusion, through the enactment of counter-terrorism measures, it is 
evident that security community practices have expanded to tackle the terrorist 
threats in the Mediterranean Sea. Diverse activities including policies, confidence 
building measures, military integration, cooperative security and the creation of 
partnerships demonstrate the spread of a security community practices. The 
execution of these activities also ensures that the mechanism of the security 
community are sustained between the security actors. In the table below I provide 
a summation of the relationship between security community practices with the 
security community-building process in the Mediterranean Sea. The relations 
demonstrate the extent to which the security community practices expansion 
features within counter-terrorism initiatives, through the prism of the security 
community framework.  
 Repertoire of Practices Counter-terrorism operations 
1.  Importance of common 
enterprises, projects, and 
partnerships in the radius of their 
interaction.  
Implementation of Operation Active Endeavour 
(NATO): 
• OAE also involved Mediterranean Dialogue 
(MD) partners, including Algeria and 
Morocco. 
• OAE also extend the cooperation and 
partnership with other interested partners 
such as Russia and Ukraine whose provide 
supports in the operation. 
2.  Cooperative security is indivisible 
and comprehensive. 
Cooperative-security between the EU and its partners 
or agencies: 
• Adoption of Declaration of Combating 
Terrorism 2004 highlights the EU pledge to 
enhance management at the external borders 
with cooperation of other relevant agencies 
and partners. 
• EU adopted strategic cooperation with 
Frontex to manage external borders of 
European member states. 
• EU developed counter-terrorism capacity-
building project with Algeria, Morocco and 
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Indonesia. This includes training on crisis 
management and border control. 
 
Adoption of European Arrest Warrant (EAW): 
• The objective of EAW is to abolish 
extradition between member states and 
promote a free movement in judicial 
decision including terrorism. 
• This policy emphasise the needs for member 
states to agree and abide with the regulations 
of EAW. Ultimately all the EU members are 
required to cooperate collectively to improve 
border surveillance at the external borders. 
3.  Disposition towards creation of 
partnerships, transnational security 
dialogues, or the constitutions of 
regions. 
• EU creates a partnership with Algeria, 
Morocco and Indonesia to synchronise 
national budgets and the EU budgets for 
counter-terrorism policy. 
 
• Euro-Mediterranean Code of Conduct on 
Countering Terrorism  
§ Cooperation between the EU and its 
neighbours from North Africa and 
Middle East. 
§ This code has the mandate to 
address the threat of terrorism 
particularly in preventing, 
containing and eradicating 
terrorism. 
4.  Changes in military planning and 
the implementation of confidence 
building measures (military 
cooperation, joint planning and 
exercises, intelligence exchanges, 
policy coordination and unfortified 
borders) 
Implementation of Operation Active Endeavour 
(NATO): 
• Naval exercises including tactical navigation 
and mine warfare exercises with Royal 
Moroccan Navy to share skills and 
experience of conducting counter-terorrism 
operations. 
• Information exchange with Mediterranean 
Dialogue (MD) partners. 
 
Implementation of Operation Coherent Behaviour 
(EU): 
• Conducted under the auspices of 
Euromarfor. 
• Includes military cooperation and 
intelligence exchange with OAE. 
• Military integration with NATO operation to 
conduct counter-terrorism operations, 
including surveillance.  
• Intelligence exchanges between NATO and 
EUROMARFOR to familiarise themselves 
with standard procedures and enhance their 
communications. 
 
The establishment of European Counter-Terrorism 
Centre (ECTC): 
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• Serves as a central information hub which 
provides information and intelligence 
sharing between law enforcement agencies 
and member states. 
 
7.3.2 The Spread of Security Community Practices in Counter-Migration 
Initiatives 
In the case of counter-migration measures conducted in the Mediterranean Sea, 
the EU plays a dominant role in tackling the massive flows of irregular migrants 
trying to reach Europe by sea. Various strategies, surveillance activities, border 
controls, and maritime operations by naval forces have been implemented to 
address this pressing issue. One of the most notable operations is the management 
of member states’ external borders by Frontex. Frontex was created with the main 
objective to coordinate operational cooperation among member states to 
strengthen security at the external borders of the EU member states (Leonard 
2010: 233). Frontex is also involved in the coordination of exercises in the 
Mediterranean, with the deployment of military ships to patrol the coastlines 
(Leonard 2010: 233). International or bilateral cooperation is an essential 
component to control the massive flows of clandestine migrants. Likewise, 
Germond (2010) explained that in order to deter, to arrest or to rescue irregular 
migrants in the Mediterranean, states must engage their navy, coast guards and 
police forces (Germond 2010: 70). Since 2005, the EU has actively involved 
through Frontex to coordinate various operations conducted multilaterally by 
European navies across the entire span of the Mediterranean, including in the 
Aegean Sea. 
The establishment of Frontex serves as a good example of the spread of 
the community practices within counter-migration initiatives. This is 
demonstrated by the creation of partnerships and transnational cooperation. 
Frontex plays a significant role as the EU agency that is responsible to ensure the 
coordination between member states in managing their external borders. The 
management of external borders remain the states’ responsibility, nevertheless 
Frontex was created to provide support, assistance and immediate response for the 
member states during distressing times at sea. In other words, the EU has 
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established Frontex to collaborate collectively for external borders management 
(Leonard 2010: 233). For that purpose, national borders and coast guards with 
designated tasks are available to provide support for counter-migration. Evidently, 
the formation of partnerships between the EU member states demonstrates the 
expansion of security community-building through Frontex and its security 
practices. 
Frontex through its various joint operations at sea, also fulfil the attributes 
of security community practices, which include military cooperation and the 
implementation of confidence building measures, such as joint training and 
exercises. Other than being responsible for managing external borders, Frontex 
also conducts various joint operations at sea, Operation Triton, Operation Nautilus 
and Operation Hera. Such operations were introduced in order to provide 
assistance to the EU member states who were confronted with the major migration 
crisis in the Mediterranean, particularly Italy and Greece. The analysis suggests 
that the advancement of military cooperation and exercises to tackle migration 
crisis in the Mediterranean explains the extent to which the security community 
practices are exhibited in these maritime activities. In addition, Frontex and the 
member states engage with each other more intensively than before in terms of 
training, exercises and joint operations, thus promoting the spread of security 
community practices within counter-migration measures in the Mediterranean 
Sea. For instance, Operation Triton was created mainly to provide assistance and 
support for Italian authorities with border surveillance, operational assistance and 
information sharing on the human smuggling networks (Gour 2015: 77). Indeed, 
this would be consistent with the security community practices, and consequently 
epitomises the expansion of community-building in the Mediterranean Sea. 
Moreover, the EU actively promotes the adoption of collective cooperation 
between its member states through Frontex operations, therefore it is evident that 
cooperative security practices have also continuously developed within the EU 
counter-migration measures in the Mediterranean Sea. 
Another essential mechanism that has been implemented in the 
Mediterranean Sea for counter-migration measures is the creation of the 
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surveillance system, EUROSUR. The creation of EUROSUR also serves as 
another example of confidence building measures through capacity-building 
projects, joint exercises and intelligence sharing. This can be supported by the 
development of technology capacity including tracking and detection systems 
which were built up to effectively to monitor the situation at sea and 
simultaneously allow authorities to take an immediate response (Rijpma and 
Vermeulen 2015: 454). Moreover, the initial purpose of EUROSUR is to improve 
cooperation between national guard forces and border guards to strengthen the 
external borders management. EUROSUR serves as a platform which provides 
quintessential information exchanges between the member states to allow rapid 
response to detect and intercept irregular migrants at sea. The adoption of 
EUROSUR, has assisted the improvement of confidence building between the EU 
member states whereby they are willing to exchange information and data, not 
only among the border guards but also other relevant agencies. These findings 
evidenced that security community practices featured in counter migration 
through confidence building and cooperative security, thus serve as a vehicle for 
security community-building in the Mediterranean Sea.  
Furthermore, as the counter-migration case study revealed, the practice of 
cooperative security can be seen to features in the Operation Sophia. Within 
cooperative security, a set of security practices are adopted by multilateral 
institutions of security communities, on the premise that threats to the 
community’s security are best handled by confidence building and dialogue, 
thereby promoting strategic cooperation (Adler 2008: 207). Operation Sophia was 
established with the core mandate to disrupt the business model of human 
trafficking in the Mediterranean Sea. Capability assets for this operation primarily 
rendered by the member states on a rotation basis. Nevertheless, it is important to 
note that Operation Sophia is working closely with other agencies, including 
Frontex, NATO and Libyan authorities. This cooperation includes information 
exchange, training for Libyan coast guards and navy and also sharing information 
of human trafficking networks with NATO (European Council 2016). It is 
paramount for the EU to ensure coordination between member states in maritime 
governance structure. That said, cooperation between NATO, Frontex and also 
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Libya has aided the EU to deal with the migration crisis and disrupt human 
trafficking networks. The findings suggest that the EU actively seeks to promote 
military cooperation beyond the frame of the EU, thus encourage the development 
of cooperative security practices within the EU, NATO and Libya to cope with 
migration crisis and human trafficking. Ultimately, the findings provide an 
important answer of how security community expand in the Mediterranean Sea 
through counter-migration practices. 
 
Likewise, this scenario is also illustrated in NATO activities for counter-
migration measures. Previously dominated by the EU, NATO has expressed its 
commitment to actively address and engage with the migration crisis in the 
Mediterranean Sea. In order to do so, NATO has enhanced its cooperative-
security with Frontex, Greek and Turkish coast guards. The Mediterranean is 
becoming more of a region of cooperation where all activities are better 
coordinated, and the members share similar values and common identities as a 
result of cooperative-security between various actors in the basin. Similarly, 
interactions among states and societies within non-homogenous regions are also 
growing in number. There have been constant discussions on the issue of EU-
NATO coordination in various areas, where maritime surveillance in particular is 
one area where coordination is likely and desirable. The EU and NATO are 
currently cooperate to conducting surveillance and monitoring activities in the 
Mediterranean- with Frontex and Operation Sea Guardian respectively. NATO 
and the EU both in the Aegean Sea aim to disrupt human smuggling networks 
with the ultimate goal to support Greece and Turkey with the provision of 
information of human smuggling networks operating mainly in Libya (Gour 2015: 
7). Frontex and Operation Sea Guardian can be conducted more effectively in a 
coordinated manner, which limits unnecessary task duplication as both EU and 
NATO are informed of their respective roles in the Mediterranean Sea. The EU 
Council in 2009 has also emphasised the need to enhance cooperation in certain 
potential areas with relevant organisations, including NATO. Hence, these 
elements demonstrate the expansion of security community practices whereby 
cooperative-security evidently features in counter-migration initiatives. The 
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implication from these findings has a clear bearing on how cooperative security 
perform an important function in security community building in that they 
transcend beyond their boundaries, but to assist each other to tackle irregular 
migration in the Mediterranean Sea.  
In summary, security community practices have been widely developed in 
the Mediterranean region, in this case it can be illustrated through counter-
terrorism and counter-migration cooperation in the Mediterranean Sea within 
NATO and the EU. The concept of security community is an attempt to provide 
alternative resolution for states in the international arena to resolve conflicts and 
handle crisis management. Accordingly, it is related to the concept of collective 
security, in the sense that the members of the security community disposed to 
promote cooperative security practices within themselves. According to six 
repertoire of practices delineated to sustain the security community mechanism, 
we can observe that these practices are featured in both counter-terrorism and 
counter-migration measures. The practices demonstrate the relations between the 
security community practices and community-building in the Mediterranean Sea. 
The security community in this context also demonstrates the development of a 
comprehensive and strong community, concentrates the importance of cooperative 
security, advancement of confidence building measures and final, evidences the 
creation of partnership among the members. In the table below I provide a 
summation of the relations between the security community practices and counter-
migration activities by the EU and NATO. The relations determine the extent of 
security community expansion exhibited in counter-migration initiatives, through 
the prism of the security community framework. 
 Repertoire of Practices Counter-migration operations 
1.  Cooperative security is indivisible 
and comprehensive. 
The implementation of Eunavfor Med Operation 
Sophia: 
• The mandate of Operation Sophia is to 
disrupt business model of human 
trafficking in the Mediterranean. In doing 
so, this operation built close cooperation 
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with other agencies such as Frontex, 
NATO and Libyan authorities for 
information exchange, training and 
exercises and capacity building project. 
 
The establishment of Operation Sea Guardian by 
NATO to provide support to Operation Sophia: 
• NATO pledged to enhance cooperation 
with the EU to address the migration 
crisis. Such cooperative-security includes 
intelligence sharing, logistics support, and 
capacity building. 
• EU and NATO also conducting 
surveillance and monitoring activities 
together in the Mediterranean to disrupt 
smugglers networks. 
 
The establishment of Frontex and cooperation with 
other member states. 
• Under the aegis of Frontex, several joint 
operations were conducted to deal with 
migration crisis and people smuggling. 
• For instance, JO Triton was created 
mainly to provide assistance and support 
for Italian authorities with border 
surveilance, operational assistance and 
information sharing on the human 
smuggling networks. 
2.  Disposition towards creation of 
partnerships, transnational security 
dialogues, or the constitutions of 
regions. 
The establishment of Frontex: 
• Frontex is the main agency of EU 
responsible to ensure coordination among 
all EU members in managing their 
external borders. 
• For that purpose, national borders and 
coast guards form parts of Frontex with 
designated tasks to provide support for the 
member states. The formation of 
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partnerships within Frontex between the 
EU member states demonstrate the 
expansion of security community 
practices in counter-migration initiatives. 
3.  Changes in military planning and the 
implementation of confidence 
building measures (military 
cooperation, joint planning and 
exercises, intelligence exchanges, 
policy coordination and unfortified 
borders) 
The establishment of Frontex: 
• Frontex conducted various joint 
operations, including, among others, JO 
Triton and JO Nautilus to provide 
assistance for the EU member states to 
deal with migration crisis. 
• Frontex also conducted training and 
exercises with naval forces and border 
guards of the member states to enhance 
their capabilities in border surveillance 
and patrolling at sea. 
 
The adoption of surveillance system EUROSUR: 
• The adoption of EUROSUR includes 
capacity-building measures such as 
tracking and detection system to 
effectively monitor the situation at sea. 
• EUROSUR also provides information 
exchanges between the member states to 
allow rapid response in detecting and 
intercepting irregular migrants at sea. 
 
7.4 The Academic Contribution  
This thesis explores maritime security study into greater details with an expanding 
literature on transboundary threats and maritime security community framework. 
The thesis focuses on terrorism and irregular migration as the main subjects of the 
study, and subsequently explores the relations between security community 
framework with the maritime practices in counter-terrorism and counter-migration 
activities. The security community framework formulated in Chapter two is an 
analytical tool, which has been used broadly to analyse the expansion of security 
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community practices in counter-terrorism and counter-migration initiatives in the 
Mediterranean Sea. By deploying the repertoire of practices while conducting the 
research, the findings were able to determine the extent to which this framework 
has been exhibited in maritime security practices by the EU and NATO to 
combatting terrorism and irregular migration. In other ways, the framework was 
intended to explain the relations between security community practices and 
maritime security activities in the Mediterranean. By applying the framework 
within counter-terrorism and counter-migration studies, I was able to further 
develop the broader security community framework for future research in security 
studies, notably in maritime security studies. 
  The thesis has refined the concept of maritime security communities. 
While previous research primarily concentrated on the traditional theories such as 
realism and liberalism to discuss maritime security (Germond 2015: 3), this thesis 
provided novelty in maritime studies by developing a security community 
framework to understand states’ behaviour and level of cooperation in conflict 
resolution. The case studies of counter-terrorism and counter-migration policies 
provide detailed analysis of maritime security practices of the EU and NATO in 
the Mediterranean Sea. Liberalism approach has dominated the discussion of 
cooperative-security and the construction of institutions to encourage cooperation 
between states as its core tenet. However, the thesis has introduced nuance and 
alternative theoretical framework, security community which adept to explain the 
high level of communication and cooperation between international institutions 
and interstates interactions.  
 On the one hand, realist theories posit that war is always expected, based 
on the assumptions of anarchy and self-interest of states. Realists argue that it is 
uncertain how shared identity will be able to prevent conflict among states.215 
Nevertheless, neorealists espouse that war may be absent temporarily when the 
balance of power, alliances, hegemonies and deterrence are present (Adler and 
																																								 																				
215 Stephen Walt explicitly rejects the proposition that anarchy may help states to overcome fears. 
He proposed that it is very unclear how a shared ‘civic identity’ will inhibit conflict among states. 
Walt also proposed that groups sharing similar traits and identity are more difficult to resolve a 
problem among them (Stephen Walt, “Commentary: Is There a Logic of the West?” World Policy 
Journal 11 (Spring 1994), pp. 118). 
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Barnett 1996: 69). Neoliberals on the other hand propose that cooperation 
between states is very likely to develop when states construct institutions to 
pursue their mutual interests.216 Nevertheless they are still incapable to switch 
from rationalism, rather they are sceptical towards the possibility to construct a 
community through shared identities. As a result, much of international relations 
theory is reluctant to consider the possibility of community because these theories 
argue that it is uncertain how shared identity can prevent conflict between states 
(Adler and Barnett 1996: 72). Hence these traditional theories always dominated 
the discipline of security studies in general, and maritime studies specifically. 
This thesis however introduced an alternative framework to explain the absence of 
war and the possibility of cooperation through community members whose shared 
mutual trust and interests. The security community framework emphasises the 
notion that war between states is unlikely due to the integration of a group of 
people who share similar interests and identities. This group of people develop a 
‘sense of community’ which ensures that disputes and social problems should be 
resolved through a ‘peaceful change’. In other ways, the security community 
framework applied in this thesis has favourably introduced alternative notions and 
challenges the traditional assumptions of war and conflicts to better understand 
the absence of war, cooperation between institutions and interstate interactions for 
security situation in maritime domain. By developing this process, my research 
has contributed to the broader debate of the maritime security communities with 
the empirical study of counter-terrorism and counter-migration in the 
Mediterranean Sea. 
 The thesis has also contributed to the academic field notably by extending 
literature of security dynamics in the maritime domain. Regardless of extensive 
existing research on transnational crime, they were however focused primarily on 
land-oriented issues. Conversely, maritime security studies are still insufficiently 
researched in which scholars academia give very little attention to the maritime 
security agenda in comparison to land security issues (Germond 2015b: 3). To 
date, very few studies are available which address the transnational threats in the 
																																								 																				
216 The seminal work is, respectively Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1977). 
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maritime domain. For instance, studies on terrorism are widely discussed as they 
pose an absolute threat to the security of the states, however these are primarily 
land-oriented discussions. With the expansion of transnational threats related to 
the maritime domain such as irregular migration, terrorism, piracy and smuggling 
activities, it is essential to extend a study on maritime security agenda. 
Considering the growing potential of terrorism at or from the sea notably after 
several evident cases of hijacking and terrorist act from terrorist organisations at 
sea, it is crucial to broaden security studies beyond traditional land-centric 
analyses but to include it within maritime security studies agenda. Although more 
studies on maritime security have been conducted in other regions, Southeast Asia 
for instance, studies on maritime security threats in the Mediterranean Sea is still 
insufficient.  
On another note, the thesis helped bring the study of maritime security into 
a broader context with wider literature on maritime security actors. Preceding 
research by Basil Germond (2015)217 for instance explores the maritime 
dimension of European with a particular focus on the EU. Meanwhile, Niklas 
Bremberg (2016)218 in his recent work study, the security community-building in 
the Western Mediterranean focuses on EU crisis management. Contrary to their 
outstanding works, this thesis suggests nuance in the maritime security agenda, by 
extending literature on other security actors in the maritime dimension of 
European security, through NATO. This demonstrates that maritime dimension of 
European security, particularly Mediterranean is not restricted to the EU dynamics 
alone, but also interrelated with NATO.   
 This thesis therefore aided to fill the loopholes in maritime security 
studies. The thesis provides comprehensive research on major maritime threats at 
present, namely terrorism and irregular migration at or from the sea. The thesis 
offered extensive discussion of what the broader security situation is in the 
maritime domain, with particular attention to evaluate what actors actually do to 
																																								 																				
217 See Basil Germond, The Maritime Dimension of European Security: Seapower and the 
European Union (Basingtoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015). 
218 See Niklas Bremberg, Diplomacy and Security Community-Building: EU Crisis Management in 
the Western Mediterranean (London: Routledge, 2016). 
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enhance maritime security. Moreover, the thesis demonstrates the interactions and 
cooperation of the security actors involved in managing maritime threats in the 
Mediterranean Sea. Based on the conclusions in the case studies analysis and 
findings from empirical research, it demonstrates how the perception of European 
countries towards security threats in maritime domain may affect the security of 
their nations and its citizens. It also demonstrates approaches and initiatives which 
have been adopted in dealing with the threats, and ultimately enhances maritime 
security and the safety of its people. 
 The research scrutinises the maritime security concept and demonstrates 
the roles of security actors in the maritime domain to enhance maritime security. 
Existing research on maritime security discusses various security issues and 
challenges in the maritime domain, nevertheless very little unravel what security 
actors actually do to address these issues. When analysing the framework, the case 
studies revealed how the security community practices explains the response of 
the EU and NATO in the maritime domain. In other ways, the maritime security 
community framework evaluates how actors collaborate in maritime security and 
the extent to which the states would engage with other security actors to enhance 
maritime security. The maritime security community framework also explores a 
set of practices of maritime activities that take place in the Mediterranean Sea. In 
these case studies, findings demonstrate the maritime activities which involved 
the EU and NATO to combat terrorism and irregular migration as well as human 
trafficking at sea. Such activities include joint exercises, maritime surveillance, 
legal enforcement activities such as apprehended and extradition, legal 
instruments, capacity building, military cooperation and adoption of maritime 
strategies. The thesis also demonstrates how these maritime security practices 
contribute to the ideal concept of maritime security community through the 
implementation of various maritime practices as mentioned above. Empirical 
studies have demonstrated what NATO and EU actually do in order to combat 
maritime terrorism and tackle irregular migration in the Mediterranean, and 
eventually provide evident understanding of how much has been done to manage 
the maritime security in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, the thesis has provide 
substantial understanding of how security community practices within maritime 
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initiatives serve as an important sources of community-building in the 
Mediterranean Sea. 
7.5 Maritime Security and the Future Research Agenda 
In this thesis, I have focused on two case studies, the threats of terrorism and 
irregular migration in the Mediterranean Sea. Also, the second case study of 
irregular migration provides extensive discussions of human smuggling and 
trafficking networks in the Mediterranean Sea. There is, nevertheless, also another 
set of lessons for future research that can be drawn in security challenges in the 
Mediterranean Sea. Future case studies could include other emerging threats such 
as trafficking of arms and drugs. Drug trafficking has become a more pressing 
issue in Europe, in which Europe has long served as an important corridor for 
illicit drug trafficking routes from other world regions owing to its geographical 
location and large production and consumer markets. Most drugs, particularly 
heroin trafficked to the Europe is originally from Afghanistan via the Balkan route 
(Delicato 2010a: 2). For geographical reasons, Spain has become a major point of 
entry for cannabis, which is produced largely in Morocco. Consequently, the 
Strait of Gibraltar has become a hot spot of the trafficking route for cannabis to 
Europe. In addition, with the increasing European demand for high value drugs, 
the risk of intensification of drug smuggling has become a security hazard for the 
EU. As for the Netherlands, it remains as a redistribution centre for heroin coming 
via the Balkan route. Meanwhile, Greece has become a major entry point for 
heroin to the EU from Bulgaria (Frontex 2013: 46). Therefore, possible future 
case studies could include the EU and NATO policies and initiatives to fight 
against drug trafficking in Europe via the sea, and also to what extent is drug 
trafficking could become a threat to the European countries. 
 A second, slightly different approach on collective collaboration in the 
Mediterranean Sea can be drawn. The thesis concentrated on the EU and NATO 
approaches to combat the threats of terrorism and irregular migration, 
respectively. It is, nevertheless, essential to examine the relationships of North-
South states of the Mediterranean region in addressing maritime threats in the 
Mediterranean. Other than initiatives from the EU and NATO as an organisation, 
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it is also useful to explore the policies of these states either individually or 
bilaterally to combat terrorism and tackle migration crisis in the Mediterranean 
Sea. The growing North-South dynamics, with more developed North on the one 
hand, and more unstable South in terms of politics, economy and social on the 
other, has changed the security policy consideration in the region and potential for 
future cooperation in the Mediterranean (Kinacioglu 2000: 27). The two shores, 
though interdependent, always developed a suspicious and distrust between each 
other which made cooperation seem very unlikely to materialise (Germond and 
Grove 2010: 9). Therefore, this analysis is useful in understanding the limitations 
and challenges underlying the cooperation between North-South countries in the 
region. Therefore, future research could include the cooperation between North-
South in managing maritime issues and the extent to which distrust could 
undermine the cooperation between each other. 
 After a comprehensive research conducted to analyse the policies of the 
EU and NATO in their counter-terrorism and counter-migration in the 
Mediterranean Sea, the findings led for a new possible question. The question lies 
at the thought of what are the possibility for collective collaboration between the 
EU and NATO in the maritime domain particularly in the Mediterranean Sea, in 
this case. As previously discussed in chapter five and six, I examined closely the 
approaches of EU and NATO individually in combatting terrorism and irregular 
migration. Nevertheless, I began to encounter cooperation between the EU and 
NATO in the Mediterranean, particularly for counter-migration initiatives. 
Although very limited, there is an opportunity for closer cooperative-security 
between NATO and EU and they are also signaling that cooperation in combatting 
maritime threats is definitely beneficial to enhance the efficiency of their 
operations. For that reason, future studies on EU-NATO relations in the 
Mediterranean Sea will be able to further develop the roles of these security actors 
to safeguard maritime security.  
 A fourth possible way forward for future research would be to take a 
comparative approach, by which the framework used in this thesis could be 
applied to study maritime security in the other region. The Mediterranean Sea is 
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linked to adjacent maritime theatres, which have their own security dynamics. 
Therefore, the security issues in the region are strongly interrelated (Germond and 
Grove 2010: 11). On the one hand, possible future case studies could include 
maritime security in the Africa region, due to its geographical reason. 
Geographically located adjacent to the Mediterranean Sea, the Horn of Africa is 
grappling with piracy problems and recorded the highest case of piracy and 
robbery at sea (Germond and Grove 2010: 11). The Horn of Africa is often seen 
as a hot spot of maritime threats in the world and the problems in that region may 
affect security and stability of the Mediterranean. From a comparative 
perspective, the research question could include the extent to which organisations 
in the region engage and promote cooperative security practices among its 
community members. For that reason, it is particularly advantageous to explore 
further the security dynamics in that region and compare the roles of security 
actors in the region to address the security threats. On the other hand, Southeast 
Asia has also been confronted with massive migration flows from the neighboring 
countries, which can be seen as a similar situation as in the Mediterranean Sea. 
The migration crisis in Southeast Asia is nothing new and they have been 
grappling with this crisis for years. Countries like Malaysia, Indonesia and 
Thailand have been offering assistance for the refugees, including providing the 
migrants shelter and humanitarian assistance. Therefore, future studies could 
study the comparison between approaches adopted between Southeast Asia and 
Europe to stop this long-running migration crisis. By developing this study, it is 
beneficial to discover the most effective approaches to resolve the outflow of 
irregular migrants and disrupt transnational crime network, both in Southeast Asia 
and Europe. Also, the comparative studies may benefit for security community 
research as we can analyse the process of security community expansion in these 
different regions within their maritime security practices. 
 The concept of maritime security communities is an ideal form to study 
cooperation between security actors in maritime dimension. In order to analyse 
the spread of security community practices in the Mediterranean Sea, it is 
essential to first understand how security communities today work. The expansion 
of the maritime security agenda is now beyond the traditional concept of security, 
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particularly with the resurgence of transboundary maritime related issues. To this 
end, the efforts to tackle non-military and transnational threats are no longer 
restricted within the traditional frame of ‘realist’ analytical framework, which 
primarily focus on states’ naval capabilities, but rather promote the spread of 
cooperative security practices. This can be seen clearly from various initiatives 
and approaches at sea. The point that this thesis makes is that practicing collective 
security as a way to manage maritime threats may help to evaluate how actors 
collaborate collectively in the Mediterranean Sea. Regional cooperation in the 
Mediterranean has benefited from the creation of varied EU and NATO 
instruments, including maritime strategies and operations at sea. This means that 
the advancement of cooperative-security, partnerships and confidence building 
measures as being explored in the thesis have demonstrated the expansion of 
security community practices through maritime initiatives of counter-terrorism 
and counter-migration enacted by the EU and NATO, which ultimately promote 
the community-building in the Mediterranean Sea. 
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